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Abstract
This dissertation concerns the computational interpretation of analysis via proof interpre-
tations, and examines the variants of bar recursion that have been used to interpret the
axiom of choice. It consists of an applied and a theoretical component.
The applied part contains a series of case studies which address the issue of understand-
ing the meaning and behaviour of bar recursive programs extracted from proofs in analysis.
Taking as a starting point recent work of Escardo´ and Oliva on the product of selection
functions, solutions to Go¨del’s functional interpretation of several well known theorems
of mathematics are given, and the semantics of the extracted programs described. In
particular, new game-theoretic computational interpretations are found for weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma for Σ01-trees and for the minimal-bad-sequence argument.
On the theoretical side several new definability results which relate various modes of
bar recursion are established. First, a hierarchy of fragments of system T based on finite
bar recursion are defined, and it is shown that these fragments are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the usual fragments based on primitive recursion. Secondly, it is shown that
the so called ‘special’ variant of Spector’s bar recursion actually defines the general one.
Finally, it is proved that modified bar recursion (in the form of the implicitly controlled
product of selection functions), open recursion, update recursion and the Berardi-Bezem-
Coquand realizer for countable choice are all primitive recursively equivalent in the model
of continuous functionals.
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Preface
The last century has seen a sweeping change in the central goals of metamathematics.
Starting with Hilbert’s metamathematical program of the 1930s, which was broadly con-
cerned with providing a finitary justification for modern mathematical methods, logic and
proof theory have experienced a gradual shift of emphasis away from foundational prob-
lems and towards applications in mainstream mathematics and computer science. Today
this new direction is embodied by research programs such as the proof mining program,
or the formalisation of mathematics in theorem provers.
In line with this shift of emphasis is a change in the way that we view traditional
metamathematical tools and techniques. Good examples of this phenomenon are proof
interpretations such as Go¨del’s functional interpretation: originally developed to establish
relative consistency results, they have since been reoriented to extract constructive infor-
mation from non-constructive proofs, leading in particular to new and improved results in
several areas of mathematics.
In this dissertation we study bar recursive functional interpretations of analysis. We
examine the meaning and behaviour of bar recursive programs extracted from proofs, and
clarify the relationship between the different variants of bar recursion. Our modest aim is
to acquire a better understanding of proof interpretations and their associated modes of
recursion, but in doing so we hope to take a small step towards making metamathematical
methods more accessible and applicable in mathematics itself.
xi
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CHAPTER
ONE
Introduction
Proof interpretations are powerful tools that allow us to make computational sense of non-
constructive ideas in mathematics. They have their origin in Hilbert’s program where they
were initially developed in order to obtain relative consistency proofs. However, in the
1950s Kreisel advocated the use of proof interpretations to systematically extract realizers
for existential theorems, through ‘unwinding’ computational information hidden in the
logical structure of their proofs. It is this feature that forms the basis of most modern
applications of proof interpretations, although their significance in this respect has only
become fully appreciated since the 1990s and the advent of the proof mining program, in
which refinements of Go¨del’s functional interpretation have been applied to obtain new
quantitative results in several areas of mathematics, including numerical analysis and
ergodic theory.
Despite these achievements, in many ways we still understand surprisingly little about
the action of proof interpretations and what they tell us about the semantics of classical
proofs. Realizers extracted from all but the most trivial proofs are highly complex -
their meaning often obscured beneath a heavy layer of syntax. This is particularly true
when analysing proofs that involve choice or comprehension principles: these are typically
interpreted using some variant of bar recursion, and appreciating the resulting realizer on
a ‘mathematical’ level can be quite difficult.
The central theme that runs through this dissertation is to gain a better understanding
of bar recursion and its role in extracting computational content from proofs in mathe-
matical analysis. We organise our work into two parts. In the first part we present a
series of case studies in which we use Go¨del’s functional interpretation extract and anal-
yse bar recursive realizers from several well-known non-constructive principles. Our aim
is to describe how these realizers work, and how they relate to the non-constructive ideas
they interpret. The second part is more abstract, and focuses on the relationship between
different variants of bar recursion. We establish a number of new definability results, and
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combining these with existing research manage to classify most of the well-known known
modes of bar recursion used in proof theory into two main groups according to whether
they are equivalent to Spector’s bar recursion, or modified bar recursion.
1.1 The computational content of proofs in classical analysis
The computational meaning of non-constructive proofs is an issue that lies at the heart of
mathematical logic and theoretical computer science, and one which has been continually
studied in one form or another since the early twentieth century. By now there exists
a plethora of elegant solutions to this problem along with corresponding methods for
extracting computational content from classical proofs. These include traditional methods
such as cut elimination and Hilbert’s ε-calculus, more recent interpretations of classical
logic in terms of game semantics [8, 22], or learning procedures [3, 4], and last but not least
proof interpretations, which include Go¨del’s functional interpretation combined with the
negative translation [37], and intuitionistic realizability combined with the A-translation
[34, 54].
In this dissertation we focus largely on just one of these methods, Go¨del’s functional in-
terpretation, and in the context of its computational interpretation of full classical analysis.
A few years after the publication of Go¨del’s original paper on the functional interpretation
of Peano arithmetic in the system T of primitive recursive functionals, Spector extended
the functional interpretation to classical analysis by adding to system T constants for bar
recursion, a new form of recursion over well-founded trees that solves the functional in-
terpretation of the double-negation shift, and therefore allows the interpretation of both
countable and countable dependent choice [86].
To date, relatively few concrete examples of program extraction involving Spector’s
bar recursion exist in the literature, and those that do (e.g. [49, 78]) are generally less
concerned with the semantics of these realizers and more with their contribution to the
complexity of bounds extracted for Π2-theorems. However, by making an effort to un-
derstand the semantics of bar recursion we create the opportunity to gain genuine insight
into the constructive meaning of the central principles of mathematical analysis.
Unfortunately, in practice, extracting meaningful computational content from non-
trivial proofs can pose quite a challenge. We are required to formalise a proof to some
extent before we can apply a proof interpretation, and in doing so we convert it from
intuitive day-to-day mathematical language to the more abstruse syntax of formal logic.
As a result, our extracted realizer often ends up as a complex higher-type term that reflects
this formal proof as opposed to the mathematical one. Identifying the salient features of
the realizer and ‘decoding’ it so that it can be read and understood as a constructive proof
in the language of mathematics is a difficult task, especially so when our realizer involves
non-trivial forms of recursion such as bar recursion.
2
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The first part of this dissertation concentrates on making sense, in qualitative terms,
of bar recursive realizers extracted from classical proofs, through a small collection of
case studies. Our main tool is to use Spector’s bar recursion in the form of the recently
developed product of selection functions [29, 30] which also computes optimal strategies
in a class of sequential games and allows us to impose onto our realizers an intuitive game
semantics.
In our first and shortest case study (Chapter 6) we analyse the simple bar recursive
realizer of arithmetic comprehension for Σ01-formulas. As well as making explicit the game
semantics of this realizer, we give a description of its operational behaviour and show that
it carries out an intuitive ‘learning process’ in the course of constructing an approximation
to the comprehension function.
We then move on to weak Ko¨nig’s lemma for Σ01-formulas (Chapter 7), and extract
realizers for this principle that can be clearly described in game-theoretic terms. As
an application we give intuitive computational interpretations to simple instances of the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and Ramsey’s theorem for pairs, both of which have been
recently analysed in the context of proof mining [55, 57, 78].
Finally, in our most intricate case study (Chapter 8) we extract a new realizer for the
functional interpretation of the minimal-bad-sequence argument for arbitrary well-founded
relations, using symbols R< for transfinite recursion to interpret the least element principle.
We show that our realizer can be clearly understood as a finitary analogue of the minimal-
bad-sequence construction that implements backtracking and well-founded recursion to
build an approximation to a minimal bad sequence. We then recall Berger’s concise open
recursive solution to the realizability interpretation of the classically equivalent principle
of open induction, and discuss the possibility of devising a new form of open recursion
that realizes the functional interpretation of both open induction and the minimal-bad-
sequence argument. We conclude with an application in which we extract a new realizer
for Higman’s lemma.
1.2 Comparing variants of bar recursion
Following Spector’s fundamental work on bar recursion, several alternative forms of bar
recursion over well-founded trees have been developed, typically to give computational
interpretations to analysis in new situations. These variants of bar recursion differ in
interesting ways.
While Spector’s bar recursion involves an explicit stopping condition ϕ(ŝ) < |s|, vari-
ants of bar recursion given in [8] and [11] that witnesses realizability interpretations of
countable dependent choice are implicitly well-founded by a continuity argument. More
radical departures from bar recursion exist in the form of the so-called BBC functional
[8] which involves out a symmetric ‘demand driven’ algorithm, or Berger’s open recursion
3
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[10] which carries out recursion over lexicographic orderings on sequences.
The theoretical part of the dissertation concerns the classification of modes of bar
recursion according to whether or not they are interdefinable. We establish several new
definability results.
Chapter 10 focuses on finite bar recursion and its relationship to Go¨del’s primitive
recursive functionals. We define a hierarchy of fragments of system T based on finite bar
recursion and show that they are in one-to-one correspondence with the usual fragments
based on restricted primitive recursion.
In the original paper on bar recursion [86] Spector defines a general instance of bar
recursion GBR but points out that only a restricted form SBR is necessary to interpret
classical analysis. Chapter 11 contains a short proof that actually, SBR is strong enough
to primitive recursively define GBR, and so the two are equivalent over system T.
Our main contribution, in Chapter 12, is to prove that open recursion, update recursion
and the symmetric BBC functional are all primitive recursively equivalent to the implicitly
iterated product of selection functions, which as shown in [30] is equivalent to modified
bar recursion. These results are the first to relate the ‘sequential’ variants of bar recursion
which include modified bar recursion and the product of selection functions to the ‘open
recursive’ variants which include open recursion and the BBC functional.
1.3 Overview of the dissertation
We now give a concise map of the dissertation as a whole, and provide details of the col-
laborations involved in its authorship.
Part I consists of standard background material.
• Chapter 2 contains an outline of the formal systems of arithmetic and analysis used
in the dissertation and contains a list of our notational conventions.
• Chapter 3 forms a short introduction to Go¨del’s functional interpretation, together
with some concrete illustrations.
• Chapter 4 contains several crucial results on Spector’s bar recursion that will be
needed in later chapters.
Part II contains our practical contributions on the extraction of realizers from proofs in
classical analysis.
• Chapter 5 reviews the product of selection functions as defined by Escardo´ and
Oliva. We introduce a new sequential variant of dependent choice that will be
required in Chapter 8 and show that it is naturally interpreted by the dependent
product of selection functions.
4
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• Chapter 6 is concerned with the functional interpretation of Σ01-arithmetical com-
prehension. We show that the usual bar recursive realizer of comprehension can be
characterised in terms of a learning-process.
• Chapter 7 focuses on the computational content of Σ01-WKL. We extract game-
theoretic realizers for the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and Ramsey’s theorem as
applications. This chapter was done jointly with Paulo Oliva and is published as
[68, 69].
• Chapter 8 examines the computational content of the minimal-bad-sequence argu-
ment. We extract a bar recursive realizer from its classical proof, and later consider
an new, direct realiser in terms of open recursion. We give a new computational in-
terpretation of Higman’s lemma as an application. This chapter forms an extended
version of [74].
Part III contains our theoretical contributions on the interdefinability of variants of bar
recursion.
• Chapter 9 provides a uniform presentation of the variants of bar recursion consid-
ered in subsequent chapters and summarises known definability results.
• Chapter 10 focuses on finite bar recursion. We define a hierarchy of fragments
of system T based on finite bar recursion and proves they are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with the usual fragments based on primitive recursion. We also calibrate
which fragments are needed to interpret bounded collection axioms. This chapter is
based on joint work with Mart´ın Escardo´ and Paulo Oliva published in [32].
• Chapter 11 consists of a proof that Spector’s general form of bar recursion GBR
can be defined from the special form SBR. This is result is joint work with Paulo
Oliva, and published in [70].
• Chapter 12 contains a proof that the BBC functional, update recursion, open recur-
sion and the product of selection functions IPS are primitive recursively equivalent
in the type-structures of continuous functionals. This amounts to showing that IPS
defines open recursion, and BBC defines IPS.
1.4 List of publications
The following publications contain some of the research reported in this dissertation.
[32] System T and the product of selection functions
Proceedings of Computer Science Logic (CSL’11), LIPIcs 12:233-247, 2011. (with
Mart´ın Escardo´ and Paulo Oliva)
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[68] A constructive interpretation of Ramsey’s theorem via the product
of selection functions
To appear: Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 2013. (with Paulo Oliva)
[69] A game-theoretic interpretation of proofs in classical analysis
To appear: Gentzen Centenary Volume, 2013. (with Paulo Oliva)
[70] On Spector’s bar recursion
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 58(4-5):356-365, 2012. (with Paulo Oliva)
[74] Applying Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation to obtain a constructive
proof of Higman’s lemma
Proceedings of Classical Logic and Computation (CL&C’12), EPTCS 97:49-62, 2012.
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TWO
Formal Theories
We begin with a brief outline of the formal systems that are involved in this dissertation.
Everything in this chapter is entirely standard, and the reader is directed to e.g. [18, 48, 90]
for further details. Our main purpose here is to allow the reader to become familiar with
the specific notation and conventions that will be used in subsequent chapters.
2.1 First order Heyting and Peano arithmetic
The language L(HA) of intuitionistic, or Heyting arithmetic HA contains the standard
logical constants, along with number variables x, y, z, . . ., a non-logical constant 0, a unary
function symbol S and function symbols for all primitive recursive functions, along with
a binary predicate = for equality between numbers. The axioms and rules of HA consist
of the usual axioms and rules of intuitionistic logic, axioms for S and =, defining axioms
for the primitive recursive functions and finally the axiom schema of induction
IND : A(0) ∧ ∀m(A(m)→ A(m+ 1))→ ∀mA(m)
where A is any formula in L(HA). Classical, or Peano arithmetic PA is obtained from HA
by adding the law of excluded middle for arbitrary formulas.
Fragments of Peano arithmetic
One can construct a variety of fragments of arithmetic based on restricted induction or
restricted forms of other strong axioms. Alternatives to induction include the axiom
schema of finite choice
FAC : ∀i ≤ m∃xA(i, x)→ ∃s∀i ≤ mA(i, si),
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where s is a finite sequence of numbers of length m + 1 (suitably encoded as a single
number), or the more widely used bounded collection axiom
BC : ∀i ≤ m∃xA(i, x)→ ∃t∀i ≤ m∃x ≤ tA(i, x).
The proof theory of Peano arithmetic and its fragments forms a rich and extensive area
of research (see [18] for an introduction). In this dissertation the fragments of arithmetic
will only feature in Chapter 10, and we restrict ourselves to presenting only some basic
facts here.
Definition 2.1. The class of bounded formulas ∆0 consists of all formulas that are quantifier-
free save for the bounded quantifiers ∀i ≤ t and ∃i ≤ t. The classes of Πn and Σn formulas
are defined inductively for all n ≥ 0 as follows:
(i) Π0 = Σ0 = ∆0;
(ii) Πn+1 consists of all formulas of the form ∀xA where A is a Σn-formula and x is a
possibly empty tuple of variables;
(iii) Σn+1 consists of all formulas of the form ∃xA where A is a Πn-formula and x is a
possibly empty tuple of variables.
Definition 2.2 (Fragments of arithmetic). The axiom schema Φ-IND denotes the axiom of
induction restricted to Φ-formulas, where Φ is any of the classes defined in Definition 2.1.
The axioms Φ-FAC and Φ-BC are defined similarly.
• A weak induction-free fragment of arithmetic PA0 is usually defined to contain only
some basic non-logical symbols 0, S, +, · and ≤ and their defining axioms, along
with ∆0-IND (there are various ways of formulating PA0 precisely, among the most
commonly used is Robinson’s theory Q [89]).
• For n ≥ 1 the theories IΣn, FΣn and BΣn consist of PA0 along with symbols and
defining axioms for all primitive recursive functions, plus the axiom Σn-IND, Σn-FAC
and Σn-BC respectively. The theories IΠn, FΠn and BΠn are defined analogously.
• Full Peano arithmetic PA consists of PA0 plus all primitive recursive functions, along
with induction for arbitrary formulas (or equivalently - by Theorem 2.3 - finite choice
or bounded collection for arbitrary formulas).
Theorem 2.3. Let S ⊆ T mean that every theorem of T is a theorem of S, and write
S = T if the converse also holds. Then IΣn = IΠn, FΣn+1 = FΠn and BΣn+1 = BΠn.
Moreover
(a) FΠn = BΠn,
10
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(b) BΠn ⊆ IΣn+1 but IΣn+1 * BΠn,
(c) IΣn ⊆ BΠn but BΠn * IΣn.
Proof. First proved in [71] and [72] (item (a) is due to [83]). See [18] for details.
Theorem 2.3 shows that PA contains two strictly interleaving hierarchies, those based
on induction and those based on finite choice/collection respectively.
PA0 IΣnoo OO

BΠnoo OO

FΠn//oo OO

IΣn+1oo OO

PAoo
IΠn BΣn+1 oo // FΣn+1 IΠn+1
Figure 2.1: Fragments of Peano arithmetic (where A→ B denotes A ⊇ B)
2.2 Extensional Heyting and Peano arithmetic in all finite types
In most of this dissertation we work in a standard higher-type extension of Peano arith-
metic. This enables us to properly formalize proofs in mathematics, and to describe and
reason about the higher-type forms of recursion needed to give these proofs a computa-
tional interpretation. The finite types are generated inductively as
types := N | ρ→ τ | ρ× τ | ρ∗
where ρ→ τ (which we may also write as τρ) is the type of functions mapping objects of
type ρ to objects of type τ , ρ× τ is the cartesian product of ρ and τ , and ρ∗ the type of
finite sequences whose elements have type ρ. We write xρ or x : ρ to denote that an object
x has type ρ. The degree deg(ρ) of the type ρ is defined inductively as
deg(N) := 0,
deg(ρ→ τ) := max{deg(ρ) + 1, deg(τ)}
deg(ρ× τ) := max{deg(ρ), deg(τ)},
deg(ρ∗) := deg(ρ)
It will be useful to also consider a type B of booleans, and to identify two subsets of the
finite types we which called the compact and discrete types, after [27]:
compact := B | compact× compact | discrete→ compact
discrete := B | N | discrete× discrete | discrete∗ | compact→ discrete.
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The theory E-HAω of extensional Heyting arithmetic in all finite types is based on that
described in [48, 90]. The language of E-HAω contains variables xρ, yρ, zρ, . . . and quanti-
fiers ∀/∃xρ for each type ρ, along with the non-logical constants 0, SN→N and the usual
constructors including the projector Πρ,τ and combinator Σσ,ρ,τ , basic operations for prod-
uct and sequence types, the recursors Rρ, and a binary predicate =N for equality between
numbers. Equality between objects of compound type is not taken as primitive but is
defined inductively by
f =ρ→τ g :≡ ∀xρ(fx =τ gx),
〈x0, x1〉 =ρ×τ 〈y0, y1〉 :≡ (x0 =ρ y0 ∧ x1 =τ y1),
s =ρ∗ t :≡ (|s| = |t| ∧ ∀i < |s|(si =ρ ti)).
The axioms and rules of E-HAω contain the axioms and of rules of intuitionistic logic (in
all finite types), defining axioms for each of the non-logical constants - including axioms
for the recursor
Ry,zρ (0) =ρ y
Ry,zρ (n+ 1) =ρ zn(R
y,z
ρ (n)),
axioms for =N, the axiom schema of induction
A(0) ∧ ∀m(A(m)→ A(m+ 1))→ ∀mA(m).
for any formula A, and finally the axiom of extensionality:
EXTρ,τ : ∀tρ→τ , xρ, yρ(x =ρ y → tx =τ ty).
Extensional Peano arithmetic E-PAω is obtained from E-HAω by adding the law of excluded
middle
A ∨ ¬A
for arbitrary formulas.
Remark 2.4. We could have alternatively constructed E-HAω over minimal collection types
containing only N and function types ρ → τ , and encoded the types ρ × τ and ρ∗ as
secondary constructions.
Remark 2.5. Tuples of variables xρ0 , . . . , xρn will always we regarded as a single variable
x : ρ0 × . . .× ρn.
Remark 2.6. In the context of finite types Σmn (Π
m
n )-formulas are Σn(Πn)-formulas whose
quantifiers are of type degree at most m.
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Weakly extensional Heyting and Peano arithmetic
The weakly extensional variants WE-HAω (WE-PAω) of E-HAω (E-PAω) have the axiom of
extensionality EXT replaced by the following rule of extensionality
QF-ER :
A0 → s =ρ t
A0 → r[s/x] =τ r[t/x]
where A0 is quantifier-free and s, t, r are arbitrary terms.
Features of (W)E-HAω
For a detailed account of the properties of (W)E-HAω the reader is directed to [48, 90].
We recall that WE-HAω admits standard constructions such as λ-abstraction (via the
combinators Πρ,τ , Σσ,ρ,τ ), definition by cases and bounded search. If A0(x
ρ) is a quantifier-
free formula in the language of WE-HAω with free variables x, then there exists a closed
term χ : ρ→ B such that
WE-HAω ` ∀x(χ(x) =B 0↔ A0(x)).
This means that quantifier-free formulas are decidable, and can be used - via their char-
acteristic functions - as clauses in function definitions by cases. We permit quantifier-
free formulas to contain bounded quantifiers ∀/∃x ≤ t, as these can be eliminated using
bounded search.
Our theory WE-HAω contains the following terms, formulas and abbreviations:
• For each type ρ constant functions nρ for n ∈ N, defined inductively by nN := n and
nρ→τ := λx.nτ (analogously for ρ× τ , ρ∗). The term 0ρ will be taken as a canonical
element of type ρ;
• Projections pii : ρ0×ρ1 → ρi and pairing functions 〈 , 〉 : ρ0 → (ρ1 → ρ0×ρ1) for each
pair types ρ0, ρ1. Given t : ρ0 × ρ1 we write ti := piit, and sometimes for sequences
α : (ρ0 × ρ1)N we write αi := λn.piiα(n);
• Functions | · | : ρ∗ → N and ∗ : ρ∗ × ρ∗ → ρ∗ for each ρ where |s| is the length of s
and s ∗ t the concatenation of s and t. We will also use ∗ to denote the function
ρ∗ × ρN → ρN where s ∗ α is the concatenation of s with the infinite sequence α.
• An overwrite function @ : ρ∗ × ρN → ρN defined by
(s @ α)(n) :=
si if n < |s|α(n) if n ≥ |s|
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• A bounded search operator µ : BN × N→ N satisfying
µ(α, n) :=
least i ≤ n(αi = 0) if it exists0 otherwise.
• We write s ≺ t or s  t if s is a (proper) initial segment of t. We write s ≺ α if s is
an initial segment of the infinite sequence α.
• For α : ρN we define [α](n) := 〈α(0), . . . , α(n−1)〉 and for s : ρ∗ we define ŝ := s @ 0ρN .
We define α, n := [̂α](n).
• For a function q : ρN → N, we define qs : ρN → N by qs(α) := q(s ∗ α).
• For α : ρN we define tailkα := λn.α(k + n).
• The formula n ∈ [x, y) for n, x, y : N is an abbreviation for x ≤ n < y. We occasion-
ally quantify over [x, y) and write ∀/∃n ∈ [x, y), and analogously for (x, y), (x, y],
[x, y].
• The term ‘xρ if b’ of type ρ is an abbreviation for
x if b = 00ρ if b 6= 0.
Go¨del’s System T
The terms of E-HAω are better known as the terms of Go¨del’s system T, and the set-
theoretic functionals represented by the closed terms of E-HAω the primitive recursive
functionals in all finite types. Technically, the theory T as described in [37] corresponds to
a quantifier-free fragment of E-HAω, but here we will always use E-HAω to reason about
terms of T. The class Tn is the subset of T in which recursion is restricted to types of
degree ≤ n, and in particular the closed terms of T0 coincide with the ordinary primitive
recursive functions. System T substantially expands T0, the most well-known illustration
of this being the Ackermann function, which does not exist in T0 but can be easily defined
in T1.
Example 2.7 (Ackermann function). The Ackermann function A : N×N→ N has defining
equations
A(m,n)
N
:=

n+ 1 if m = 0
A(m− 1, 1) if m > 0 and n = 0
A(m− 1, A(m,n− 1)) if m > 0 and n > 0
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It can be constructed using the recursor of type N→ N as follows. Using RN define
y(n) = n+ 1
z(m,F )(n) =

F (1) if n = 0
F (z(m,F )(n− 1)) if n > 0
.
Then it is easy to check that λm, n.RN→Nyzm(n) satisfies the defining equations of the
Ackermann function.
2.3 Subsystems of analysis
We now discuss the subsystems of mathematics in all finite types which we will used in
practise to formalise mathematical proofs. These will be obtained from Peano arithmetic
in finite types by adding various choice principles.
A base system of analysis
We obtain a good base system of mathematical analysis by adding to E-PAω or WE-PAω
the axiom schema of quantifier-free choice:
QF-ACρ,τ : ∀xρ∃yτA0(x, y)→ ∃fρ→τ∀xA0(x, fx)
for A0 quantifier-free. The theory E-PA
ω + QF-ACN,N already contains the well-known
subsystem of second order arithmetic RCA0 as defined in [84], and is in fact consider-
ably stronger since RCA0 only admits induction for Σ1-formulas (on the other hand, the
fragment of E-PAω + QF-ACN,N with induction restricted to Σ1-formulas and recursion
restricted to type 0 is a conservative extension of RCA0).
Unfortunately, full extensionality becomes problematic if we want a theory of analysis
that admits a computational interpretation (see [48, Chapter 8]). In this case, unless we
are able to eliminate extensionality in some way, we are forced to work in the weakly
extensional variants of our subsystems. In this dissertation we make an effort to formalise
proofs in the weakly extensional systems, although later on in Part III we allow ourselves
full extensionality to reason about modes of higher-type recursion.
A sizeable portion of mathematics can be formalised in WE-PAω + QF-AC. Note that
in particular we can construct the rational numbers Q and the real numbers R via suitable
encodings over N and N → N respectively, define the usual operations (=Q,≤Q, =R, ≤R
etc.) and prove basic properties about them. For full details of the formalization of Q
and R within WE-HAω see [48, Chapter 4]. Here we take for granted that our base theory
allows us to use a fairly expressive mathematical language. We occasionally treat Q, R,
QN, RN etc. as types on the assumption that these ‘types’ can be encoded by a suitable
member of the usual types.
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Weak Ko¨nig’s lemma
A binary tree T is a predicate on sequences of Booleans B∗ that is prefix-closed:
∀sB∗ , tB∗(T (s ∗ t)→ T (s)).
If T (s) holds we say that s is a branch of T . Unless otherwise stated, we assume that T is
a decidable predicate. A tree is infinite if it contains branches of arbitrary length. Weak
Ko¨nig’s lemma is the statement that every infinite binary tree has an infinite branch,
given formally by the schema
WKL : ∀n∃s(|s| = n ∧ T (s))→ ∃αBN∀nT ([α](n)),
where T ranges over all decidable binary trees.
The importance of Weak Ko¨nig’s lemma lies in the fact that it allows us to construct
an ‘intermediate’ subsystem of analysis. The theory E-PAω + QF-ACN,N + WKL contains
the subsystem WKL0 central to the field of reverse mathematics, in which we are, for
instance, able to reason about Heine/Borel compactness but not sequential compactness
or completeness [84].
From the perspective of proof mining, WKL is significant because effective bounds
can still be extracted from proofs using WKL that are prima facie non-constructive (see
[48, 51]).
Full classical analysis
A strong theory of classical analysis can be achieved through the addition of the axiom
schema of countable dependent choice
DCρ : ∀n, xρ∃yρAn(x, y)→ ∀x0∃fN→ρ(f(0) = x0 ∧ ∀nAn(f(n), f(n+ 1))).
Weaker than DC is the axiom schema of countable choice
ACN,ρ : ∀n∃xρAn(x)→ ∃fN→ρ∀nAn(f(n)).
and in turn an instance of ACN,N proves the schema of full comprehension over numbers
CAN : ∃fN→N∀x(f(x)↔ A(x)).
Already E-PAω + QF-ACN,N→N + QF-ACN→N,N + CAN contains the whole of second order
arithmetic in the sense of [84], and is therefore capable of formalising most of classical
analysis. The special case of arithmetical comprehension over numbers is given by
CAar : ∃fN→N∀x(f(x)↔ Aar(x)).
where Aar is an arithmetical formula (containing only quantifiers of type level 0). The
theory E-PAω+QF-ACN,N+CAar contains the subsystem of second order arithmetic ACA0.
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Proof Interpretations
In this chapter we provide some basic background material on proof interpretations, our
main focus being on Go¨del’s functional (or ‘Dialectica’) interpretation. The reader is
encouraged to consult [5, 48, 90] for details and a much more comprehensive treatment
than that given here.
Go¨del’s functional interpretation belongs to a wider family of proof interpretations
(also including Kreisel’s modified realizability [54]) that consist of:
1. A mapping I : T → F from a theory T to a constructive system of higher-type
functionals F , under which formulas A in the language of T are mapped to formulas
of the form AI :≡ ∃xAI(x) in the language of F satisfying
A↔ ∃xAI(x)
over some reasonable theory;
2. A soundness proof for I which contains an algorithm for converting a proof p of A in
T to a constructive proof pI of AI in F , by providing a direct interpretation to the
axiom and rules of T and allowing us to unwind pI by recursion over the structure
of p. As a result, we obtain
T ` A⇒ F ` AI(t)
where t is a closed term of F that can be extracted from a given proof of A.
Go¨del had devised his functional interpretation by 1941, although it was not published
until his paper of 1958 [37], in which it is shown that Heyting and Peano arithmetic have a
functional interpretation in the primitive recursive functionals of finite type, where in the
case of Peano arithmetic one pre-composes the functional interpretation with the negative
translation. A few years later Spector extended Go¨del’s result to full classical analysis
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by demonstrating that the negative translation of the axiom of choice has a Dialectica
interpretation in the so-called bar recursive functionals of finite type [86]. These results
can be easily adapted to incorporate the weakly-extensional higher-type subsystems of
analysis based on WE-PAω + QF-AC ([90]).
classical theory interpreting theory in all finite types
pure logic λ-calculus (+ basic recursive functionals)
arithmetic primitive recursive functionals
analysis bar recursive functionals
Table 3.1: Functional interpretation of subsystems of mathematics
Proof interpretations like the functional interpretation were originally designed to ob-
tain relative consistency proofs: If T is interpreted in F then the consistency of T follows
from that of F . However, since then they have found numerous applications in proof the-
ory and in the process have been extended and refined in quite sophisticated ways. Notable
applications include the establishment of conservation and closure results, the character-
isation of provably recursive functions and - perhaps most significantly - the systematic
unwinding computational content from non-constructive proofs.
The basic idea behind the latter of these applications is that the interpretation ∃xAI(x)
represents a reformulation of A that admits a direct computational interpretation (where
in particular the interpretation of Π2-formulas ∀x∃yA0(x, y) is given by ∃f∀xA0(x, fx)).
The soundness proof gives us a means of extracting an explicit witness t for ∃x from a proof
p of A. The complexity of this witness will be restricted according to exactly what was
used in the formalisation of p, and moreover because it has been extracted directly from
the translated proof pI its syntax and behaviour will mirror in some sense the structure
of p. In other words, t carries computational information about A that reflects the fact
that that it was proved by restricted means rather than that it is simply true. A witness t
can often be extracted even when the proof p involves ineffective principles, and it is this
use of proof interpretations to extract non-trivial constructive information subtly hidden
in classical proofs that forms the basis of the proof mining program, and also forms one
of the central themes of this dissertation.
In the present chapter we review Go¨del’s functional interpretation of Peano arithmetic
in all finite types, while Spector’s interpretation of classical analysis will be dealt with in
Chapter 4. As well as defining the interpretation, we endeavour in Section 3.3 to provide
some insight into how the interpretation can be understood in intuitive terms. Finally, we
briefly discuss modified realizability and related interpretations in Section 3.4.
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3.1 The negative translation
There are several ways of constructing negative translations from classical logic to intu-
itionistic logic. The first was given by Kolmogorov [52], although variants were discovered
independently by Go¨del and Gentzen. In this chapter we give the version of Kuroda [60].
The reader is directed to [33] for more on the relationship between these different negative
translations. For proofs of the results in this section see e.g. [48, Chapter 10]. Note that
¬A :≡ A→ ⊥ as usual.
Definition 3.1 (Negative translation). Let A be a formula in a theory based on intuitionistic
logic in all finite types. The negative translation of A is defined as AN :≡ ¬¬A∗ where A∗
is defined recursively over the logical structure of A by
(i) A∗ :≡ A if A is prime,
(ii) (AB)∗ :≡ A∗B∗ where  ∈ {∧,∨,→},
(iii) (∃xρA)∗ :≡ ∃xρA∗,
(iv) (∀xρA)∗ :≡ ∀xρ¬¬A∗.
Proposition 3.2. For an arbitrary set of formulas ∆ in the language of (W)E-PAω we
have
(W)E-PAω + ∆ ` A⇒ (W)E-HAω + ∆N ` AN
where ∆N :=
{
BN : B ∈ ∆}.
Whenever the negative translation in used in practise it is useful to simplify it if possible
to avoid unnecessary double negations cluttering the formulas, and we assume familiarity
with standard laws of intuitionistic logic in this respect.
Remark 3.3. In particular, note that intuitionistic logic proves
(i) ¬¬(A→ B)↔ (A→ ¬¬B)↔ (¬¬A→ ¬¬B),
(ii) ¬¬∀x¬¬A(x)↔ ∀x¬¬A(x),
while WE-HAω proves
(iii) ¬¬A0 ↔ A0 for A0 quantifier-free.
The soundness of the negative translation can not be directly extended to our base
system WE-PAω + QF-AC because QF-ACN is not provable in WE-HAω + QF-AC. However,
QF-ACN can be derived in the semi-classical theory WE-HAω + QF-AC + MPω where MPω
is the Markov principle
MPω : ¬¬∃xρA0(x)→ ∃xA0(x)
for A0(x) quantifier-free.
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Proposition 3.4. For an arbitrary set of formulas ∆ in the language of WE-HAω we have
WE-PAω + QF-AC + ∆ ` A⇒WE-HAω + QF-AC + MPω + ∆N ` AN
where ∆N := {BN : B ∈ ∆}. For the special case where ∆ contains only purely universal
formulas ∀xρB0(x) note that ∆N is equivalent to ∆ over WE-HAω.
3.2 The functional interpretation
Go¨del’s functional interpretation, also widely known as the Dialectica interpretation, maps
formulas A to formulas of the form ∃x∀y|A|xy where x, y are (possibly empty) sequences
of variables and |A|xy is a quantifier-free formula whose free variables are x, y and the free
variables of A. We label x and y the witness and counterexample variables respectively.
The idea is that A is equivalent to ∃x∀y|A|xy , so that the functional interpretation carries
out a kind of Skolemisation. We now give the precise definition.
Definition 3.5 (Functional ‘Dialectica’ interpretation). To every formula A in the language
of WE-HAω we assign a formula AD :≡ ∃x∀y|A|xy , where |A|xy is a quantifier-free formula
defined by induction over the logical structure of A as follows.
(i) |A| :≡ A if A is prime,
(ii) |A ∧B|x,uy,v :≡ |A|xy ∧ |B|uv ,
(iii) |A ∨B|b,x,uy,v :≡ (b = 0→ |A|xy) ∧ (b 6= 0→ |B|uv ),
(iv) |A→ B|U,Yx,v :≡ |A|xY xv → |B|Uxv ,
(v) |∃tρA(t)|z,xy :≡ |A(z)|xy ,
(vi) |∀tρA(t)|Xz,y :≡ |A(z)|Xzy .
The definition of the functional interpretation is straightforward apart from the treat-
ment of implication, which is essentially its characterising feature (see e.g. [67]). We travel
from ∃x∀y|A|xy → ∃u∀v|B|uv to ∃U, Y ∀x, v|A→ B|U,Yx,v via the following equivalences:
∃x∀y|A|xy → ∃u∀v|B|uv (3.1)
↔ ∀x(∀y|A|xy → ∃u∀v|B|uv ) (3.2)
↔ ∀x∃u(∀y|A|xy → ∀v|B|uv ) (3.3)
↔ ∀x∃u∀v(∀y|A|xy → |B|uv ) (3.4)
↔ ∀x∃u∀v∃y(|A|xy → |B|uv ) (3.5)
↔ ∃U, Y ∀x∀v(|A|xY xv → |B|Uxv ). (3.6)
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While this route is non-constructive - in particular the passage from (3.2) to (3.3) requires
independence of premise IPω∀ for universal formulas:
IPω∀ : (∀yC0(y)→ ∃uD(u))→ ∃u(∀yC0(y)→ D(u)),
(for C0 quantifier-free) while (3.4) to (3.5) requires Markov’s principle MP
ω - it is never-
theless the ‘least non-constructive’ Skolemisation of implication, which is precisely why it
was chosen by Go¨del.
One way to visualise ∃x∀y|A|xy is as a game played between the quantifiers ∃loise
and ∀belard. The soundness theorem guarantees that whenever A is provable, ∃loise has
a winning strategy t satisfying ∀y|A|ty. In this sense, game representing the functional
interpretation of implication can be described as follows. First ∀belard plays a witness x
for the premise of |A|xy → |B|uv , challenging ∃loise to witness the conclusion. Once ∃loise
has responded with a witness u, ∀belard then attempts to invalidate this witness with
a counterexample v. Finally, ∃loise responds by trying to invalidate ∀belard’s original
witness with a counterexample y. The functional interpretation of implication is the
statement that ∃loise has a winning strategy U , Y in this game.
Remark 3.6. Sometimes for notational convenience we omit the final step in the functional
interpretation and give AD as a Π2 formula ∀y∃xA0(y, x) when technically AD is given by
∃X∀yA0(y,Xy).
Interpreting intuitionistic arithmetic
Go¨del’s fundamental result of 1958 is that Heyting arithmetic has a functional interpre-
tation in the system T primitive recursive functionals of finite type. His soundness proof
remains valid we extend Heyting arithmetic with any new axioms which can be also be
interpreted in system T. Further details and full proofs for this section can be found in
e.g. [48, Chapters 8, 10].
Theorem 3.7 (Soundness theorem for Heyting arithmetic [37, 90]). Let ∆ be an arbitrary
set of purely universal sentences in L(WE-PAω), and A(a) be a formula in L(WE-PAω)
containing only a free. Then
WE-HAω + AC + IPω∀ + MP
ω + ∆ ` A(a)⇒WE-HAω + ∆ ` ∀y|A(a)|t(a)y
where t is a closed term of WE-HAω which can be extracted from the proof of A.
Remark 3.8. Here, AC denotes the full axiom of choice in all types
∀xρ∃yτA(x, y)→ ∃fρ→τ∀xρA(x, fx)
so in particular includes QF-AC.
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Remark 3.9. The Dialectica interpretation is not sound for fully extensional arithmetic
E-HAω, which is a consequence of the fact that it interprets MPω (see [48, p.126]).
Outline of the proof of Theorem 3.7. Induction over the derivation of A. We illustrate
only a few important cases. Firstly we note that only a typed λ-calculus (plus a few basic
recursive functionals) is required to interpret the logical axioms and rules of WE-HAω.
The most interesting case is the contraction axiom A→ A∧A. If A is interpreted as |A|xy
we must find terms t, t′ and s satisfying
∀x, v, v′(|A|xsxvv′ → |A|txv ∧ |A|t
′x
v′ ).
It is clear that t = t′ := λx.x and
sxvv′ :=
v if ¬|A|xvv′ otherwise .
do the trick. Note that we rely on the decidability of the quantifier-free formula |A|xv . This
makes extending the functional interpretation to systems where decidability of quantifier-
free formulas cannot be taken for granted quite problematic (see e.g. Burr [17] for an
extension of the functional interpretation to set theory).
Primitive recursion is required to interpret the induction. To start with we can replace
the induction axiom IND with the equivalent induction rule
A(0) ∧ ∀n(A(n)→ A(n+ 1))
IR∀nA(n)
which makes verifying the interpretation somewhat easier. Now, suppose we have inter-
preted the premise of the rule, namely we have t, Z and S satisfying
∀y|A(0)|ty
∀n, x, y(|A(n)|xSnxy → |A(n+ 1)|Znxy ).
Then we define T0 := t and T (n+ 1) := Zn(Tn) via primitive recursion, and T satisfies
∀y|A(0)|T0y
∀y|A(n)|Tny → ∀y|A(n+ 1)|T (n+1)y .
By induction we see that ∀n, y|A(n)|Tny holds in WE-HAω, which is the functional inter-
pretation of the conclusion.
The remaining non-logical axioms and rules, including AC, IPω∀ and MP
ω, and any
additional universal sentences ∆, are trivially interpreted.
Remark 3.10. Go¨del’s original soundess proof was carried out in the quantifier-free system
T as opposed to WE-HAω, his aim being to reduce the consistency of Heyting arithmetic
to the weakest system possible.
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Interpreting classical arithmetic
The functional interpretation can be extended to classical arithmetic by precomposing the
functional interpretation proper with the negative translation. For example, by Theorem
3.7 combined with Proposition 3.2 we obtain
WE-PAω ` A⇒WE-HAω ` AN ⇒WE-HAω ` ∀y|AN|ty.
We refer to the two-step interpretation as the ND-interpretation, or sometimes just the
functional interpretation when it is clear that we are referring to its combination with the
negative translation.
Theorem 3.11 (Soundness theorem for classical arithmetic). Let ∆ be an arbitrary set of
purely universal sentences in L(WE-PAω), and A(a) be a formula in L(WE-PAω) containing
only a free. Then
WE-PAω + QF-AC + ∆ ` A(a)⇒WE-HAω + ∆ ` ∀y|A(a)N|t(a)y
where t is a closed term of WE-HAω which can be extracted from the proof of A.
Proof. By Proposition 3.4
WE-PAω + QF-AC + ∆ ` A(a)⇒WE-HAω + QF-AC + MPω + ∆ ` A(a)N,
and therefore the result follows from Theorem 3.7 applied to A(a)N.
The following fundamental result confirms that the ND-interpretation can directly
extract programs from proofs of Π2-theorems, even when those proofs are non-constructive.
Theorem 3.12 (Program extraction theorem). Let ∆ be a set of purely universal sen-
tences in L(WE-PAω), and A0(xρ, yτ ) a quantifier-free formula in L(WE-PAω) with free
variables x, y of arbitrary type. Then
WE-PAω + QF-AC + ∆ ` ∀xρ∃yτA0(x, y)⇒WE-HAω + ∆ ` ∀xA0(x, fx)
where f is a closed term of WE-HAω which can be extracted from the proof of ∀x∃yA0(x, y).
Proof. This follows from the crucial fact that the functional interpretation admits Markov’s
principle:
WE-PAω + QF-AC + ∆ ` ∀x∃yA0(x, y)
Prop.3.4⇒ WE-HAω + QF-AC + MPω + ∆ ` ∀x¬¬∃yA0(x, y)
MPω⇒ WE-HAω + QF-AC + MPω + ∆ ` ∀x∃yA0(x, y)
Thm.3.7⇒ WE-HAω + ∆ ` ∀xA0(x, fx).
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3.3 Understanding the Dialectica interpretation
The functional interpretation of classical logic translates a formula A into a variant AND ≡
∃x∀y|AN|xy that is weak enough to admit a direct computational interpretation, but still
classically equivalent to A.
Theorem 3.13 (Characterisation theorem, Kreisel [54]). We have
WE-PAω + QF-AC ` A↔ ∃x∀y|AN|xy
for any formula A in the language of WE-PAω.
While Theorem 3.13 verifies that A and AND are provably equivalent, a more intuitive
understanding of this relationship can be quite difficult to attain. The combination of
negative translation and functional interpretation is a subtle interpretation that maps
even relatively simple theorems to abstruse higher-type functionals. The action of the ND
interpretation on Π2-formulas is straightforward enough to appreciate, but on the other
hand Π3-formulas of the form A ≡ ∀uσ∃vρ∀wτA0(u, v, w) are interpreted as
∃V σ×(ρ→τ)→ρ∀uσ, pρ→τA0(u, V up, p(V up)).
which even for arithmetical formulas already contains a functional V of degree 2. So how
can we characterise the functional interpretation of A? We consider this question in three
different contexts.
(a) Proof theoretic. Firstly we can try to appreciate why A and AND are logically equiva-
lent. Suppose, for contradiction, that ¬A holds. Then by QF-AC this is equivalent to
the statement
∃u, pρ→τ∀v¬A0(u, v, pv),
where we envisage p as a ‘counterexample function’ that refutes any candidate realiser
for ∃v∀wA0(u, v, w). Therefore A is equivalent to
¬∃u, pρ→τ∀v¬A0(u, v, pv)
which in turn is equivalent to
∀u, p∃vA0(u, v, pv).
The ND interpretation of A asks for a functional V that witnesses this statement. For
each parameter u, the role of V u is to refute arbitrary counterexample functions p for
∃v∀wA0(u, v, w). This rather intuitive ‘no-counterexample’ interpretation (n.c.i.) was
studied by Kreisel in [53], where arbitrary formulas of PA are interpreted in this way by
functionals of at most degree 2. The n.c.i. coincides with the functional interpretation
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for Π3-formulas, but the two diverge for formulas of higher complexity. Unfortunately
the restriction on types for the n.c.i. has the disadvantage in that its interpretation
of implication is too weak to achieve the nice modular behaviour enjoyed by the
functional interpretation (see [47]), although the intuition behind the n.c.i. is still
beneficial when discussing the functional interpretation of relatively simple formulas.
(b) Computational. Suppose that A is an ineffective lemma used in the proof of a Π02
statement i.e.
(∗) ∀u∃v∀wA0(u, v, w)→ B :≡ ∀xN∃yNB0(x, y).
The (partial) functional interpretation of (∗) given by
∀V ∃f∀x∃u, p(A0(u, V up, p(V up))→ B0(x, fx)),
describes a way of using the functional interpretation of the ineffective lemma A in
the construction of a realizer fV : N → N for B. The idea is that while A is needed
to derive B, only an ‘approximation’ of A is required to prove ∃yB0(x, y) for fixed x.
The functional V produces approximations to A whose ‘quality’ is determined by the
parameters u, p, and the full functional interpretation of (∗) consists of the realizer fV
along with realizers uV,x, pV,x that for each x calibrate the size of the approximation to
A necessary to validate B0(x, fV x). See also [48, p.171] for a more detailed discussion
of this particular instance of the ND interpretation of implication.
(c) Mathematical. The reading of AND as a finitary approximation to A has been shown
to be particularly illuminating in some mathematical contexts, in particular it has
been observed in [48] that the functional interpretation is closely related to so called
correspondence principle as discussed in [88]. This correspondence principle refers to
the process of finitizing a ‘soft’ statement in mathematical analysis involving qualita-
tive notions such as infinite or convergent to produce an equivalent ‘hard’ statement
involving quantitative notions such as large or metastable. Roughly speaking, the for-
mer represent formulas in which the relationship between the quantifiers is hidden,
the latter formulas in which this relationship is made explicit. In logical terms the
process of finitization is essentially a shuﬄing of quantifiers so that they become de-
pendent on one another - which is precisely what the ND interpretation does. The
ND interpretation of certain theorems has been shown to coincide with the finitary
versions of those theorems used in mathematics, albeit the former phrased in terms of
higher-type functionals and the latter in terms of well-behaved set-theoretic functions.
Generally, soft statements involve quantification over some compact space K which
becomes eliminated during the finitisation process. From a proof theoretic perspec-
tive this corresponds to the ability of the monotone functional interpretation extract
bounds for realizers that are uniform with respect to K. The relationship between the
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monotone interpretation and the correspondence principle is discussed in more detail
in [36, 48].
We now illustrate our discussion of the functional interpretation with a well-known
example that has been widely studied in the context of applied proof theory.
Example 3.14 (Cauchy convergence). Suppose we have a classical proof that a sequence
(xi) is Cauchy convergent, which can be formally stated as the Π
0
3 formula
∀k∃n∀i, j ≥ n(‖xi − xj‖ ≤ 2−k), (3.7)
or alternatively, absorbing the quantifiers ∀i, ∀j into one, as
∀k∃n∀l∀i, j ∈ [n, n+ l](‖xi − xj‖ ≤ 2−k). (3.8)
The ND interpretation of (3.8) is
∃NN×(N→N)→N∀k, pN→N∀i, j ∈ [Nk,p, Nk,p + p(Nk,p)](‖xi − xj‖ ≤ 2−k). (3.9)
Following our previous discussion, one can view Nk as a functional whose job is to refute
potential counterexample functions p which seek to disprove permanent stability within
the error 2−k by exhibiting, for each n, some i, j ≥ n with ‖xi − xj‖ > 2−k.
From a slightly different perspective Nk is a functional that serves as an approxima-
tion to permanent stability of (xi), for each k producing regions [Nk,p, Nk,p + p(Nk,p)] of
metastability within error 2−k. The statement (3.9) that such regions of metastability
exist for any specified error 2−k and for arbitrary p is fully equivalent to (3.8) and con-
stitutes a finitary reformulation of the Cauchy convergence property. It turns out that
this interpretation of Cauchy convergence plays a key role in ergodic theory, whereby one
obtains quantitative versions of convergence theorems by extracting explicit bounds on N
that are in some sense uniform with respect to sequences (xi).
A simple example of this phenomenon is the monotone convergence principle, which
states that any increasing sequence of rationals 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x1 ≤ . . . ≤ 1 is Cauchy conver-
gent. This is easily formalised using classical logic: suppose for contradiction that there
exists some k such that
∀n∃m(xn+m − xn > 2−k).
Then by QF-ACN,N there exists a function p satisfying
∀n(xn+p(n) − xn > 2−k).
Defining p˜(n) := n + p(n) we see that we must have xp˜(i+1)(0) − xp˜(i)(0) ≤ 2−k for some
i ≤ 2k else x
p˜(2
k)(0)
> 1, and this contradicts the construction of p.
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It has been shown that in general there is no computable bound on the rate of con-
vergence of (xi) [85]. However, the ND interpretation (3.9) of the monotone convergence
principle is equivalent to
∃N∀k, p(xNk,p+p(Nk,p) − xNk,p ≤ 2−k), (3.10)
and from a quick inspection of our classical proof we obtain the computable bound Nk,p ≤
p˜2
k
(0). Furthermore, our bound on Nk,p is independent of the sequence (xi), so we can
eliminate the implicit quantification over infinite increasing sequences and replace it with
quantification over finite sequences of length Mk,p := p˜
2k(0), yielding
∀k, p∀(0 ≤ x0 ≤ . . . ≤ xMk,p ≤ 1)∃n ≤ n+p(n) ≤Mk,p∀i, j ∈ [n, n+p(n)](|xi−xj | ≤ 2−k).
This is essentially an explicit version of the so called finite convergence principle considered
by Tao in [88]:
If k is a natural number, p : N → N a function and 0 ≤ x0 ≤ . . . ≤ xM ≤ 1
a finite sequence such that M is sufficiently large depending on k and p, then
there exists n with 0 ≤ n ≤ n + p(n) ≤ M such that |xi − xj | ≤ 2−k for all
n ≤ i, j ≤ p(n).
The finite convergence principle is an important principle in ergodic theory that lies behind,
for instance, the proof of the Szemeredi regularity lemma, and therefore in this case the
functional interpretation yields a finitary reformulation of a non-constructive theorem that
has genuine mathematical significance.
The extraction of uniform bounds for the functional interpretation of more complex
convergence theorems has been the subject of several papers in the intersection of proof
theory and ergodic theory. For instance, in [6] the functional interpretation is used to
develop a quantitative version of the mean ergodic theorem.
Remark 3.15 (Infinite pigeonhole principle). Let [k] denote the set {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} ⊂ N.
A finite colouring of the natural numbers with k colours is a function c : N → [k]. The
infinite pigeonhole principle (IPHP) states that any finite colouring uses at least one colour
infinitely often, or more formally
IPHP[k, c] : ∃i ≤ k∀n∃m(m ≥ n ∧ c(m) = i). (3.11)
One can show that there exist realizers for the functional interpretation of IPHP that
are uniform with respect to the compact space N → [k], and therefore similarly to the
previous example the functional interpretation can be used to produce a finitary form of
IPHP which one only needs to quantify over finite colourings. This finitization via the
functional interpretation is discussed in [48, Chapter 2]. Interestingly, a finitization of
IPHP ‘by hand’ without resorting to proof theoretic tools was also given by Tao in an
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early version of [88]. This latter finitization turned out to be false, and was later corrected
in light of the functional interpretation. An account of the whole story and the precise
relationship between each of these finitizations in given in [36], which more generally forms
an interesting case study of the interplay between mathematics and proof theory.
3.4 Modified realizability, and other proof interpretations
While our main focus in this dissertation will be on the functional interpretation, many of
the issues we discuss pertain to proof interpretations in general. We conclude the chapter
with a brief mention of some other functional interpretations that feature in proof the-
ory. Because Chapter 8 involves a comparison between the functional interpretation and
Kreisel’s modified realizability [54], which has also been widely used in program extraction,
we take this opportunity to recall its definition.
Definition 3.16 (Modified realizability). To every formula A in the language of E-HAω
we assign a formula Amr :≡ ∃x(x mr A), where x mr A is a ∃-free formula defined by
induction over the logical structure of A as follows.
(i) x mr A :≡ A if A is prime,
(ii) x, y mr (A ∧B) :≡ x mr A ∧ y mr B,
(iii) b, x, y mr (A ∨B) :≡ (b = 0→ x mr A) ∧ (b 6= 0→ y mr B),
(iv) f mr (A→ B) :≡ ∀x(x mr A→ fx mr B),
(v) x mr (∀tA(t)) :≡ ∀t(xt mr A(t)),
(vi) z, x mr (∃tA(t)) :≡ x mr A(z).
Modified realizability differs from the functional interpretation most significantly in its
treatment of implication - which is closer to the natural BHK interpretation of implication
and somewhat easier to appreciate.
However, while E-HAω has a straightforward realizability interpretation in the primitive
recursive functionals analogous to Theorem 3.7 (see [48, Chapter 5]), in contrast to the
functional interpretation modified realizability does not assign any constructive content to
negated formulas. As a result, if we want to extend modified realizability to classical logic
it is not enough to simply compose it with the negative translation - the typical solution
to this has been to add Friedman’s A-translation as an intermediate step [34].
This combination of modified realizability and the A translation has several drawbacks
compared to the ND interpretation. In particular it loses modularity, and it is not even
sound for the weak quantifier-free rule of extensionality QF-ER. Nevertheless, many re-
finements and improvements of modified realizability have been proposed, and it is still
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open whether or not there are situations in which modified realizability is better suited to
the functional interpretation in program extraction.
In addition to the functional interpretation and modified realizability, notable proof
interpretation include:
1. The Diller-Nahm interpretation. This hybrid of modified realizability and the func-
tional interpretation adjusts the functional interpretation’s treatment of implication
to
(A→ B)DN :≡ ∃U, Y ∀x, v(∀y < |Y xv|(|A|xy → |B|Uxv ))
where Y now returns a finite sequence as opposed to a single element. This interpre-
tation can be viewed as a ‘Dialectica-like’ interpretation, which nevertheless shares
nice structural properties with modified realizability: in particular, we no longer
require decidability of formulas to interpret contraction. The Diller-Nahm interpre-
tation plays an important role in the categorical semantics of proof interpretations
given by the Dialectica categories (see [24]).
2. The bounded and monotone variants of interpretations. These interpretations ask for
bounds on witnesses as opposed to exact witnesses. For instance, while the Dialectica
interpretation extracts a term t satisfying ∀y|AN|ty, its monotone variant asks only
for a bound t∗ (or at higher types a majorant) satisfying
∃x(t∗ ≥ x ∧ ∀y|AN|xy).
These interpretations are central to the proof mining program because by relax-
ing their requirement for for a precise witness they are capable of interpreting a
wider range of non-constructive principles. For instance, WKL is trivially realized
by the monotone functional interpretation, and therefore contributes nothing to the
complexity of extracted bounds.
A uniform syntactic framework encompassing many of these interpretations has been
developed by Oliva in [67].
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FOUR
Spector’s Bar Recursion
The main result reviewed in the previous chapter was that classical arithmetic has an
ND interpretation in the primitive recursive functionals of finite type. However, primitive
recursion no longer suffices if we wish to expand the soundness theorem to incorporate
strong comprehension or choice principles. In a remarkable paper of 1962 [86], C. Spector
succeeded in extending Go¨del’s functional interpretation to full classical analysis by adding
to system T constants for bar recursion in all finite types.
The bar recursive functional interpretation of classical analysis will be treated in de-
tail in Chapter 5 using the product of selection functions. In this introductory chapter
we simply prepare the way for later work by stating Spector’s result and proving some
important properties about bar recursion. We also mention Howard’s realizer of weak
Ko¨nig’s lemma using a restricted, binary form of GBR. Finally, we take the opportunity
to briefly introduce some well-known type structures of E-HAω + GBR.
Spector’s so called ‘general’ bar recursor GBRρ,τ where ρ, τ are arbitrary types has
defining axiom
GBRφ,q,ϕρ,τ (s
ρ∗)
τ
:=
q(s) if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|φs(λx . GBRφ,q,ϕ(s ∗ x)) otherwise, (4.1)
where the parameters of GBR have types ϕ : ρ∗ → ((ρ → τ) → τ), q : ρ∗ → τ and
ϕ : ρN → N. Note that the parameters in the superscript remain fixed in the defining
axiom, in future these are often omitted when there is no risk of ambiguity.
Bar recursion is fundamentally different from primitive recursion. The primitive re-
cursor R is well-defined by well-foundedness of the natural numbers: we assign a value to
R(0) and define R(n + 1) in terms of R(n). In contrast GBR(〈〉) is well-defined by well-
foundedness of the tree T (s) := ∀n < |s|(ϕ(s, n) ≥ n): we assign a value q(s) to GBR(s)
whenever s is a leaf of T , and otherwise decide GBR(s) based on its value at extensions of
s, or in other words in terms of the function λx . GBR(s ∗ x).
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In the same way that primitive recursion is the computational analogue of the axiom
of induction, Spector’s bar recursion can be viewed as a computational analogue of the
axiom of bar induction. There are several formulations of the principle of bar induction
(which is of particular importance in intuitionistic mathematics, see e.g. [90]). Here we
use the schema of relativised bar induction, given by
BIρ :

S(〈〉)
∧∀α ∈ S∃nP ([α](n))
∧∀s ∈ S(∀x(S(s ∗ x)→ P (s ∗ x))→ P (s))
→ P (〈〉).
for P , S arbitrary formulas on ρ∗, where α ∈ S and s ∈ S are shorthand for ∀nS([α](n))
and S(s) respectively. The axiom schema of relativised quantifier-free bar induction QF-BI
is bar induction for P restricted to being quantifier-free. Note that bar induction is
intuitionistically acceptable only with either a decidability or a monotonicity condition on
S (otherwise it implies e.g. law of excluded middle for Π01-formulas - see [42]). In most
cases we will not need to relativise the bar induction at all, simply taking S(s) = true.
Spector’s bar recursion GBR is one of the most well known instances of recursion over
well-founded trees, although it is just one of many extensions of system T in the literature,
which also include modified bar recursion [11], the Berardi-Bezem-Coquand functional [8]
and open recursion [10]. Extensions of system T and their relationship to one another will
form the subject of Part III of this thesis.
4.1 Spector’s condition
A necessary condition for Spector’s bar recursion to exist in a model of E-HAω is that the
underlying tree over which the recursion is carried out is well-founded, or in more precise
terms the following principle is satisfied:
Spec : ∀ϕρN→N, αρN∃n(ϕ(α, n) < n). (4.2)
We refer to Spec as Spector’s condition. In fact the least n satisfying this condition can
be explicitly constructed in E-HAω + GBR.
Proposition 4.1 (Howard [39]1). Define θϕ,α : ρ
∗ → N in E-HAω + GBR as
θϕ,α(s) :=
0 if ∃t  s(ϕ(tˆ) < |t|)1 + θϕ,α(s ∗ α(|s|)) otherwise.
Then provably in E-HAω + GBR we have
∃n ≤ θϕ,α(〈〉)(ϕ(α, n) < n),
1This is the standard reference, although Howard attributes the trick to Kreisel.
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and therefore using bounded search can construct a term µSp(ϕ, α) in E-HA
ω + GBR sat-
isfying
E-HAω + GBR ` ϕ(α, µSp(ϕ, α)) < µSp(ϕ, α) ∧ (n < µSp(ϕ, α)→ ϕ(α, n) ≥ n).
Proof. Define βi := θϕ,α([α](i)). Then β satisfies
βi =
0 if ∃n ≤ i(ϕ(α, n) < n)1 + β(i+ 1) otherwise. (4.3)
and by (4.3) we have
(βi 6= 0 ∧ j ≤ i)→ βj = 1 + β(j + 1) (4.4)
and hence by induction from j = 0 to j = i− 1
βi 6= 0→ β0 = i+ βi. (4.5)
Setting i = β0 it follows from (4.5) that β(β0) = 0, and therefore by (4.3) we have
∃n ≤ β0(ϕ(α, n) < n).
But β0 = θϕ,α(〈〉) so we’re done.
We call µSp Spector’s search functional, as it finds the least number satisfying Spector’s
condition. It has been pointed out by Oliva that the search functional µSp is actually
definable, though not validated, in E-HAω.
Proposition 4.2. Define γϕ,α : ρ
N in E-HAω by
γϕ,α(i) :=
0ρ if ∃k ≤ i+ 1(ϕ(α, k) < k)α(i) otherwise,
and define µ˜Sp(ϕ, α) as the least n ≤ ϕ(γϕ,α) + 1 satisfying ϕ(α, n) < n, or just 0 if none
exist. Then
E-HAω ` ϕ(α,N) < N → ϕ(α, µ˜Sp(ϕ, α)) < µ˜Sp(ϕ, α) ∧ (n < µ˜Sp(ϕ, α)→ ϕ(α, n) ≥ n).
Proof. Assuming ϕ(α,N) < N let m ≤ N be the least number satisfying Spector’s condi-
tion. Then for i < m− 1 we have γϕ,α(i) = α(i), and for i ≥ m− 1 we have γϕ,α(i) = 0ρ,
which implies that γϕ,α = α,m− 1. By minimality of m we must have ϕ(γϕ,α) ≥ m − 1
and hence m ≤ ϕ(γϕ,α) + 1, and the search bounded by µ˜Sp(ϕ, α) must find m.
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4.2 Spector’s computational interpretation of ACN
Over intuitionistic logic the functional interpretation of the axiom of choice is trivial, but in
the presence of classical logic things become problematic because WE-PAω + QF-AC + ACN
is no longer closed under the negative translation. However, (ACN)
N
, which is equivalent
to
∀n¬¬∃xρAn(x)N → ¬¬∃f∀n(An(fn))N
is derivable in WE-HAω+ACN+DNS where DNS is the intuitionistically unprovable double
negation shift
DNS : ∀nN¬¬B(n)→ ¬¬∀nB(n).
Suppose that B(n)D = ∃xρ∀yτ |B(n)|xy . Then the Dialectica interpretation of DNS is given
by
∃f, p, n∀ε, q, ϕ
(
|B(n)|εnpp(εnp) → |B(ϕf)|
f(ϕf)
qf
)
, (4.6)
where f : ρN, p : ρ → τ and n are dependent on ε : N → ((ρ → τ) → ρ), q : ρN → τ and
ϕ : ρN → N. Spector’s achievement was to solve DNSD using bar recursion. In fact, he
used a restricted form SBR of GBR which we call his ‘special’ variant of bar recursion. The
constant SBRρ for arbitrary ρ has defining axiom
SBRφ,ϕρ (s
ρ∗)
ρN
:= s @
0ρN if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|SBRφ,ϕρ (s ∗ as) otherwise (4.7)
where as := φs(λx . SBR(s ∗ x)), and the parameters have types φ : ρ∗ → ((ρ→ ρN)→ ρ),
ϕ : ρN → N respectively.
Theorem 4.3 (Spector [86]). Given ε, q and ϕ as above, define f : ρN and pn : ρ→ τ by
f := SBRφ
ε,ϕ
ρ (〈〉)
pn := λx . q(SBR
φε,ϕ
ρ ([f ](n)))
where φε(P ρ→ρN) := ε|s|(λx . q(P (x))). Then f and pn satisfy
fn = εnpn
pn(fn) = qf
(4.8)
for all n ≤ ϕf , and therefore in particular f , p := pϕf and n := ϕf witness the Dialectica
interpretation of DNS (4.6).
We prove Spector’s theorem under the guise of the product of selection functions in
Theorem 5.7, and cover its extension to dependent choice (which first appears in [61]) in
Theorem 5.13. A corollary of Theorem 4.3 is soundness of the functional interpretation
for classical analysis.
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Theorem 4.4. Let A(a) be a formula in L(WE-PAω) containing only a free. Then
WE-PAω + QF-AC + ACN ` A(a)⇒WE-HAω + SBR ` ∀y|A(a)N|t(a)y
where t is a closed term of WE-HAω + SBR which can be extracted from the proof of A.
Remark 4.5. By WE-HAω + SBR we of course mean WE-HAω extended with constants
SBRρ of each type along with their defining axioms.
Remark 4.6. That the conclusion of Theorem 4.4 can be verified in WE-HAω + SBR does
not in fact follow from Spector, who uses higher-type extensionality to validate his realizer.
This is pointed out in [61] where it is claimed that a constructive ω-rule is required, but
in fact a precise formalization of Spector’s proof is only given in [48, p.204], where it is
shown that a quantifier-free fragment of WE-HAω + SBR is sufficient for the verification.
4.3 Howard’s computational interpretation of WKL
In [41] Howard demonstrated that a simple, binary form of bar recursion was sufficient to
realize the ND interpretation of weak Ko¨nig’s lemma (see Section 2.3). We make use of
Howard’s realizer in Part II, so we state and prove his result here. Under the assumption
that T is a binary tree (i.e. satisfying T (s ∗ t)→ T (s)) can state WKL as
∀nT (hn)→ ∃α∀nT ([α](n))
where to eliminate the bounded quantifier ∃s ∈ Bn we have defined h as
hn := least code of an s ∈ Bn satisfying T (s) , 0Bn if none exist
for a suitable coding of Bn. The negative translation of WKL is then equivalent to
∀nT (hn)→ ¬¬∃α∀nT ([α](n)),
and therefore its functional interpretation is given by
∃α, n∀ϕ (T (hn)→ T ([α](ϕα))) . (4.9)
where α and n are now dependent on ϕ : BN → N.
Theorem 4.7 (Howard [40]). Define Kϕ : B∗ → N using GBRB,N as
Kϕ(s) :=
0 if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|1 + max{Kϕ(s ∗ 0),Kϕ(s ∗ 1)} otherwise. (4.10)
Then Nϕ := Kϕ(〈〉) and αϕ := uˆ for least u  hNϕ satisfying ϕ(uˆ) < |u| (or 〈〉 otherwise)
satisfy the ND interpretation of WKL (4.9).
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Actually, in his original paper [40] Howard proves that n := Kϕ(〈〉) witnesses the
contrapositive of WKL in the form of the FAN principle:
∀ϕ(∀α¬T ([α](ϕα))→ ¬T (h(Kϕ(〈〉)))).
His proof uses bar induction and Proposition 4.1, and is outlined in considerable detail in
[77]. We give a slightly shorter verification that his realizer witnesses the ND interpretation
of WKL.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. We begin by proving that Kϕ(〈〉) is a uniform bound on the first
point at which binary sequences satisfy Spector’s condition:
∀s(|s| ≥ Kϕ(〈〉)→ ∃n ≤ |s|(ϕ(s, n) < n)).
For arbitrary s, suppose that
(∗) ∀n ≤ |s|(ϕ(s, n) ≥ n).
Then for n < |s| we have
Kϕ([s](n))
(∗)
= 1 + max{Kϕ([s](n) ∗ 0),Kϕ([s](n) ∗ 1)} ≥ 1 +Kϕ([s](n+ 1)).
By induction from n = 0 to n = |s| − 1 we obtain
Kϕ(〈〉) ≥ |s|+Kϕ(s),
and by (∗) for n = |s| we have Kϕ(s) > 0 and therefore
Kϕ(〈〉) > |s|.
This proves that Kϕ(〈〉) is a uniform bound, so setting Nϕ = Kϕ(〈〉) we know that there
is some u  h(Nϕ) satisfying ϕ(û) < |u| ≤ Nϕ. Setting αϕ = û we have
[αϕ](ϕ(αϕ)) = [û](ϕ(û))
ϕ(û)<|u|
= [u](ϕ(û)) ≺ u  h(Nϕ)
and therefore
T (h(Nϕ))→ T ([αϕ](ϕ(αϕ)))
by prefix closure of T , which is the ND interpretation of WKL.
Remark 4.8. Note that technically the full statement of weak Ko¨nig’s lemma must explic-
itly include the assumption that the predicate T is a binary tree i.e. ∀s, t(T (s∗t)→ T (s)),
and therefore its functional interpretation must calibrate exactly how, for each ϕ, we use
the tree property. We ignore the assumption here at it has no computational content, and
a quick inspection of preceding proof confirms that our realizer only requires closure for
prefixes of the branch hNϕ.
Corollary 4.9. Let A(a) be a formula in L(WE-PAω) containing only a free. Then
WE-PAω + QF-AC + WKL ` A(a)⇒WE-HAω + GBRB,N ` ∀y|A(a)N|t(a)y
where t is a closed term of WE-HAω + GBRB,N which can be extracted from the proof of A.
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4.4 Models of GBR
An immediate corollary of the fact that E-HAω+GBR validates Spector’s condition (4.2) is
that the type structure of full set theoretic functionals S ω is not a model of bar recursion.
Define ϕ : NN → N by
ϕ(α) := i+ 1 for least i such that αi = 0 if it exists, else 0.
Then Spector’s condition fails for ϕ and α = λi.1 since ϕ(α, n) = n + 1 for all n. This
confirms that the theory E-HAω + GBR is a proper extension of E-HAω because S ω is a
model of E-HAω.
However, there are several important structures that do validate bar recursion.
4.4.1 Term models
Term models for bar recursion were first developed by Luckhardt [61] and Tait [87]. Strong
normalisation for bar recursive functionals without using infinite terms is proved in [14].
4.4.2 The continuous functionals
There are several equivalent ways of formulating the type stucture of continuous func-
tionals C ω, the most well-known being those of Kleene [45] (via associates) and Kreisel
[54] (via formal neighbourhoods). We direct the reader to e.g. Norman [65] for details of
these structures. It is a standard result that the continuous functionals are a model of bar
recursion.
Theorem 4.10. C ω is a model of E-HAω + GBR.
Theorem 4.10 was first proved by Scarpellini [79], who uses yet another formulation
of the continuous functionals, the so-called sequentially continuous functionals (which are
nevertheless shown to be equivalent to the usual Kleene continuous functionals in [43]).
One can alternatively justify bar recursion in the continuous functionals by appealing to
Ershov’s result [26] that C ω can be identified with the total elements of the model Cˆ ω of
partial continuous functionals - see [11].
Informally, Spector’s condition holds in C ω because it validates the axiom of continuity :
Cont : ∀F ρN→τ , αρN∃N∀βρN([α](N) =ρ∗ [β](N)→ F (α) =τ F (β)),
where the type τ is restricted to being discrete. To see this, note that for any ϕ : ρN → N
and α : ρN there exists, by Cont, a number N such that ϕ(α, n) = ϕ(α) for all n ≥ N .
Setting n = max{N,ϕ(α) + 1} we have
ϕ(α, n) = ϕ(α) < n.
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4.4.3 The majorizable functionals
For many years bar recursion was only considered in the context of the continuous func-
tionals. However, in 1985 Bezem proved the remarkable fact that the strongly majorizable
functionals are a model of GBR, despite the fact that they include discontinuous function-
als.
The relation s-maj is defined inductively on the finite types byn∗ s-majN n :≡ n∗ ≥ nf∗ s-majρ→τ f :≡ ∀x∗, x(x∗ s-majρ x→ f∗x∗ s-majτ f∗x, fx).
(we omit details of how one could extend it to our enriched system of types). We say
that x : ρ is strongly majorizable if there exists some x∗ satisfying x∗ s-majρ x, and call
x∗ a majorant of x. The type structure M ω := 〈Mρ〉 of hereditarily strongly majorizable
functionals is defined inductively by M0 := N, and Mρ→τ is the space of all set-theoretic
functionals M
Mρ
τ which also have a majorant in M
Mρ
τ (see [15] or [48] for details).
Theorem 4.11 ([15]). M ω is a model of E-HAω + GBR.
While the full proof of this result is rather technical, to see that Spector’s condition
holds inM ω, suppose that ϕ∗ and α∗ are majorants of α and ϕ respectively. Then α∗ is also
a majorant of α, n for arbitrary n, so setting n = ϕ∗α∗ + 1 we have ϕ∗α∗ s-majN ϕ(α, n)
i.e.
ϕ(α, n) ≤ ϕ∗α∗ < n.
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The Semantics of Bar Recursive Functionals
The first main contribution of this dissertation will be to present a series of case studies
in which we use Go¨del’s functional interpretation to extract bar recursive programs from
proofs in classical analysis. Rather than merely stating the extracted programs in com-
puter code or abstruse logical syntax, our goal is to study the meaning and behaviour
of these rather complicated functionals so that they can be understood on a mathemati-
cal level as intuitive constructive analogues to non-constructive principles. Our primary
tool for interpreting choice principles will be Spector’s bar recursion in the form of the
product of selection functions. However, as part of our analysis we address the issue of
whether or not bar recursion is always best suited for obtaining illuminating programs
from proofs, and consider the possibility that alternatives to bar recursion, or at least new
descriptions of bar recursive realizers, might be more appropriate when interpreting cer-
tain non-constructive ideas. In broad terms our aim is that these case studies will provide
some insight into the constructive nature of classical analysis. In doing so we also hope to
highlight the functional interpretation as an elegant translation on proofs whose output
can be read and understood on mathematical terms - a feature that can often become
obscured beneath the formal language of logic.
∗ ∗ ∗
Realizers extracted from a classical proofs using proof interpretations can yield highly
non-trivial constructive information hidden deep in the logical structure of that proof.
This feature has been exploited in the proof mining program to obtain explicit numerical
information from non-constructive proofs, which has let to improved results in several
areas of mathematics.
However, realizing terms give us more that just numerical information. A functional
extracted from a non-constructive proof is ultimately a constructive reformulation of that
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proof, and an analysis of the behaviour of that functional can reveal insights into the com-
putational semantics of the proof. In recent years there has been an increasing interest in
applying proof theoretic techniques for the sole purpose of understanding the constructive
meaning of non-constructive principles, whether it is to explore a specific non-constructive
idea (such as the analysis of the minimal bad sequence argument in [82]) or to give classical
logic a general computational semantics (such as the learning-based realizability of [3]).
In many ways work of this kind forms a natural continuation of Hilbert’s program, and
while (outside of the proof mining program) the direct impact of this research on main-
stream mathematics may appear limited, there are complex links between proof theory
and mathematics - such as that between the functional interpretation and the correspon-
dence principle described in Section 3.3 - that lend force to the idea that understanding
the constructive meaning of non-constructive ideas has a relevance beyond the world of
computer science and logic.
Extracting computational content from proofs can be a difficult task. The soundness
theorems for the functional interpretation guarantee that we can extract realizers from a
large class of proofs and come equipped with an algorithm for doing so providing the proof
has been fully formalised, and in this sense program extraction is mathematically trivial:
it is a procedure that could be automated by a theorem prover. But aside even from
the laborious task of fully formalising a non-trivial proof, such a blind implementation
would yield little more than a ‘black box’, a complex higher-type term that mysteriously
works but provides little immediate insight into the proof it interprets. In reality, it often
requires a certain amount of work and the application of new ideas or techniques to obtain
constructive information that is useful or meaningful.
In this practical part of this dissertation our challenge is to use the functional interpre-
tation to analyse the constructive content of several important principles in mathematical
analysis, with the aim of obtaining programs whose behaviour and semantics can be clearly
understood. Our starting point is the recent work of Escardo´ and Oliva [29, 30, 31], who
have shown that Spector’s bar recursion is closely related to the so-called ‘explicitly it-
erated’ product of selection functions. This form of recursion can be intuitively viewed
as an operation that computes optimal plays in a class of unbounded sequential games,
and therefore realizers extracted using the product of selection functions come equipped
with a natural game semantics. We focus on giving a detailed description of exactly what
our realizers are attempting to do, and how their behaviour can be related to the non-
constructive ideas present in the original proof. In certain cases we suggest alternative
ways of viewing and constructing these realizers.
We have deliberately chosen to study well-known proofs in mathematics, and in what
follows we are generally not the first to analyse the computational content of these proofs.
The originality of work is that we give new realizers and more importantly new descrip-
tions of these realizers. However, in Chapter 8 we give an analysis of minimal-bad-sequence
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argument for arbitrary well-founded relations via transfinite recursion, which to our knowl-
edge constitutes one of the first applications of the functional interpretation in the theory
of well-quasi-orderings.
We adhere to an informal style of presentation and whenever possible write in a familiar
mathematical language. We make no attempt to give full details of how our realizers can be
formally obtained from proofs - in all cases they are extracted ‘by hand’, and this contrasts
from the more rigorous, syntactic approach often found elsewhere in the literature.
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to providing technical background and
outlining the main ideas that will be used in the case studies that follow.
5.1 The explicitly iterated product of selection functions
We first introduce the product of selection functions and show that it can be viewed as a
functional that computes optimal strategies in unbounded sequential games. This section
is a survey of results due to Escardo´ and Oliva, which forms part of a larger body of
research by these authors on selection functions and game theory. In particular the reader
is referred to the original paper [30] and the more recent [31] for general background to
the work presented here.
A selection function is any element of type (ρ→ τ)→ ρ. As in [30] we abbreviate this
type to Jτρ. Closely related to the selection function ε : Jτρ is its corresponding quantifier
ε¯ : (ρ→ τ)→ τ defined by ε¯p := p(εp). The intuition is to view ε as a selector that given
a function p : ρ → τ picks a particular element of εp of ρ that attains its quantifier ε¯.
Selection functions and quantifiers are ubiquitous in mathematics and computer science,
as the following examples illustrate.
Example 5.1. (a) A canonical example of a selection function and its associated quantifier
arises when τ forms a set of truth values e.g. τ = B. Hilbert’s epsilon term ερ : JBρ of
type ρ is a selection function whose corresponding quantifier is just the usual existential
quantifier ∃ρ for predicates over type ρ, since classically we have
∃xρ p(x)⇔ p(ερp).
(b) By the mean value theorem there exists a selection function ε : J[0,1]R such that for
any continuous function p : [0, 1]→ R we have
p(εp) =
∫ 1
0
p(x)dx.
Its corresponding quantifier is the operator
∫ 1
0 .
(c) Assume we are given a position in a game where we have to pick a move in ρ. A
strategy for that position can be defined by a selection function ε : Jτρ that determines
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an optimal move for this position, given a mapping p : ρ → τ of possible moves x : ρ
to corresponding outcomes p(x) : τ .
There is a natural product operation ⊗ with which one can compose selection functions.
Definition 5.2 (Binary product of selection functions [30]). Given a selection function
ε : Jτρ, a family of selection functions δ : ρ→ Jτσ and a function q : ρ× σ → τ , let
A[xρ]
σ
:= δx(λy.q(x, y))
a
ρ
:= ε(λx.q(x,A[x])).
The binary product ε⊗ δ is another selection function, of type Jτ (ρ× σ), defined by
(ε⊗ δ)(q) ρ×σ:= 〈a,A[a]〉.
If δ is independent of x we call this the simple product of selection functions. The general
case is then sometimes referred to as the dependent product of selection functions.
Example 5.3. Continuing from Example 5.1:
(a) It is easy to show that the product of ε operators ερ ⊗ εσ is an epsilon operator of
type ρ× σ in the sense that
∃xρ∃yσq(x, y)⇔ q((ερ ⊗ εσ)(q)).
(b) Given a continuous function q : [0, 1]2 → R we have
q((ε⊗ ε)(q)) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
q(x, y) dxdy.
(c) Given strategies ε0, ε1 for each round in a two round sequential game with outcome
function q : ρ0 × ρ1 → τ , then (ε0 ⊗ ε1)(q) forms a strategy for the game which is
“compatible” with the local strategies ε0 and ε1. This key instance of the product is
discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.
Remark 5.4. The binary product also appears throughout applied proof theory, due to its
connection with the functional interpretation of finite choice principles (as elaborated in
Section 5.3). For example, it is implicitly used in e.g. [50, p.14].
The explicitly iterated product of selection functions EPS is an infinite iteration of the
binary product ⊗, controlled by a functional ϕ which stops the iteration once Spector’s
condition (4.2) is obtained. Note that the following definition differs from that given in e.g.
[31, Definition 15] (in that case the parameter q changes with each recursive call, whereas
we prefer to minimise the number of parameters that change as part of the defining axiom).
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Definition 5.5 (Explicitly iterated product of selection functions). The explicitly iterated
product of selection functions EPSρ,τ has defining equation
EPSε,q,ϕ(sρ
∗
)
ρN
= s @

0ρN if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|
EPSε,q,ϕ(s ∗ as) otherwise,
(5.1)
for as := εs(λx . q(EPS
ε,q,ϕ(s ∗ x))), where ε : ρ∗ → Jτρ is a family of selection functions,
q : ρN → τ is referred to as the outcome functional and ϕ : ρN → N is referred to as the
control functional.
Note that EPS is very similar to Spector’s special form of bar recursion SBR (4.7), the
key difference being the introduction of the outcome functional q. In fact, it is easy to see
that SBR is precisely the instance of EPS in which τ = ρN and q : ρN → ρN is the identity
functional. Conversely, EPS is definable from SBR: if we set ε˜qs(pρ→ρ
N
)
ρ
= εs(λx . q(px))
then SBRε˜
q ,ϕ satisfies the defining equation of EPSε,q,ϕ. EPS is precisely what we need
to solve Spector’s equations (4.8), a fact that we now prove in full. In what follows we
suppress the parameters of EPS when it is clear what we mean.
Lemma 5.6. Let α = EPSε,q,ϕ(s). Then for all n ≥ |s|,
α = EPSε,q,ϕ([α](n)). (5.2)
Proof. Induction on n. For n = |s| we have [α](n) = [EPS(s)](|s|) = s and therefore (5.2)
holds by definition. Now assume (5.2) holds for n ≥ |s|. There are two cases:
(a) If ϕ([̂α](n)) = ϕ(α, n) < n then
α
(IH)
= EPS([α](n)) = [α](n) @ 0 ≡ α, n.
But then ϕ( ̂[α](n+ 1)) = ϕ(α, n+ 1) = ϕ(α, n) < n < n + 1 by extensionality, and
therefore EPS([α](n+ 1)) = [α](n+ 1) @ 0 = α, n+ 1 = α, n = α.
(b) Otherwise,
α
(IH)
= EPS([α](n)) = [α](n) @ EPS([α](n) ∗ a) (∗)= EPS([α](n) ∗ a)
where a = ε[α](n)(λx . q(EPS([α](n)∗x))). Note that (∗) holds because [α](n) is a prefix of
EPS([α](n) ∗ a). Now then α(n) = EPS([α](n) ∗ a)(n) = a and therefore α = EPS([α](n) ∗
α(n)) = EPS([α](n+ 1)).
This lemma is the building block behind the following fundamental theorem on EPS.
Theorem 5.7. Define α : ρN and ps : ρ→ τ by
α := EPSε,q,ϕρ,τ (〈〉)
ps := λx . q(EPS
ε,q,ϕ
ρ,τ (s ∗ x)).
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Then for all n ≤ ϕα we have
α(n) = ε[α](n)(p[α](n))
p[α](n)(α(n)) = qα.
(5.3)
Proof. If n ≤ ϕα then we must have (∗) ϕ([̂α](n)) ≥ n. Otherwise, if ϕ([̂α](n)) < n then
by Lemma 5.6 (for s = 〈〉) we would have α = EPS([α](n)) = [α](n) @ 0 = [̂α](n), and
hence n ≤ ϕα = ϕ([̂α](n)) < n which is a contradiction. Therefore
α(n)
L5.6
= EPS([α](n))(n)
(∗)+(5.1)
= ([α](n) @ EPS([α](n) ∗ a[α](n)))(n)
(5.1)
= a[α](n)
and a[α](n) = ε[α](n)(λx . q(EPS([α](n) ∗ x))) = ε[α](n)(p[α](n)). For the second equality, we
have
qα
L5.6
= q(EPS([α](n+ 1)))
= q(EPS([α](n) ∗ α(n)))
= p[α](n)(α(n)).
Note that (5.3) is the dependent formulation of Spector’s equations (4.8). The signifi-
cance of the work done in [30, 31] regarding the product of selection functions lies in the
observation that Spector’s equations have a fundamental meaning that goes beyond the
functional interpretation of choice, and that this meaning is elegantly expressed in terms
of selection functions. In short, (5.3) characterise the product EPS as an operation that
computes a kind of sequential equilibrium between selection functions. Such equilibria ap-
pear naturally in a variety of contexts, and we now outline perhaps the most illuminating
of these contexts: the theory of sequential games.
5.2 Sequential games and optimal strategies
One of the most remarkable property of EPS is that it computes optimal strategies in a
certain class of sequential games. The reader is encouraged to consult [31] in conjunction
with the relatively concise discussion here (where in particular they discuss a more general
class of games).
Definition 5.8 (Sequential game of unbounded length). A sequential game G is defined by
a pair of types (ρ, τ) and a tuple of terms (ε, q, ϕ) described as follows.
(a) ρ is the type of possible moves at each round,
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(b) τ is the type of possible outcomes of the game,
(c) a finite sequence s : ρ∗ is thought of as a position in the game in representing moves
for the first |s| rounds, and an infinite sequence α : ρN is considered to be a play of
the game,
(d) q : ρN → τ determines the outcome of any given play α,
(e) ϕ : ρN → N determines the relevant part of a play,
(f) ε : ρ∗ → Jτρ defines a strategy for the game, where εs determines the optimal move at
position s given that the outcome of all potential moves ρ→ τ is known.
Given a play α, all moves α(n) for n ≤ ϕα are relevant moves. A position s is
called relevant if |s| ≤ ϕ(sˆ), i.e. if in a canonical extension of the current position s the
current move is considered a relevant move. We shall only consider infinite plays which
are obtained by some canonical extension of a finite play s. Therefore, we think of these
as finite games of unbounded length.
A strategy for the game is a function next : ρ∗ → ρ which determines for each position
s what the next move next(s) should be. To follow a strategy from position s means to
play all following moves according to the strategy, i.e. we obtain a sequence of moves
α(0), α(1), . . . as
α(n) = next(s ∗ [α](n)).
We call this the strategic extension of s. The strategic extension of the empty play is
called the strategic play.
Definition 5.9. Given a game G = (ε, q, ϕ), a strategy next is said to be optimal if the
move played at each relevant position s is the one recommended by the selection function
εs i.e.
next(s) = εs(λx . q(s ∗ x ∗ α))
where α is the strategic extension of s∗x. The strategic extension of the empty play when
our strategy is optimal is the optimal play of the game G.
The main result of [31] is that the product of selection functions computes optimal
strategies.
Theorem 5.10 ([31]). Given a game G = (ε, q, ϕ), the strategy
next(s) = EPSε,q,ϕ(s)(|s|) (5.4)
is optimal, and, moreover,
α = λn . EPSε,q,ϕ(s)(|s|+ n) (5.5)
is the strategic extension of s, i.e. α(n) = next(s ∗ [α](n)). In particular EPSε,q,ϕ(〈〉) is
the optimal play of G.
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Proof. We have that
α(n)
(5.5)
= EPS(s)(|s|+ n)
L5.6
= EPS(s ∗ [α](n))(|s|+ n)
(5.4)
= next(s ∗ [α](n)),
which proves the second claim (5.5). Note that the second equality follows from Lemma
5.6 because s ∗ α = EPS(s) and since |s|+ n ≥ |s| we have s ∗ α = EPS([s ∗ α](|s|+ n)) =
EPS(s ∗ [α](n)). Hence, assuming that s is a relevant position, i.e. (∗) ϕ(ŝ) ≥ |s| we have
next(s)
(5.4)
= EPS(s)(|s|)
(∗)+(5.1)
= (s @ EPS(s ∗ as))(|s|)
= as
= εs(λx . q(EPS(s ∗ x)))
= εs(λx . q(s ∗ x ∗ β))
where β := λn . EPS(s ∗ x)(|s| + 1 + n), and by the second claim (5.5) is the strategic
extension of s ∗ x.
5.3 A game-theoretic computational interpretation of DC
We now prove that the product of selection functions EPS give a computational interpre-
tation to dependent choice DC. This extends slightly the result from [30, 31] which is
restricted to the interpretation of countable choice ACN. In particular we define a variant
of DC that is very naturally interpreted by EPS. We also attempt to explain in detail the
link between the theory of selection functions and Go¨del’s functional interpretation - in
particular the notion that optimal plays in a sequential games are somehow related to the
axiom of choice.
Suppose we are given a Σ2-theorem A ≡ ∃xρ∀yτA0(x, y) where A0 is quantifier-free.
The negative translation of A is equivalent to ¬¬∃x∀yA0(x, y), and therefore its functional
interpretation is given by
|AN|εp = A0(εp, p(εp)).
In other words, the functional interpretation eliminates double negations in front of a
Σ2-formula with a selection function ε : Jτρ. As discussed in section 3.3, p can be viewed
as a counterexample function attempting to disprove A, and therefore the constructive
interpretation of A is precisely a selection function ε that refutes arbitrary counterexample
functions.
Thus under the functional interpretation we have the following mapping:
Σ2-Theorems 7→ Selection functions.
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The elimination of double negations in AN for an arbitrary formula A is essentially a
(albeit complex) modular iteration of this process, suggesting that selection functions and
modes of recursion based on selection functions lie behind the functional interpretation in a
fundamental way. Most importantly, the product of selection functions directly interprets
the negative translation of the axiom of countable dependent choice.
For simplicity, let’s first consider AC for Π1-formulas:
Π1-AC : ∀n∃xρ∀yτAn(x, y)→ ∃fN→ρ∀n, yAn(fn, y)
where the An are quantifier-free. Its negative translation is intuitionistically equivalent to
∀n¬¬∃x∀yAn(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f∀n, yAn(fn, y),
and the (partial) functional interpretation of this is given by
∃F∀ε, q, ϕ(∀n, pAn(εnp, p(εnp))→ Ai(F (ϕF ), qF )). (5.6)
This constructive interpretation of AC asks for a function F ε,q,ϕ approximating the choice
sequence f , given a sequence of selection functions εn which interpret each of the An.
By Theorem 5.7, F ε,q,ϕ := EPSε,q,ϕ(〈〉) does the job, indicating that under the functional
interpretation we have a mapping
Choice principles 7→ Product of selection functions.
At first glance it may seem strange that an operation that computes optimal strategies in
sequential games is related to the axiom of choice is this manner. But if we take a closer
look, the game theoretic semantics of (5.6) becomes clear. The selection functions εn which
realise the premise of (5.6) can be seen as a collection of strategies separately witnessing
the Σ2-formulas (An). The dialectica interpretation calls for a procedure that takes these
pointwise strategies and produces a co-operative selection function F that witnesses ∀nAn.
Such a procedure is provided naturally by the product of selection functions.
We now prove that more generally, EPS witnesses the functional interpretation of
countable dependent choice for arbitrary formulas. This is a slight reformulation of the
analogous result for Spector’s bar recursion first given in [61]. Dependent choice is usually
given in the following form:
DCρ : ∀n, xρ∃yρAn(x, y)→ ∀x0∃fN→ρ(f(0) = x0 ∧ ∀nAn(f(n), f(n+ 1))).
It turns out that EPS naturally interprets a variant of DC given by
DCρseq : ∀sρ
∗∃xρAs(x)→ ∃fN→ρ∀nA[f ](n)(fn).
This sequential formulation of dependent choice is similar to the one considered in [82]
and will be important in Chapter 8.
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Lemma 5.11. DC is equivalent to DCseq.
Proof. First we show that DCseq ⇒ DC. Define Bs(y) :≡ A|s|(s|s|−1, y) for |s| > 0 and
B〈〉(y) :≡ A0(x0, y). Then we have ∀n, xρ∃yAn(x, y)→ ∀s∃yBs(y) and therefore by DCseq
there exists fN→ρ satisfying
A0(x0, f(0)) ∧ ∀n > 0An(f(n− 1), fn).
Defining
f˜(n) :=
x0 if n = 0f(n− 1) if n > 0
we clearly have ∀nAn(f˜(n), f˜(n+ 1)).
For DC⇒ DCseq, define
Bn(s
ρ∗ , tρ
∗
) :≡ (|s| = n→ |t| = n+ 1 ∧ s ≺ t ∧As(tn)).
Then As(x)→ B|s|(s, s ∗ x)→ Bn(s, s ∗ x) and therefore
∀s∃xAs(x)→ ∀n, s∃tBn(s, t).
By DC for s0 = 〈〉
∀s∃xAs(x)→ ∃fN→ρ∗(f(0) = 〈〉 ∧ ∀nBn(f(n), f(n+ 1)))
where
Bn(f(n), f(n+1)) ≡ |f(n)| = n→ |f(n+1)| = n+1∧fn ≺ f(n+1)∧Af(n)(f(n+1)(n)).
By induction |f(n)| = n for all n, and therefore
∀s∃xAs(x)→ ∃f(f(0) = 〈〉 ∧ ∀n(|f(n+ 1)| = n+ 1∧ fn ≺ f(n+ 1)∧Af(n)(f(n+ 1)(n))).
Define the function f˜ : N→ ρ by f˜(n) ρ:= f(n+ 1)(n). Now, clearly [f˜ ](0) = 〈〉 = f(0) and
because for arbitrary n we have f(n) = [f(n+ 1)](n) it follows that
[f˜ ](n) = f(n)→ [f˜ ](n) = [f(n+ 1)](n)→ [f˜ ](n+ 1) = f(n+ 1)
and therefore by induction [f˜ ](n) = f(n) for all n. Therefore we obtain ∀nA[f˜ ](n)(f˜(n)).
Remark 5.12. While it is clear that the direction DCseq ⇒ DC can be formalised in
WE-PAω, as it stands our proof of DC ⇒ DCseq makes use of the extensionality axiom
to derive
[f˜ ](n) = f(n) ∧Af(n)(f(n+ 1)(n)))→ A[f˜ ](n)(f˜(n)).
While we don’t doubt that this need for extensionality can be eliminated with a little
effort, it does not concern us too much here as we are able to give a direct computational
interpretation to DCseq using EPS.
50
5.3. A game-theoretic computational interpretation of DC
Theorem 5.13. (a) The functional interpretation of the principle of dependent choice
DCseq : ∀sρ∗∃xρAs(x)→ ∃fN→ρ∀nA[f ](n)(fn)
is realized by the dependent product of selection functions EPS.
(b) The functional interpretation of the principle of countable choice
ACN : ∀n∃xρAn(x)→ ∃fN→ρ∀nAn(f(n))
is realized by the simple product of selection functions.
(c) The functional interpretation of the principle of finite choice
FAC : ∀k(∀n ≤ k∃xρAn(x)→ ∃sρ∗∀n ≤ kAn(sn))
is realized by a finite product of selection functions.
Proof. We prove (a). Part (b) was first shown in [30], and in any rate follows directly from
(a). Part (c) will be discussed in Chapter 10.
Since As(x) is interpreted as ∃x˜ρ˜∀yτ |As(x)N|x˜y it suffices to interpret instances of DCseq
for Σ2-formulas:
∀sρ∗∃xρ, x˜ρ˜∀yτAs(x, x˜, y)→ ∃fN→ρ∀n∃x˜∀yA[f ](n)(fn, x˜, y).
Moreover, by adding a dummy variable t of type ρ˜∗ this in turn follows directly from an
instance of Π1-DCseq:
Π1-DCseq : ∀sρ∗ , tρ˜∗∃x, x˜∀yAs,t(x, x˜, y)→ ∃fN→ρ, f˜N→ρ˜∀n, yA[f,f˜ ](n)(fn, f˜n, y).
Therefore it suffices to deal with Π1-DCseq in general i.e.
Π1-DCseq : ∀sρ∗∃xρ∀yτAs(x, y)→ ∃f∀n, yA[f ](n)(fn, y).
where As is quantifier-free. This has negative translation equivalent to
∀s¬¬∃x∀yAs(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f∀n, yA[f ](n)(fn, y).
and therefore its functional interpretation is given by
|Π1-DCN|f,p,sε,ϕ,q ≡ As(εsp, p(εsp))→ A[f ](ϕf)(f(ϕf), qf), (5.7)
omitting, for the sake of readability, the parameters ε, ϕ and q on f, p and s. Let
f = EPSε,q,ϕ(〈〉)
ps = λx . q(EPS
ε,q,ϕ(s ∗ x)).
By Theorem 5.7 we have that f and p := p[f ](ϕf) and s := [f ](ϕf) satisfy εsp = f(ϕf)
and p(εsp) = qf , and hence, clearly witness |Π1-DCN|f,p,sε,ϕ,q.
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Theorem 5.14 (Soundness theorem for classical analysis using EPS). Let A(a) be a for-
mula in L(WE-PAω) containing only a free. Then
WE-PAω + QF-AC + DCseq ` A(a)⇒WE-HAω + EPS ` ∀y|A(a)N|t(a)y
where t is a closed term of WE-HAω + EPS which can be extracted from the proof of A.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3.11 and 5.13 (a), although technically here we
only prove that the conclusion can be verified in E-HAω + EPS, because full extensionality
is required for our proof of Lemma 5.6. However, this instance of extensionality can be
reduced to the quantifier-free rule by appealing to the trick of Kohlenbach [48, Lemma
11.5], allowing us to indeed verify the conclusion in WE-HAω + SBR (in fact a quantifier-
free fragment of WE-HAω suffices) and obtain a soundness theorem for dependent choice
analogous to [48, Theorem 11.9].
The significance of Theorem 5.13 in conjunction with Theorem 5.10 lies in the fact
that our realizer for choice also computes optimal strategies in sequential games, which
means that programs extracted using EPS can often be given an intuitive game-theoretic
semantics. To be more precise, given a proof that is based on an instance of countable
choice, we can informally identify the functional interpretation |AN| of the theorem A
with a partially defined sequential game GA (whose parameters arise from the interpreted
proof):
Classical theorem A // Partially defined game GA
and in this sense the constructive reformulation of A can be understood in terms of optimal
plays in GA.
5.4 Alternatives to Spector’s bar recursive interpretation of analysis
We have introduced a variant of Spector’s bar recursion with close links to game theory,
and in the following chapters we provide concrete examples of program extraction using
the product of selection functions that produce realizers with a natural game semantics.
However, we also address the issue of whether or not Spector’s bar recursion or the closely
related EPS are always best suited for extracting programs from proofs.
Spector devised bar recursion for foundational reasons - in order to extend Go¨del’s
proof of the consistency of Peano arithmetic to classical analysis. Bar recursion is ideal
for this purpose as it provides a simple and elegant solution to the functional interpretation
of the double negation shift, and therefore to both countable and dependent choice.
However, its suitability as a device for extracting intuitive and readable realizers from
proofs is not so firmly established. This is particularly true when a proof makes use of
the choice axiom in the guise of a different principle A, where A might be arithmetical
52
5.4. Alternatives to Spector’s bar recursive interpretation of analysis
comprehension, the variants of Ko¨nig’s lemma, or the minimal-bad-sequence argument.
In this case, while we can certainly find a bar recursive realizer for A by interpreting
DC→ A, it may be better to search for a direct realizer for A that more naturally reflects
the computational content of A.
The idea of constructing new realizers to the axiom of choice and its variants for the
purpose of improved program extraction is not new, and has been explored in context of
the realizability interpretation of analysis in e.g. [8, 10, 11, 82]. However, few alternatives
for Spector’s bar recursion have been proposed for the functional interpretation of analysis.
In each of the subsequent case studies, not only do we attempt to understand the
bar recursive realizer extracted from our classical proof, but we consider the possibility of
replacing it with a more direct and intuitive realizer. In the case of arithmetic compre-
hension (Chapter 6) and Σ01-WKL (Chapter 7) we characterise the behaviour of our bar
recursive in terms of update procedures (similar to the learning-based realizers discussed
in [3]), and for minimal-bad-sequence argument (Chapter 8) we investigate the possibility
of constructing a realizer for its functional interpretation via open recursion, as done by
Berger in the context of modified realizability in [10].
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CHAPTER
SIX
Arithmetical Comprehension
This small chapter forms a note in which we examine the computational content of the
principle of arithmetical comprehension for Σ01-formulas (In fact, arithmetical comprehen-
sion CANar for arbitrary formulas is derivable in WE-PA
ω + Σ01-CA, see [48]). As a warm up
for later chapters we give the bar recursive realizer for Σ01-CA in terms of EPS and outline
its game semantics. Then in the main part of the chapter we analyse the behaviour of this
realizer and characterise it as a fixpoint for an intuitive learning-process.
In informal set-theoretic language arithmetical comprehension for Σ01-formulas is given as
follows.
Arithmetical comprehension (Σ01-CA). Given an arbitrary Σ
0
1-formulaB(n) :≡ ∃kNB0(n, k)
(for B0 quantifier-free) we can construct a set X ⊆ N such that n ∈ X ↔ B(n).
We identify subsets of N with their characteristic functions tX : N→ B. Written formally
in the language of WE-PAω, Σ01-CA becomes
1
∃tN→B∀n(t(n) = 0↔ ∃kB0(n, k)). (6.1)
Our first observation is that we can eliminate the two way-implication, as (6.1) follows
directly from the formula
∃fN→N∀n(∃kB0(n, k)→ ∃i < f(n)B0(n, i)), (6.2)
1Note that since we can construct characteristic functions for quantifier-free formulas we could alterna-
tively write Σ01-CA as the single axiom
∀fN×N→N∃t∀n(t(n) = 0↔ ∃k(f(n, k) = 0))
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by setting
tf (n) :=
0 if ∃i < f(n)B0(n, i)1 otherwise.
Note that, conversely, (6.2) follows from (6.1) using QF-AC. The bounded quantifier in
the conclusion of (6.2) is not strictly necessary, although in this and the following chapters
we sometimes prefer to work with bounded formulas because it makes the computational
interpretation slightly more intuitive, and more useful in applications. Now, (6.2) is equiv-
alent to
∃fN→N∀n, k(∃i < kB0(n, i)→ ∃i < f(n)B0(n, i)), (6.3)
and the ND interpretation of (6.3) is given by
∀q, ϕ∃f∀n ≤ ϕf(∃i < qfB0(n, i)→ ∃i < f(n)B0(n, i)) (6.4)
where q and ϕ have type NN → N. One can rephrase this interpretation of Σ01-CA as follows.
Finitary arithmetical comprehension (Fin-Σ01-CA). Given arbitrary functionals q, ϕ : NN →
N there exists a function f : N → N such that the set Yf :≡ {n | ∃i < f(n)B0(n, i)} ⊆ X
is an approximation to X relative to q, ϕ in the sense that for all n ≤ ϕf we have n ∈ Y
whenever ∃iB0(n, i) is witnessed for i < qf .
The idea behind this equivalent formulation of Σ01-CA is that Y ⊆ X is an approximation
to X whose ‘size’ and ‘depth’ are calibrated by the functionals ϕ and q respectively. The
existence of such approximations for arbitrary ϕ, q is classically equivalent to Σ01-CA.
However, while the comprehension set X cannot be effectively constructed, arbitrarily
good approximations Y can be computed using bar recursion.
6.1 A game-theoretic interpretation of Σ01-CA
We now extract directly from the classical proof of Σ01-CA a bar recursive realizer for
Fin-Σ01-CA in terms of the product of selection functions. Bar recursive interpretations of
comprehension are not new (see e.g. [48, Chapter 11.3]) - our aim here is to provide one in
terms of EPS that has a natural game-theoretic reading. One obtains Σ01-CA in the form
of (6.3) from a instance of ACN,N applied to
∀n∃l∀k(∃i < kB0(n, i)→ ∃i < lB0(n, i)) (6.5)
where (6.5) is a direct consequence of the law of excluded middle sometimes referred to
as the ‘drinkers paradox’. The functional interpretation of (6.5) asks for a sequence of
selection functions ε : JNN satisfying
∀n, pN→N(∃i < p(εnp)B0(n, i)→ ∃i < εnpB0(n, i)), (6.6)
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and it is clear that
εn(p) :=
0 if ∀i < p(0)¬B0(n, i)p(0) if ∃i < p(0)B0(n, i) (6.7)
does the job. To see this, note that if ∀i < p(0)¬B0(n, i) then the premise of (6.6) is false
for εnp = 0, and otherwise the conclusion must be true for εnp = p(0). Now, to interpret
the instance of countable choice applied to (6.5) we define
fq,ϕ := EPS
ε,q,ϕ(〈〉).
By Theorem 5.7 we have εnpn = f(n) and qf = pn(εnpn) for all n ≤ ϕf (for pn := p[f ](n)
as in Theorem 5.7), therefore by (6.6) we obtain
∀n ≤ ϕf(∃i < qfB0(n, i)→ ∃i < f(n)B0(n, i)), (6.8)
and so fq,ϕ is a realizer for Fin-Σ
0
1-CA. We can attach the game-semantics of EPS to this
particular case, where Fin-Σ01-CA corresponds to a partially defined game G[q, ϕ] which
can be described in mathematical terms as follows.
(a) The move at round n is a natural number k which in this context should be viewed
as a potential bound for a witness of ∃iB0(n, i).
(b) An arbitrary play α determines a subset {n | ∃i < α(n)B0(n, i)} of X.
(c) The strategy for constructing an approximation to X is given by the selection func-
tions. At position s with |s| = n, provided ϕ(sˆ) ≥ n the selection function ε|s| defines
a policy for whether or not to include n in the approximation. By default it selects 0
and attempts to get away with omitting n from the approximation. However, if the
outcome q(s ∗ 0 ∗α) (where α is the strategic extension of s ∗ 0 in the sense of Section
5.2) bounds a witness for ∃iB0(n, i), εn accepts it must change its mind and includes
n in the approximation, stealing this bound as justification.
G[q, ϕ] Finitary arithmetical comprehension
εn decide whether to include n in approximation
EPSε construct approximation to X
ϕ, q determine size and depth of approximation respectively
Table 6.1: Functional interpretation of Σ01-CA
Under this correspondence between plays of G[q, ϕ] and subsets of X, we see that an
optimal play of G[q, ϕ] given by f = EPSε,q,ϕ(〈〉) is an approximation to X of depth and
size given by q and ϕ. This fact is clear in informal game theoretic terms: that fn is an
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optimal move at round n implies that fn = 0 only if q([f ](n) ∗ 0 ∗α[f ](n)∗0) = qf does not
bound a witness for ∃iB0(n, i), otherwise fn > 0 and must by definition bound a witness
for ∃iB0(n, i).
We have taken a non-constructive derivation of Σ01-CA and have quickly and easily
transformed it into a constructive proof of the functional interpretation of Σ01-CA that can
be clearly understood in mathematical terms by using the semantics of EPS.
6.2 Fin-Σ01-CA as the fixpoint of an update procedure
While EPS gives us an intuitive constructive proof of Fin-Σ01-CA, it is natural to ask whether
we can understand the actual computation that it carries out in more detail. How does the
specific instance EPSε with ε defined as in (6.7) behave? Can we give a more illuminating
characterisation of how our realizer computes approximations to Σ01-CA? In this section
we show that the bar recursive realizer EPSε(〈〉) is exactly the fixed point of a learning
process that keeps track of when the selection functions ‘change their mind’ and discover
non-trivial constructive information.
An informal description of the realizer
To begin with, let us give a rough simulation of how our realizer constructs an approxima-
tion to Fin-Σ01-CA. Given q and ϕ it computes the sequence f = EPS
ε,q,ϕ(〈〉), a procedure
in which each selection function εn picks a default value 0, and waits for the εm for m > n
to compute the strategic extension for this choice before it decides whether or not to
change its mind. The non-trivial steps in the procedure are precisely the points at which
the selection functions change their mind, as only in this case do they discover genuine
constructive information.
Initially, each selection function will test 0 in turn until we reach the first point N0
at which Spector’s condition holds i.e. ϕ(0N→N, N0) = ϕ(0) < N0. Clearly this point is
given by N0 = ϕ(0) + 1. EPS will then backtrack until it finds a point n0 < N0 such that
∃i < q(0)B0(n0, i) and εn0 is forced to change its mind. We have two possibilities:
(1) no such n0 exists, in which case f = EPS(〈〉) = 0N→N;
(2) εn0(p[0](n0)) = q(0) (for ps as defined in Theorem 5.7) where n0 ≤ ϕ(0) is the greatest
such that ∃i < q(0N→N)B0(n0, i).
In the case (2) let us define
u1 := [0N→N](n0) ∗ q(0N→N).
At this point in the calculation of f the εn are testing the default value 0 for all n < n0, and
it has been decided that next([0](n0)) = q(0), or in other words EPS([0](n0)) = EPS(u1).
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The computation continues by calculating the strategic extension of u1. We find the first
point N1 > n0 such that ϕ( ̂[û1](N1)) = ϕ(û1) < N1. This time, either ϕ(û1) ≤ n0 in
which case N1 = n0 + 1, or ϕ(û1) > n0 and N1 = ϕ(û1) + 1.
Putting these cases together we get N1 = max{n0 + 1, ϕ(û1) + 1}. As before, EPS
backtracks until it finds a point n0 < n1 < N1 such that ∃i < q(û1)B0(n1, i). If no such
point exists we conclude that the strategic extension of u1 is 0N→N i.e. EPS(u1) = û1. The
backtracking then continues until a point n1 < n0 is found satisfying ∃i < q(û1)B0(n1, i).
Once more, overall there are two possibilities, according to whether or not a selection
function ends up changing its mind:
(1) no such n1 exists, in which case f = EPS(û1) = û1;
(2) εn1(p[û1](n1)) = q(û1) where n1 ≤ max{n0, ϕ(û1)} = max{|u1| − 1, ϕ(û1)} is the great-
est such that n1 6= n0 and ∃i < q(û1)B0(n1, i).
In the case (2) let us define
u2 := [û1](n1) ∗ q(û1).
We have reached the next non-trivial stage in the calculation of f , in which the selection
function at n1 has changed its mind and we have next([û1](n1)) = q(û1). Now the εn are
testing 0 for all n < n1 except for the point n = n0 if n0 < n1, as this will have already
been set to the value q(0). If n1 < n0, then we are now calculating the optimal extension
of a new position [0](n1) ∗ q(û1) and we forget the value that was previously assigned to
n0.
Either way we continue by calculating the strategic extension of u2, and the algorithm
follows the same pattern as before, backtracking from the point N2 = max{n1 +1, ϕ(û2)+
1} and checking whether or not the default value works at points n < N2 that are being
tested (i.e. n 6= n0, n1 if n0 < n1, else n 6= n1). Our claim is that the process continues in
this way, yielding a sequence of updates
u0 = 〈〉 7→ u1 7→ u2 7→ . . . 7→ um
where
uj+1 = [uj ](nj) ∗ q(ûj)
for nj ≤ max{|uj | − 1, ϕ(ûj)} the greatest such that uj(nj) = 0 ∧ ∃i < q(ûj)B0(nj , i) (the
condition uj(n) = 0 indicating that εn is currently in the testing stage). This corresponds
to case (2) above. If no such nj exists we have uj+1 = uj , and this corresponds to case
(1) above. We claim that f = ûm where um is the fixpoint of this process.
The idea behind looking at the computation of EPS(〈〉) in this way is that our bar
recursive realizer for Fin-Σ01-CA can be characterised as a learning process in the sense of
[1, 2], the ‘learning’ in this case corresponding to a selection function changing its mind.
We now make this characterisation of our realizer precise.
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EPS as a learning process
Given a finite sequence u define dom(u) := {i < |u| | u(i) > 0} (note that we consider the
value 0 to be ‘undefined’). Now define an operation ? : N∗ × ((N× N) + {∅})→ N∗ by2
u ? 〈n, x〉 := [û](n) ∗ x
and u ? ∅ = u.
Definition 6.1. (a) An update procedure is a functional η : N∗ → (N× N+ {∅}) satisfying
∀u, n, x(η(u) = 〈n, x〉 → n /∈ dom(u) ∧ x > 0).
(b) Given an update procedure η and a finite sequence of numbers s, the ?-learning process
Uη,s : (ρ∗)N generated by η and s is the sequence defined by
Uη,s0 := s U
η,s
i+1 := U
η,s
i ? η(U
η,s
i ).
(c) The learning process Uη,s has a fixpoint if there exists some j such that Uη,sj+1 = U
η,s
j .
We write fix(η, s) = Uη,sj .
Remark 6.2. Note that while our definition of an update procedure in similar to e.g. Avi-
gad’s [4] and others used in the literature, our definition of the learning process generated
by an update procedure is slightly different due to the fact the operation ? performs a
‘cut-off’ update as opposed to an update ⊕ in the usual sense. We elaborate on this
below.
Remark 6.3. Fixpoints of learning processes are unique, since if Uj is a fixpoint then
Ul = Uj for all l > j. Also Uj is a fixpoint iff η(Uj) = ∅. One direction is obvious, for
the other note that if η(Uj) 6= ∅ then η(Uj) = 〈n, x〉 with n /∈ dom(Uj) and x > 0 which
implies that Uj+1(n) = x and therefore n ∈ dom(Uj+1).
Theorem 6.4. Suppose that εn : JNN is defined as
εn(p) :=
0 if ¬Cn(p(0))p(0) otherwise
where Cn is a decidable predicate satisfying ∀n¬Cn(0). Define the update procedure ηq,ϕ
by
ηq,ϕ(u) := 〈n, q(û)〉 for µ˜n ≤ max{|u| − 1, ϕ(û)}(n /∈ dom(u) ∧ Cn(q(û))), else ∅
where µ˜n ≤ mQ(n) is the bounded search operator returning the greatest element satisfying
Q(n) if it exists. Note that the condition on Cn(0) ensures that ηq,ϕ is indeed an update
2Here we casually extend our collection of finite types to include coproducts + and a null object ∅
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procedure. Then, provably in E-HAω +EPS+BI, the learning process Uηq,ϕ,〈〉 has a fixpoint
and
̂fix(ηq,ϕ, 〈〉) = EPSε,q,ϕ(〈〉).
Proof. For given q, ϕ we use bar induction on the statement P (s) that the learning process
Uη|s|,s has a fixpoint with ̂fix(η|s|, s) = EPSε,q,ϕ(s), for
ηm(u) := 〈n, q(û)〉 for µ˜n ∈ [m,max{|u| − 1, ϕ(û)}](n /∈ dom(u) ∧ Cn(q(û))), else ∅.
Clearly the theorem follows from P (〈〉). First we must establish that for any α : NN there
exists N with P ([α](N)). Now, provably in E-HAω+EPS there exists an N satisfying Spec-
tor’s condition ϕ(α,N) < N (this fact, usually given in terms of GBR, is proved for EPS in
Proposition 11.1). In this case max{N − 1, ϕ(α,N)} < N and therefore ηN ([α](N)) = ∅,
so U
ηN ,[α](N)
0 = [α](N) is a fixpoint of U
ηN ,[α](N), and
EPS([α](N)) = [α](N) @ 0 = ̂fix(ηN , [α](N)).
Now given s assume that P (s ∗ x) holds for all x. We must prove P (s). If ϕ(ŝ) < |s| then
P (s) holds by a similar argument to the one above, so we assume that ϕ(ŝ) ≥ |s|, in which
case by definition of EPS:
EPS(s) =
EPS(s ∗ 0) if ¬C|s|(q(EPS(s ∗ 0)))EPS(s ∗ q(EPS(s ∗ 0))) otherwise.
Let us define ui := U
η|s|,s
i and vi := U
η|s|+1,s∗0
i . By the hypothesis P (s ∗ 0), (vi) has a
fixpoint: let j be the least with vj = vj+1. Now, we claim that for all i ≤ j:
(i) ûi = v̂i and therefore dom(ui) = dom(vi);
(ii) s ∗ 0 ≺ ûi so in particular |s| /∈ dom(ui),dom(vi);
(iii) |s| ≤ max{|ui| − 1, ϕ(ûi)};
(iv)
n ∈ [|s|+ 1,max{|ui| − 1, ϕ(ûi)}] ∧ n /∈ dom(ui) ∧ Cn(q(ûi))
↔ n ∈ [|s|+ 1,max{|vi| − 1, ϕ(v̂i)}] ∧ n /∈ dom(vi) ∧ Cn(q(v̂i)).
We use induction. Both (i) and (ii) are clearly true if i = 0 because u0 = s and v0 = s ∗ 0.
Furthermore, max{|u0| − 1, ϕ(û0)} = max{|v0| − 1, ϕ(v̂0)} ≥ |s| by our assumption that
ϕ(ŝ) ≥ |s|, from which (iii) and (iv) follow.
Assume the induction hypothesis for i < j, and note that η|s|+1(vi) 6= ∅ by minimality
of j. Now, using the fact that
(∗) µ˜n ∈ [|s|,K]Q(n) =

µ˜n ∈ [|s|+ 1,K]Q(n) if it exists
|s| if |s| ≤ K ∧Q(|s|)
∅ otherwise
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we must have
η|s|+1(vi) = 〈n, q(v̂i)〉 (i)= 〈n, q(ûi)〉 (iv),(∗)= η|s|(ui).
Therefore ui+1 = [ûi](n) ∗ q(ûi) = [v̂i](n) ∗ q(v̂i) = vi+1, so (i) and (iv) clearly hold for
i+ 1, by the fact that n ≥ |s|+ 1 (ii) and (iii) follow.
Now, for i = j we have η|s|+1(vj) = ∅, and by (∗), using (iv) along with (ii) (|s| /∈
dom(uj)) and (iii) we obtain
η|s|(uj) = 〈|s|, q(ûj)〉 if C|s|(q(ûj)) else ∅.
There are two possible scenarios:
Case (a): ¬C|s|(q(EPS(s ∗ 0))), which by the bar induction hypothesis
ûj
(ii)
= v̂j
P (s∗0)
= EPS(s ∗ 0)
is equivalent to ¬C|s|(q(ûj)). This implies that η|s|(uj) = ∅ and so Uη|s|,s has fixpoint uj
and
ûj = EPS(s ∗ 0) = EPS(s).
Case (b): C|s|(q(EPS(s ∗ 0))) which as before is equivalent to C|s|(q(ûj)). This time
η|s|(uj) = 〈|s|, q(ûj)〉, so
uj+1 = [ûj ](|s|) ∗ q(ûj) (ii)= s ∗ q(ûj).
Define u′i := uj+1+i and wi := U
η|s|+1,s∗q(ûj). By the hypothesis P (s∗q(ûj)) we can assume
that wi has a fixpoint, so let k be the least with wk = wk+1. Now we use an analogous
but simpler argument to before, where we can claim that for all i ≤ k that:
(i) u′i = wi and therefore clearly
n ∈ [|s|+ 1,max{|u′i| − 1, ϕ(û′i)}] ∧ n /∈ dom(u′i) ∧ Cn(q(û′i))
↔ n ∈ [|s|+ 1,max{|wi| − 1, ϕ(ŵi)}] ∧ n /∈ dom(wi) ∧ Cn(q(ŵi)).
(ii) |s| ∈ dom(ui),dom(wi);
These are true for i = 0 since u′0 = s ∗ q(ûj) = w0. Assuming they hold for i < k, by
minimality of k we have
η|s|+1(wi) = 〈n, q(ŵi)〉 (i)= 〈n, q(û′i)〉
(i),(∗)
= η|s|(u′i)
and therefore u′i+1 = [û′i](n) ∗ q(û′i) = [ŵi](n) ∗ q(ŵi) = wi+1 and (ii) follows because
n ≥ |s|+ 1.
62
6.2. Fin-Σ01-CA as the fixpoint of an update procedure
For i = k we have η|s|+1(wk) = ∅, and by (∗), using (iv) along with the fact that this
time (ii) (|s| ∈ dom(u′k)) we have η|s|(u′k) = η|s|(uj+1+k) = ∅ and therefore Uη|s|,s has
fixpoint uj+1+k and
ûj+1+k
(i)
= ŵk
P (s∗q(ûj))
= EPS(s ∗ q(ûj)) P (s∗0)= EPS(s ∗ q(EPS(s ∗ 0))) = EPS(s).
This completes the bar induction, and hence the proof.
Setting Cn(x) := ∃i < xB0(n, i), Theorem 6.4 gives us an alternative characterisation
of our bar recursive realizer of Fin-Σ01-CA. The functional interpretation of Σ
0
1-CA asks
for a finite approximation Yq,ϕ to the non-computable set X := {n | B(n)} on arbitrary
counterexample functions q, ϕ. The bar recursive realizer extracted to produce Y returns
the fixpoint of a learning process Uη,〈〉, which in set theoretic terms can be written as
∅ 7→ Y1 7→ Y2 7→ . . . 7→ Ym = Y.
where Yi := {n | ∃i < Ûη,〈〉i (n)B0(n, i)}. This learning process starts with the empty
set and by a pattern of trial and correction picks up new elements until the process
terminates. It is clear from this description why our realizer works. We can informally
write Yi+1 = [Yi](ni) ∪ {ni} for ni ∈ X, therefore by induction Yi is a subset of the
non-computable set X for all i. In addition, η(Um) = ∅ implies that, setting f = Ûm,
∀n ≤ ϕf(n /∈ Ym → ∀i < qf¬B0(n, i)),
which is precisely the condition needed for Ym to be an approximation to X.
We note that inessential adjustments to the bar recursive realizer - for instance altering
the selection functions so that they play a default value 1 instead of 0, might lead to a
realizer that is slightly more difficult to describe in these terms, but would ultimately
behave in a broadly similar fashion.
Viewing the bar recursive interpretation of Σ01-CA as the fixpoint of a learning process
not only improves our understanding of how programs from proofs involving Σ01-CA behave,
but brings the ND interpretation and bar recursion closer to the world of learning-based
realizability that has been extensively explored in one sense or another in [2, 3, 4, 22]
to name just a few. It is not surprising in itself that Spector’s bar recursion can be
characterised in terms of learning - indeed it has been suggested that the concept of
learning underlies and unites all computational interpretations of classical logic (see e.g.
[2]). Nevertheless it is illuminating to be able to describe in more concrete terms the
variation on learning that specific computational interpretations implement, as we have
done in Theorem 6.4.
We will not go into any detail here on how the combination of negative translation
and functional interpretation compare with the more direct learning-based realizability
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interpretations of classical logic that have been produced in the last decade or so. We
point out that the learning process defined in this section is based on an operation ?
which only retains constructive information below the point at which we’re updating.
This ‘forgetful’ behaviour is an intrinsic feature of the backtracking implemented by bar
recursion. In contrast, learning in the sense of [3, 4] is based on an operation ⊕ is given
by
(α ⊕ 〈n, x〉)(m) :=
x if m = nα(n) otherwise.
where α is a partial function of type N→ N. The operator ⊕ generates learning processes
that always retain any constructive information they find.
All this raises an interesting question of whether the functional interpretation is of
Σ01-CA is better witnessed directly using a different form of recursion based on learning
processes, not only to produce more expressive and intuitive realizers, but for the sake
of efficiency too. However, we leave a more detailed study of this rather subtle issue to
future work.
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SEVEN
Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma for Undecidable Trees
In the previous chapter we gave a bar recursive computational interpretation of arith-
metical comprehension that could be understood in intuitive game-theoretic terms. In
this chapter we examine, from the same perspective, the computational content of weak
Ko¨nig’s lemma for Σ01-trees. We give some applications in mathematics, in each case
providing an informal game-theoretic description of the extracted realizers.
When we talk of weak Ko¨nig’s lemma in the context of reverse mathematics we usually
mean weak Ko¨nig’s lemma restricted to quantifier-free trees (as in Section 2.3). Weak
Ko¨nig’s lemma for undecidable Σ01-trees (Σ
0
1-WKL) is considerably stronger and can be
used to conveniently formalise several important theorems of mathematics including the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and the infinite Ramsey’s theorem, as has been done in [78]
and [57] respectively - bar recursive realizers for these principles also being extracted in
[78] and [56] respectively.
In this Chapter we focus on investigating the semantics of the general bar recursive in-
terpretation of Σ01-WKL, and as applications we aim to derive readable constructive proofs
of the finitizations of these two theorems given by the functional interpretation.
Weak Ko¨nig’s lemma for Σ01 trees (Σ
0
1-WKL). Any infinite binary Σ
0
1-tree T has an
infinite branch α.
We write T (sB
∗
) :≡ ∃kT0(s, k) where T0(s, i) is quantifier-free. Without loss of generality
we can insist on monotonicity in the second argument by setting T ′0(s, k) :≡ ∃i < kT0(s, i),
which will turn out to be quite convenient when extracting our realizer. For Σ01-trees, prefix
closure ∀s, t(T (s ∗ t) → T (s)) is no longer a purely universal statement, and our realizer
is constructed relative to a functional θ : B∗ × N → N that witnesses closure of T in the
following sense:
∀s, t, k(∃i < kT0(s ∗ t, i)→ ∃i < θ(s ∗ t, k)T0(s, i)). (7.1)
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We can write Σ01-WKL formally as
Σ01-WKL : ∀n∃s ∈ Bn, kT ′0(s, k)→ ∃αB
N
, βN
N∀nT ′0([α](n), β(n)).
where in fact the conclusion is slightly strengthened through an application of QF-AC to
obtain the function β. As with WKL we can absorb the bounded quantifier ∃s ∈ Bn by
defining
hk(n) := µs ∈ Bn∃i < kT0(s, i) else 0
so that Σ01-WKL becomes
Σ01-WKL : ∀n∃kT ′0(hkn, k)→ ∃α, β∀nT ′0([α](n), β(n)).
Remark 7.1. As with Σ01-CA we could alternatively write Σ
0
1-WKL as a single axiom i.e.∀f [∀s, t(∃k(f(s ∗ t, k) = 0)→ ∃k(f(s, k) = 0))→ (∀n∃s, k(f(s, k) = 0)→ ∃α∀n∃k(f([α](n), k) = 0))]
This is (essentially) the form in which it is interpreted in e.g. [78]. The difference here
is that we interpret a rule form of Σ01-WKL in which we assume that the predicate T is
prefix closed. This is certainly sufficient for applications of Σ01-WKL to specific trees, and it
means that we have the luxury of a somewhat simpler program extraction. Note, however,
that by calibrating exactly where our realizers for the rule form use prefix closure, we could
easily regain a functional interpretation of the axiom form of Σ01-WKL.
It is easy to see that Σ01-WKL can be reduced to WKL by encoding finite branches
s : B∗ as natural numbers and using a single instance of Σ01-CA to produce a characteristic
function for T . We analyse the computational content of a slightly different reduction of
Σ01-WKL to WKL using bounded collection and Π
0
1-AC.
Theorem 7.2. Σ01-WKL is instancewise provable from Π
0
1-AC over WE-PA
ω + QF-AC +
WKL.
Proof. By the law of excluded middle we have
∀n∀sBn∃l∀k(∃i < kT0(s, i)→ ∃i < lT0(s, i)).
Applying bounded collection over the quantifier ∀s ∈ Bn we have
∀n∃L∀sBn , k(∃i < kT0(s, i)→ ∃i < LT0(s, i))
and therefore by Π01-AC there exists β : N→ N satisfying
∀s, k(∃i < kT0(s, i)→ ∃i < β(|s|)T0(s, i)). (7.2)
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Observe that this is just a reformulation of (6.2) where we now have an instance of
bounded collection as an intermediate step. Now, if T is infinite, then by (7.2) T β(s) :≡
T ′0(s, β(|s|)) is an infinite quantifier-free tree. By WKL on T β there exists a α : BN satisfying
∀nT β([α](n)) or in other words
∀nT ′0([α](n), β(n))
which is the conclusion of Σ01-WKL.
7.1 A bar recursive interpretation of Σ01-WKL
Using MPω, the negative translation of Σ01-WKL is equivalent to
∀n∃kT ′0(hkn, k)→ ¬¬∃α, β∀nT ′0([α](n), β(n)),
so we will construct a realizer for the functional interpretation of
∃gNN∀nT ′0(hgnn, gn)→ ∀ω∃α, β∀n ≤ ωαβT ′0([α](n), β(n)) (7.3)
where ω : BN × NN → N, which will entail the extraction of α, β and n on parameters g,
ω and θ.
Remark 7.3. Note that technically the functional interpretation only requires us to realize
∃gNN∀nT ′0(hgnn, gn)→ ∀ω˜∃α, βT ′0([α](ω˜αβ), β(ω˜αβ)). (7.4)
However, bar recursion naturally provides us with a realizer for (7.3), and either way
a realizer for (7.3) is easily obtained from a realizer for (7.4) by setting ω˜αβ := µn ≤
ωαβ¬T ′0([α](n), β(n)).
One can rephrase (7.3) more naturally as follows
Finitary weak Ko¨nig’s lemma for Σ01 trees (Fin-Σ
0
1-WKL). Suppose there exists a
function g : N→ N witnessing that the Σ01-tree T has branches of arbitrary length. Then
for any ω : BN × NN → N there exists a sequence α : BN along with a function β : NN wit-
nessing that α is an approximation to an infinite branch of T , in the sense that for all
n ≤ ωαβ, β(n) bounds a witness for [α](n) ∈ T .
We now extract from the classical proof of Σ01-WKL a constructive proof of (the full
functional interpretation of) Fin-Σ01-WKL. Our first step is the construction of an approx-
imation to the function β in (7.2) using the product of selection functions.
Lemma 7.4. For arbitrary q, ϕ : NN → N there exists βq,ϕ : N→ N satisfying
∀n ≤ ϕβ∀s ∈ Bn(T ′0(s, qβ)→ T ′0(s, βq,ϕn)).
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Proof. Define the selection functions εn : JNN by
εn(p) := p
(i)(0) (7.5)
where i ≤ 2n is the least such that
∀s ∈ Bn(T ′0(s, p(i+1)(0))→ T ′0(s, p(i)(0))).
It is easy to see that εn is well-defined. If not, then we end up with a sequence s0, . . . , s2n
in Bn such that
∃i < p(j+1)(0)T0(sj , i) ∧ ∀i < p(j)(0)¬T0(sj , i),
for all j, which implies that the sj form 2
n + 1 distinct elements of Bn - a contradiction.
Therefore the εn satisfy
∀n, p∀s ∈ Bn(T ′0(s, p(εnp))→ T ′0(s, εnp))
Now define βq,ϕ := EPS
ε,q,ϕ(〈〉). By the fact that EPS solves Spector’s equations (5.3) i.e.
βq,ϕn = εnpn and pn(εnpn) = qβq,ϕ for all n ≤ ϕβq,ϕ, we have
∀s ∈ Bn(T ′0(s, qβq,ϕ)→ T ′0(s, βq,ϕn))
for all n ≤ ϕβq,ϕ.
Finally, we use Howard’s computational interpretation of WKL (Section 4.3) in con-
junction with our approximation of β to witness Fin-Σ01-WKL. Informally, we assume the
existence of a non-computable function β satisfying
∀s, k(∃i < kT0(s, k)→ ∃i < β(|s|)T0(s, i))
and compute an approximation αβ to an infinite branch in the tree T β(s) ≡ ∃i <
β(|s|)T0(s, i) on the functional ωβ := λα.ωαβ. We then calibrate the size qω, ϕω of the
approximation to β necessary to validate our realizer. Of course, in pure logical terms this
is nothing more than the functional interpretation of implication. We (very informally)
illustrate the whole construction in Figure 7.1.
Theorem 7.5. Suppose we have a binary tree T , whose prefix closure is witnessed by θ
as in (7.1). Given parameters g : N → N and ω : BN × NN → N, for arbitrary β : N → N
define Kβω using Howard’s binary bar recursion as
Kβω(s) :=
0 if ω(sˆ, β) < |s|1 + max{Kβω(s ∗ 0),Kβω(s ∗ 1)} otherwise.
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Th. 4.7
λβ . |WKL[β]|αω,βωβ
L. 7.4
|Σ01-CA|βqω,ϕω
Th. 7.5
|Σ01-WKL|αβ ,βω
Figure 7.1: Constructive proof of finitary weak Ko¨nig’s lemma for Σ01-trees
Then define Nβω := K
β
ω(〈〉) and αβω,g := ûβω,g where uβω,g is the least u  hgNβωN
β
ω satisfying
ω(û, β) < |u| (which must exist by the proof of Theorem 4.7). Finally, abbreviate βω,g :=
βqω,g ,ϕω,g as in Lemma 7.4 where
qω,gβ := θ(hgNβω
Nβω , gN
β
ω )
ϕω,gβ := ωα
β
ω,gβ.
Then Nω,g := N
βω,g
ω , αω,g := α
βω,g
ω,g and βω,g witness the functional interpretation of (7.3)
i.e.
∀g, ω(T ′0(hgNω,gNω,g, gNω,g)→ ∀n ≤ ωαω,gβω,gT ′0([αω,g](n), βω,gn).
Proof. Let n ≤ ωαω,gβω,g. Then because αω,g = ûω,g where we abbreviate uω,g := uβω,gω,g
we have,
[αω,g](n)  [αω,g](ωαω,gβω,g) = [ûω,g](ω(ûω,g, βω,g))
ω(û,β)<|u|≺ uω,g  hgNω,gNω,g.
Therefore by prefix closure of T (witnessed by θ) and definition of qω,g,
T ′0(hgNω,gNω,g, gNω,g)→ T ′0([αω,g](n), θ(hgNω,gNω,g, gNω,g))→ T ′0([αω,g](n), qω,gβω,g).
Now by Lemma 7.4 and the fact that ωαω,gβω,g = ϕω,gβω,g, we have
∀n ≤ ωαω,gβω,g∀s ∈ Bn(T ′0(s, qω,gβω,g)→ T ′0(s, βω,gn)),
so setting s = [αω,g](n) we get
T ′0([αω,g](n), qω,gβω,g)→ T ′0([αω,g](n), βω,gn)
and putting these together we obtain
T ′0(hgNω,gNω,g, gNω,g)→ T ′0([αω,g](n), βω,gn)
for arbitrary n ≤ ωαω,gβω,g, and we’re done.
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A game theoretic description of the realizer
We now make explicit the game semantics of our realizer for Fin-Σ01-WKL. The situation
is more complex than for arithmetical comprehension in the previous chapter, partly due
to the fact that we now have two instances of bar recursion. However, the most significant
component of the realizer is the single instance of EPS used in Lemma 7.4 to construct the
comprehension function β, and this behaves similarly to our realizer in Chapter 6, as the
selection functions (7.5) are just an iterative version of (6.7). Our constructive proof of
Fin-Σ01-WKL can be described in terms of a central sequential game G[ω, g] = (ε, qω,g, ϕω,g)
of type (N,N) parametrised by ω and g.
(a) A play β of G defines a subset T β = {s | ∃i < β(|s|)T0(s, i)} of the non-computable
tree T , where moves at round n are natural numbers that witness branches of length
n. Note that for arbitrary β the set T β need not be a tree itself.
(b) Under the assumption that g satisfies the premise of (7.3), for each play β we can
construct, via binary bar recursion, a branch αβω,g satisfying T ([α
β
ω,g](ωα
β
ω,gβ)).
Now, the property ‘[αβω,g](ωα
β
ω,gβ) is a branch of T ’ is substantially weaker than [α
β
ω,g](ωα
β
ω,gβ),
β being an approximation to an infinite branch in the sense of Fin-Σ01-WKL. For this, we
require that β also satisfies ∀n ≤ ωαβω,gβT ′0([αβω,g](n), βn), or in other words
∀n ≤ ωαβω,gβ([αβω,g](n) ∈ T β).
One way of looking at β is that it allows us to compute arbitrarily many witnesses that
in a sense converge to αβω,g.
The role of our main instance of EPS is to compute an optimal play βq,ϕ in G = (ε, q, ϕ)
that will form an approximation to the ideal characteristic function β in (7.2) relative to
given counterexample functions q and ϕ. We calibrate the size of this approximation in
terms of ω and g to ensure that T βq,ϕ contains [α
βq,ϕ
ω,g ](n) for n ≤ ωαβq,ϕω,g βq,ϕ, and therefore
contains an approximation to an infinite branch.
(c) The selection functions ε defined in Lemma 7.4 build an approximation βq,ϕ relative
to some ϕ, q using the following strategy. At position tN
∗
with |t| = n and ϕ(t̂) ≥
n, the selection function εn decides which branches of length n to include in the
approximation. It plays a default value x0 = 0 and tries to get away with omitting all
branches in Bn from the approximation. If, however, the outcome p(0) = q(EPS(t ∗
0)) = q(t∗0∗α0) (where α0 is the optimal extension of t∗0) bounds a witness for T0(s, i)
for some s ∈ Bn, it changes its mind and updates x0 7→ x1 = q(t ∗ 0 ∗α0) to include all
such s in the approximation. It now repeats this step: if p(p(0)) = p(x1) = q(t∗x1∗α1)
(where α1 the optimal continuation of t ∗ x1) bounds a witness for any new branches
not already witnessed by x1, εn updates x1 7→ x2 = q(t ∗ x1 ∗ α1) and adds those new
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branches to the approximation. It continues the process of trial and improvement at
most 2n times before it find some xj bounding a suitably large subset of Bn such that
∃i < q(t ∗ xj ∗ αj)T0(s, i)→ ∃i < xjT0(s, i)
for all s ∈ Bn.
An optimal play βq,ϕ in the game satisfies
n ≤ ϕβq,ϕ, ∀s ∈ Bn[∃i < qβq,ϕT0(s, i)→ ∃i < βq,ϕnT0(s, i)].
In other words, the set T βq,ϕ is an approximation to T of size ϕβq,ϕ and depth qβq,ϕ. Now,
given ω and g, specific parameters qω,g, ϕω,g for G[ω, g] are given as follows.
(d) The relevant part of a play β, which determines the size of the approximation to T ,
is given by ϕω,gβ := ωα
β
ω,gβ to guarantee that the approximation covers the branches
[αβω,g](n) for n ≤ ωαβω,gβ.
(e) The outcome of a play β, which determines the ‘depth’ of the approximation to
T , is given by qω,gβ := θ(hgNβω
Nβω , gN
β
ω ), which guarantees that the approximation
also covers witnesses to [αβω,g](n) for all n ≤ ωαβω,gβ, since T ′0(hgNβωN
β
ω , gN
β
ω ) implies
T ′0([α
β
ω,g](n), qω,gβ).
Together, these imply that an optimal play βω,g = βqω,g ,ϕω,g of G[ω, g] satisfies
∃i < βω,gnT0([αβω,gω,g ](n), i)
for all n ≤ ωαβω,gω,g βω,g and so forms an approximation to T β of sufficiently high quality
that it contains an approximation to an infinite branch of T relative to ω, hence realizing
the functional interpretation of Σ01-WKL.
The semantics of EPS give us a clear game-theoretic characterisation of our constructive
proof of Fin-Σ01-WKL, and one which nicely reflects the structure of the classical proof
it was extracted from. Our derivation of Σ01-WKL in Theorem 7.2 contains three key
ineffective steps: first a combination of the law of excluded middle and bounded collection
to construct a bound L for witnesses T (s) for s of fixed length, then an application of
Π01-AC to obtain a characteristic function β for T , and finally weak Ko¨nig’s lemma applied
to the quantifier-free tree T β.
These three steps correspond to the main components of the game G[ω, g]. Bounded
collection is interpreted by the selection functions εn which define a strategy for G[ω, g] that
entails approximately deciding which branches of length n lie in T , and their unbounded
product EPSε interprets Π01-AC to form an approximation to the characteristic function
β. Finally, the outcome and control functionals ϕω,g and qω,g constructed using binary
bar recursion interpret WKL and ensure that T β contains an approximation to an infinite
branch of T .
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classical proof sequential game G[ω, g]
LEM/bounded collection selection functions εn
countable choice unbounded product EPSε
weak Ko¨nig’s lemma outcome and control functionals qω,g, ϕω,g
Table 7.1: Functional interpretation of Σ01-WKL
Fin-Σ01-WKL as the fixpoint of an update procedure
We claim that the ideas from Section 6.2, in which the realizer for Σ01-CA was characterised
in terms of a learning process, are also valid for our realizer of Σ01-WKL whose selection
functions ε employ a similar strategy. Our approximation to T could be characterised as
the fixpoint of a ?-learning process
T0 = ∅ 7→ T1 7→ T2 7→ . . . 7→ Tm ⊇ [α](ωαβ)
where Ti+1 is obtained from Ti by adding (potentially several) new branches of length
n to Ti and erasing all branches of length greater than n. In contrast to the selection
functions defined in Chapter 6, our selection functions here test up to 2n values before
deciding on a move, suggesting that our update procedure would allow updated points to
be ‘improved’ finitely many times. It would be interesting to see an extension of Theorem
6.4 that incorporates our realizer for Σ01-WKL
7.2 The Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
We now give the first of two applications in which we briefly illustrate how the game
semantics of our realizer of Σ01-WKL might be useful in practise to shed some light on the
computational content of well-known theorems in mathematics. The Bolzano-Weierstrass
principle (BW) follows directly from Σ01-WKL, and we give a straightforward computational
interpretation to BW for rational sequences in the unit interval. The reader is directed to
[78] for a comprehensive account of the computational content of the Bolzano-Weierstrass
principle. There a general bar recursive realizer for the ND interpretation of BW for se-
quences of reals in the product space Πn∈N[−kn, kn] is given, and a complexity analysis of
the realizer is carried out to calibrate the computational contribution of fixed instances of
BW used in proofs of Π2-theorems. However, the realizer given in [78] is rather intricate,
and we feel it is beneficial to present a realizer in terms of EPS for a simple instance of
BW and describe how it behaves.
Bolzano-Weierstrass principle for [0, 1]Q. Any sequence (xi) of rationals in the unit
interval [0, 1] contains a subsequence (xbi) converging to some a ∈ [0, 1].
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We can express this formally as
BW : ∀(xi)N→[0,1]Q∃αBN , bNN∀n(bn < b(n+ 1) ∧ xbn ∈ I[α](n)),
where for a finite sequence of booleans s we define the interval
Is :=
|s|−1∑
i=0
si
2i+1
,
|s|−1∑
i=0
si
2i+1
+
1
2|s|

for |s| > 0 and I〈〉 := [0, 1]. Note that x ∈ Is is decidable for x : Q. Intuitively we identify
α : BN with the real number a :=
∑∞
i=0
αi
2i+1
, so that xbn ∈ I[α](n) ↔ |xbn − a| ≤ 2−n and
therefore (xbi) converges to a (although a detailed formalisation of BW would require us
to make this intuition explicit relative to some appropriate encoding of the real numbers
- see [78] for details).
Theorem 7.6. BW is instancewise provable from Σ01-WKL over WE-PA
ω + QF-AC.
Proof. Fix the sequence (xi) and define
T (s) :≡ ∃i(|s| ≤ i ∧ (xi ∈ Is)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T0(s,i)
).
Observe that the functional θ witnessing prefix closure of T can be taken to be the identity
in this case, as T0(s ∗ t, i) → T0(s, i) for all s, t because Is∗t ⊆ Is. The tree T is infinite
because for any n there is some sequence s of length n such that the interval Is contains
the point xn. Therefore by Σ
0
1-WKL there exists α : BN and β : NN satisfying
∀n∃i ∈ [n, β(n))(xi ∈ I[α](n)).
Now define bα,β : N→ N primitive recursively by
bα,β(0) := 0
bα,β(n+ 1) := µi ∈ [b(n) + 1, β(b(n) + 1))(xi ∈ I[α](b(n)+1)).
Then b(n) < b(n+1) by definition. Moreover, xb(0) ∈ I〈〉 and xb(n+1) ∈ I[α](bn+1) ⊆ I[α](n+1)
since bn+ 1 ≥ n+ 1. Therefore α and bα,β satisfy BW.
To solve the functional interpretation of BW we must produce a witness for α and b in
∀(xi), ψBN×NN→N∃α, b∀n ≤ ψ(α, b)(bn < b(n+ 1) ∧ xbn ∈ I[α](n)), (7.6)
a statement which can be rephrased as
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Finitary Bolzano-Weierstrass principle for [0, 1]Q (Fin-BW). Suppose (xi) is a se-
quence of rationals in [0, 1]. For an arbitrary functional ψ : BN × NN → N, there exists
α ∈ [0, 1] and a function b : N→ N such that xb0, xb1, . . . , xb(ψ(α,b)) is a finite subsequence
of (xi) satisfying |xbn − α| ≤ 2−n for all n ≤ ψ(α, b).
A realizer for this computational interpretation of BW can be easily constructed from our
realizer of Fin-Σ01-WKL.
Theorem 7.7. Given (xi) and ψ, primitive recursively define g : N → N and ωψ : BN ×
NN → N by
g(n) := n+ 1
ωψ(α, β) := bα,β(ψ(α, bα,β))
where bα,β is defined by
bα,β(0) := 0
bα,β(n+ 1) := µi ∈ [b(n) + 1, β(b(n) + 1))(xi ∈ I[α](b(n)+1)), else b(n) + 1.
.
Construct βψ := βωψ ,g and αψ := αωψ ,g as in Theorem 7.5. Then bψ := bαψ ,βψ and αψ
realize Fin-BW (7.6).
Proof. We have T0(hgnn, gn) for all n since xn lies in at least one Is for s : Bn. Therefore
by Theorem 7.5
∀n ≤ ωψ(αψ, βψ)∃i ∈ [n, βψ(n))(xi ∈ I[αψ ](n)).
Clearly xbψ0 = x0 ∈ I〈〉, and n < ψ(αψ, bψ) implies that bψ(n) + 1 ≤ bψ(ψ(αψ, bψ)) =
ωψ(αψ, βψ) (since we have bψ(i) < bψ(i+ 1) by definition) and hence
∃i ∈ [bψ(n) + 1, β(bψ(n) + 1))(xi ∈ I[αψ ](bψ(n)+1)).
This implies that xbψ(n+1) ∈ I[αψ ](bψ(n)+1) ⊆ I[αψ ](n+1) and we’re done.
Because our realizer for Fin-BW is constructed directly from that of Fin-Σ01-WKL, it
also inherits the game-semantics we have imposed on the latter, and its main component
is the computation of an optimal strategy in the game G[ωψ, g] for ωψ and g as defined
in Theorem 7.7. We will not reiterate in detail the description of our realizer given in
Section 7.1, although it is instructive to describe in a more informal manner the concrete
sequential game that arises in this case.
Intuitively, in this scenario objects α : BN represent real numbers in [0, 1] and objects
β : NN search for convergent subsequences of (xi): indeed, if α is an infinite branch of T
witnessed by β then the function bα,β yields a subsequence (xbi) that converges to α. In
order to construct an approximation xbψ0, . . . , xbψ(ψ(αψ ,bψ)) to a convergent subsequence we
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require an approximation αψ, βψ to an infinite branch of T of size ωψαψβψ = bψ(ψ(αψ, bψ))
for bψ = bαψ ,βψ : Because our g witnesses that T is infinite, the approximation satisfies
∀n ≤ bψ(ψ(αψ, bψ))∃i ∈ [n, βψ(n))(xi ∈ I[αψ ](n)),
and in turn this guarantees that the construction bψ always satisfies xbψ(n) ∈ I[αψ ](n)
for n ≤ ψ(αψ, bψ), and therefore provides us with a subsequence of length ψ(αψ, bψ)
approximately converging to αψ.
The main instance of EPS in our realizer for Σ01-WKL finds an optimal play in the game
in which the selection function εn is responsible for collecting information about which
intervals Is for |s| = n are inhabited by elements of (xi) for i ≥ n. Very roughly, the
backtracking implemented by EPS is based on the following idea: an initial segment of
a play β corresponds to a collection of candidates for the initial segment of a convergent
subsequence, and the bar recursion attempts to extend this collection to an approximation
to a convergent subsequence. If this extension lies outside of the intervals inhabited by
the initial collection, we update our initial collection with elements from this extension
and repeat the process.
Of course, further work is needed to make all this precise. However, at the very least
we have been able to characterise the basic mathematical meaning of the main components
of G[ωψ, g], which we summarise in Table 8.2.
G[ωψ, g] Finitary Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
g(n) there is an interval in partition of size 2n that is inhabited by xn
εn find intervals in partition of size 2
n that are inhabited by some xi for i ≥ n
EPSε construct approximation to convergent subsequence (via bα,β)
ωψ make sure length of resulting approximation is large enough relative to ψ
Table 7.2: Functional interpretation of BW
7.3 Ramsey’s theorem for pairs
We conclude this chapter with a computational interpretation of the proof of Ramsey’s
theorem for pairs by Erdo˝s and Rado [25, Section 10.2]. Unsurprisingly, Ramsey’s theorem
has been extensively studied in logic, and several constructive interpretations have been
offered. A computational analysis of Ramsey’s theorem is given in e.g. [7, 21, 93], and also
in [56] where a realizer for its ND interpretation based on the Erdo˝s-Rado proof is given,
even for RT2<∞. However, our work here is directly inspired by that of Kohlenbach and
Kreuzer [57] who demonstrate that the Erdo˝s-Rado proof can be formalised with Σ01-WKL.
Using a slightly different formalisation to theirs, we apply our realizer for Σ01-WKL to
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extract a new computational interpretation of Ramsey’s theorem in terms of the product
of selection functions. Note that the primary motivation of [57] is to establish conservation
results and bounds on the computational complexity of programs extracted from proofs
using Ramsey’s theorem (see also [55, 58]). Here we simply wish to gain some insight into
the constructive meaning of the well-known and proof theoretically non-trivial Erdo˝s-Rado
construction.
A more thorough treatment of the interpretation of Ramsey’s theorem using the prod-
uct of selection functions is given by the author in [68]. Here, Howard’s realizer for WKL
is replaced by a binary product of selection functions (see Section 7.4), and using in addi-
tion the finite product of selection functions to interpret the infinite pigeonhole principle
a computational interpretation of Ramsey’s theorem is given purely in terms of three co-
ordinated games.
Ramsey’s theorem for pairs (RT2n). For any n-colouring c : N(2) → [n] of pairs of
natural numbers, there exists an infinite set X ⊆ N that is pairwise monochromatic.
Pairwise monochromatic means that there exists some x < n such that c{i, j} = x for all
{i, j} ∈ X(2). In our analysis of Ramsey’s theorem we restrict ourselves to the two-colour
case RT22, although everything that follows can be directly extended to the general case
(we will indicate how as we go along) and the behaviour of the general program is largely
analogous to this special case. Written formally
RT22 : ∀cN
(2)→[2]∃x < 2, FN→N∀n(Fn ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j ≤ n(Fi < Fj → c({Fi, Fj}) = x)).
(7.7)
Note that the infinite monochromatic set is encoded by F as X := {n | ∃k(Fk = n)}.
Notation. In the following it is more natural to encode c as a function c : N2 → [2] satis-
fying c(i, j) = c(j, i) for i < j and c(i, i) = 0.
The main idea behind the Erdo˝s-Rado proof of RT2n is to organise the natural numbers
into a tree (described as an ordering ≺ on N) whose branches are min-monochromatic,
in the sense that c(i, j) = c(i, k) for i ≺ j ≺ k. This is the so-called Erdo˝s-Rado
(E/R) tree. The E/R tree is finitely branching, and therefore contains an infinite min-
monochromatic branch a : NN. By the infinite pigeonhole principle applied to the colour-
ing ca(i) = c(a(i), a(i + 1)) there exists an infinite subset of this branch that is pairwise
monochromatic. By encoding branches of the E/R tree as branches of a binary Σ01-tree,
we show that Ramsey’s theorem can be derived from Σ01-WKL.
It is important to remark why - as in [57] - the Erdo¨s-Rado proof is preferred to Ram-
sey’s seemingly simpler proof in [75]. Ramsey constructs an infinite min-monochromatic
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branch directly using dependent choice: First we define a0 = 0, then we use IPHP to
produce an infinite set A1 ⊆ N\0 that is monochromatic under c0(i) = c(0, i) and define
a(1) = minA1. Next use IPHP to produce an infinite set A2 ⊆ A1\a(1) that is monochro-
matic under ca(1)(i) = c(a(1), i) and define a(2) = minA2 and so on. It is easy to see that
the resulting a is min-monochromatic. However, Ramsey’s construction uses dependent
choice of type 1 (and cannot even be formalised in the subsystem ACA0 [84]), therefore
its computational interpretation would seemingly involve bar recursion of level 1. Our
interpretation of the Erdo˝s-Rado proof, on the other hand, makes use of the product of
selection functions of lowest type only, meaning that our construction is computationally
simpler.
Definition 7.8 (Erdo˝s/Rado tree). Given a colouring c : N2 → [2], define a partial order ≺
on N recursively as follows:
1. 0 ≺ 1
2. Given that ≺ is already defined on the initial segment of the natural numbers [m],
for i < m define
i ≺ m iff c(k, i) = c(k,m), for all k ≺ i.
Note that ≺ is a suborder of ≤, and also that ≺ is decidable.
It is not too hard to show that ≺ is transitive, and also that i ≺ j iff i < j for
i, j ∈ pd(m). Therefore ≺ defines a tree on N, the so-called Erdo˝s/Rado tree, whose
branches are min-monochromatic i.e. c(k, i) = c(k, j) for k ≺ i ≺ j. Moreover, this tree is
binary branching because i and j are distinct successors of k if and only if c(k, i) 6= c(k, j)
(for the general n-colour case the E/R-tree is n-branching). For proofs of these facts see
[57, Section 4].
Lemma 7.9. The tree ≺ has an infinite branch, or in other words there exists a : N→ N
satisfying
∀n(n ≤ an ∧ ∀i, j, k < n(ak < ai ∧ ak < aj → c(ak, ai) = c(ak, aj))), (7.8)
provably in WE-PAω + QF-AC + Σ01-WKL.
Proof. Define the Σ01 tree T by
T (s) :≡ ∃k(|s| ≤ k ∧ ∀i < |s|(si = 0↔ i ≺ k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T0(s,k)
),
Note that T (s ∗ t, k) → T (s, k). If a binary sequence s belongs to T then it is the
characteristic function of a proper initial segment of a branch in the E/R tree. Clearly T
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has branches of arbitrary length: for any n we have T0(s, n) where s is the branch of length
n defined by si = 0 ↔ i ≺ n, i.e. s is the characteristic function of pd(n). Therefore by
Σ01-WKL there exist α, β satisfying
∀n∃k ∈ [n, β(n))∀i < n(α(i) = 0↔ i ≺ k). (7.9)
We must now show that α encodes an infinite min-monochromatic branch. Let us construct
the function aα,β : N→ N as
a(n) =

0 if n = 0
µi ∈ [n, β(2)(n)) such that α(i) = 0, else n if n > 0.
(7.10)
We claim that a satisfies α(a(n)) = 0 for all n. If this is so, then a also satisfies (7.8), since
a(n) ≥ n by definition, and if ak < ai < aj then setting n = aj + 1 in (7.9) gives some k′
such that ai, aj, ak ≺ k′ and therefore ak ≺ ai ≺ aj and hence c(ak, ai) = c(ak, aj).
Clearly α(a(0)) = α(0) = 0 since 0 ≺ k for all k. To prove the claim for n > 0,
suppose for contradiction that α(i) 6= 0 for all i ∈ [n, β(2)(n)). Let j < n be the largest
such that α(j) = 0 (this exists since 0 ≺ k for all k). By (7.9) let k0 ∈ [n, β(n)) be the
least satisfying ∀i < n(α(i) = 0 ↔ i ≺ k0). Then k0 is an immediate successor of j,
otherwise if j ≺ x ≺ k0 then x ≥ n by maximality of j, contradicting minimality of k0.
Next, define k1 ∈ [β(n), β(2)(n)) to be the least satisfying ∀i < β(n)(α(i) = 0 ↔ i ≺ k1).
By assumption, j is the greatest number < β(n) with α(j) = 0, therefore k1 is also an
immediate successor of j. But there exists k2 ≥ β(2)(n) satisfying ∀i < β(2)(n)(α(i) =
0 ↔ i ≺ k2). Because k0 < k1 < k2 and j ≺ k2, by the fact that the E/R tree is
binary branching we must have ki ≺ k2 and therefore α(ki) = 0 for i = 0 or 1. But
ki ∈ [n, β(2)(n)), a contradiction.
Remark 7.10. In generalising the proof of Lemma 7.9 for m-colours we would need to
define a(n) = µk ∈ [n, β(m)) . . . to reflect the fact that the E/R-tree is m-branching.
Remark 7.11. The formalisation of Ramsey’s theorem in [57] is based on a slightly different
Σ01-tree whose branches represent colourings of branches of the E/R tree as opposed to
characteristic functions of those branches. There the priority is a formalisation that is
optimal with respect to the amount of induction used, here we have no such concerns and
prefer a formalisation in which branches of T directly encode branches of the E/R tree.
Theorem 7.12. RT22 is instancewise provable from Σ
0
1-WKL, over WE-PA
ω + QF-AC.
Proof. We use Lemma 7.9 along with IPHP, which we recall states that for any colouring
c : N→ [k] there exists x ≤ k such that
∀n∃m(m ≥ n ∧ c(m) = x).
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Define the colouring ca : N→ [2] as ca(n) := c(a(n), a(a(n)+1)) for a as defined in Lemma
7.9. Then by QF-AC there exists x < 2 and p : N→ N such that p(n) ≥ n for all n and
x = ca(pi) = c(a(pi), a(a(pi) + 1))
(7.8)
= c(a(pi), a(pj))
for any i, j with a(pi) < a(pj). Hence setting F (n) := a(pn) we have
F (n) ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j ≤ n(Fi < Fj → c(Fi, F j) = x),
for arbitrary n, and therefore F and x satisfy (7.7).
7.3.1 A bar recursive interpretation of RT22
The functional interpretation of RT22 is given by
∀c, η[2]×NN→N∃x, F∀n ≤ ηxF (Fn ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j ≤ n(Fi < Fj → c(Fi, Fj) = x)). (7.11)
which can be informally stated as
Finitary Ramsey’s theorem for pairs (Fin-RT22). Given a colouring c : N(2) → [2] and
a functional η : [2]× NN → N there exists x < 2 and a function F such that the finite set
X := {Fk | k ≤ ηxF} is pairwise monochromatic.
Here X forms a finite approximation to an infinite monochromatic set. Note that by defin-
ing F˜ by F˜ (0) = F (0) and F˜ (n+1) = F (F˜ (n)+1) and setting η˜xF := maxi≤ηxF˜ (F˜ (i)+1)
we obtain
∀c, η[2]×NN→N∃x, F˜∀m < n ≤ ηxF˜ (F˜ (m) < F˜ (n) ∧ c(F˜ (m), F˜ (n)) = x)
from (7.11), and so we can always produce an approximation F˜ of size ηxF˜ .
The following lemma is the computational interpretation of Lemma 7.9.
Lemma 7.13. Given an arbitrary functional ψ : NN → N define g : N → N and ω : BN ×
NN → N by
g(n) := n+ 1
ωψ(α, β) := max
i≤ψ(aα,β)
(max{i, β(i), β(2)(i)})
where aα,β is as in Lemma 7.9. Construct βψ = βωψ ,g and αψ = αωψ ,g as in Theorem 7.5.
Then aψ = aαψ ,βψ satisfies
∀n ≤ ψaψ(n ≤ aψn ∧ ∀i, j, k ≤ n(aψk < aψi ∧ aψk < aψj → c(aψk, aψi) = c(aψk, aψj))).
(7.12)
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Proof. We have T0(s, n) for the branch s ∈ B(n) given by si = 0 ↔ i ≺ n, therefore we
have T ′0(hnn, gn) for all n. Then by Theorem 7.5 we have
∀n ≤ ωψ(αψ, βψ)∃k ∈ [n, βψ(n))∀i < n(αψ(i) = 0↔ i ≺ k). (7.13)
Now, aψn ≥ n by definition. Next, we can show that α(aψ(n)) = 0 for all n ≤ ψ(aψ) by
definition of ωψ and (7.13), using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 7.9.
Finally, for i, j, k ≤ ψaψ with (w.l.o.g) aψk < aψi < aψj, by (7.13) for n = aψj + 1 ≤
β
(2)
ψ (j) ≤ ωψ(αψ, βψ) and the fact that αψ(aψi) = αψ(aψj) = αψ(aψk) = 0 there is
some k′ such that aψk, aψi, aψj ≺ k′ and therefore aψk ≺ aψi ≺ aψj, so we must have
c(aψk, aψi) = c(aψk, aψj) by definition of ≺. Thus aψ satisfies (7.12).
Now we interpret the instance of IPHP in the proof of RT22. One can very naturally
interpret IPHP using a finite form of bar recursion such as the finite product of selection
functions (see [66], [31, Section 7] for a general solution). In this instance we only require
the binary product ⊗ (see Definition 5.2), while the n-colour case will involve the finite
product of length n. We give the construction directly without further explanation, as it
forms only a minor part of the overall realizer.
Lemma 7.14. Suppose we have a colouring d : N→ [2] and a functional δ : [2]×NN → N.
Then there exists x < 2 and p : N→ N dependent on d and δ satisfying
∀i ≤ δxp(pi ≥ i ∧ d(pi) = x). (7.14)
Proof. Define δ˜xp := µi ≤ δxp¬(pi ≥ i ∧ d(pi) = x) and let 〈a0, a1〉 = (δ˜0 ⊗ δ˜1)(max) and
N = max{a0, a1}. Then we have
a0 = δ˜0p0 a1 = δ˜1p1 N = p0(a0) = p1(a1)
where p1 := λy.max{a0, y} and p0 := λx.max{x, δ˜1(λy.max{x, y})} (these are just Spec-
tor’s equations (5.3) for the binary product of selection functions). Let xd,δ = d(N) and
pd,δ = pxd,δ . Then x and px satisfy (7.14) because (suppressing parameters) px(δ˜xpx) =
px(ax) = N ≥ ax = δ˜xpx and d(px(δ˜xpx)) = d(px(ax)) = d(N) = x. Therefore
px(δ˜xpx) ≥ δ˜xpx ∧ d(px(δ˜xpx)) = x
and so (7.14) must hold by definition of δ˜i.
We are now ready to construct our realizer for Fin-RT22.
Theorem 7.15. Suppose we are given η : [2] × NN → N and c : N2 → [2]. Suppressing
these parameters, for arbitrary a : N→ N define δa : [2]×NN → N by δaxp:=ηx(a◦p), define
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the colouring ca(i) := c(a(i), a(a(i) + 1)) and let xa : [2], pa : N → N be constructed as in
Lemma 7.14 on parameters ca, δa so that they satisfy
∀i ≤ ηxa(a ◦ pa)(pa(i) ≥ i ∧ ca(pa(i)) = xa). (7.15)
Now define ψa := maxi≤ηxa (a◦pa)(max{pa(i), a(pa(i)) + 1}) and define aψ as in Lemma
7.13 so that it satisfies
n ≤ aψn ∧ ∀i, j, k ≤ n(aψk < aψi ∧ aψk < aψj → c(aψk, aψi) = c(aψk, aψj)) (7.16)
for all n ≤ ψaψ. Then Fη,c = aψ ◦ paψ and xη,c = xaψ satisfy the functional interpretation
of RT22(c):
∀n ≤ ηxη,cFη,c(Fη,cn ≥ n ∧ ∀i, j ≤ n(Fη,ci < Fη,cj → c(Fη,ci, Fη,cj) = xη,c)).
Proof. For n ≤ ηxF = ηxaψ (aψ ◦ paψ) we have
Fn = aψ(paψn)
(7.16)
≥ paψn
(7.15)
≥ n,
and for i, j ≤ ηxaψ (aψ ◦ paψ) and Fi < Fj we have
xaψ
(7.15)
= caψ(paψ(i)) = c(aψ(paψ(i)), aψ(aψ(paψ(i)) + 1))
(7.16)
= c(aψ(paψ(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fi
, aψ(paψ(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fj
)
where note that for the last step we have pa(i), pa(j), a(pa(i)) + 1 ≤ ψa and a(pa(i)) <
a(a(pa(i)) + 1) ∧ a(pa(i)) < a(pa(j)). This completes the proof.
A map of the whole construction is given in Figure 7.2.
L. 7.14
λa . |IPHP[ca]N|pa,xaδa
Th. 7.5
|Σ01-WKL|αψ ,βψωψ
Lem. 7.13|E/R(c)|aψψη
Th. 7.15
|RT22(c)|
aψ◦paψ ,xaψ
η
Figure 7.2: Constructive proof of Fin-RT22(c).
Once more, we will briefly describe the specific sequential game that arises from our
computational interpretation of RT22(2).
Branches s of our Σ01-tree T represent proper initial segments of branches of the Erdo˝s-
Rado tree via their characteristic functions, and as proved in Lemma 7.9, infinite branches
α of T encode infinite branches of the E/R tree, the witnessing function β allowing us to
recursively find zeroes of the sequence α via the function aα,β.
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In order to construct an approximation aψ to an infinite branch of the E/R tree of size
ψ we require an approximation αψ, βψ to an infinite branch of our original tree T of size
ωψαψβψ = maxi≤ψaψ(max{i, βψ(i), β(2)ψ (i)}). This approximation satisfies
∀n ≤ ωψ(αψ, βψ)∃k ∈ [n, βψ(n))∀i < n(αψ(i) = 0↔ i ≺ k)
and this is sufficient to ensure that aψ = aαψ ,βψ always picks out an element of a min-
monochromatic branch for n ≤ ψ(aψ), as proved in Lemma 7.13.
Now in turn, to obtain an approximation F to an infinite pairwise monochromatic
set of size η, we require an approximation aψη to an E/R branch of size ψη (as defined
in Theorem 7.15), where ψη is constructed using finite bar recursion to interpret IPHP
(Lemma 7.14). This ensures that our approximation aψη to an infinite branch of the
E/R tree is large enough to also contain an approximation to an min-monochromatic set
relative to η. While the definitions of ωψ and ψη may seem quite complex, their purpose
is simply to ensure that our approximation to α, β propagates through the constructions
aα,β and pa to an approximation of F of sufficient quality.
The main instance of EPS in our realizer forms a sequential game in which the role
of the selection function εn is to collect information about which branches of length n
represent proper initial segments branches of the E/R tree, so in other words discover
information about how the initial segment of the natural numbers [n] is arranged in the
E/R tree. By working together they are able to compute an approximation to an infinite
branch of the E/R tree, and the backtracking implemented by EPS roughly corresponds
to a backtracking along the E/R tree itself.
G[ωψη , g] Finitary Ramsey’s theorem
g(n) there is a proper i.s. of a branch of the E/R tree in [n] given by pd(n)
εn find proper i.s.’s t of the E/R tree in [n] s.t. t ≺ pd(k) for k ≥ n
EPSε construct an approximation to infinite branch of E/R tree
ωψη ensure approximation contains infinite monochromatic set relative to η
Table 7.3: Functional interpretation of RT22
7.4 An alternative to Howard’s realizer of WKL
We have focused thus far on making clear the game-theoretic intuition behind the main
instance of bar recursion in the realizer of Σ01-WKL. However, it is also possible to replace
Howard’s realizer for WKL via a binary form of GBR with a binary version of EPS instead,
giving us a game-theoretic computational interpretation of WKL as well.
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Notation. Given a decidable binary tree T , let us define the tree Ts(t) := T (s ∗ t). We
write Depthn(T ) :≡ ∃s(|s| = n ∧ T (s)).
Lemma 7.16. The selection function ε : B∗ → JNB given by
εs(p)
B
:=
0 if Depthp(0)+1(Ts)→ Depthp(0)(Ts∗0)1 otherwise (7.17)
satisfies
∀s, p(Depthp(εsp)+1(Ts)→ Depthp(εsp)(Ts∗εsp)).
Proof. If Depthp(0)+1(Ts) → Depthp(0)(Ts∗0) then εsp = 0 and (7.17) is clearly true. So
let us assume that Depthp(0)+1(Ts) ∧ ¬Depthp(0)(Ts∗0) so that εsp = 1, and suppose that
the premise of (7.17) i.e. Depthp(1)+1(Ts) is true. We want to show that Depthp(1)(Ts∗1).
There are two cases to consider.
Case (a): p(0) ≥ p(1), and we have
Depthp(0)+1(Ts) ∧ ¬Depthp(0)(Ts∗0)→ Depthp(0)(Ts∗1)→ Depthp(1)(Ts∗1).
Case (b): p(0) < p(1), and we have ¬Depthp(0)(Ts∗0)→ ¬Depthp(1)(Ts∗0). But Depthp(1)+1(Ts),
and therefore Depthp(1)(Ts∗1).
Theorem 7.17. Given ϕ : BN → N, define αϕ := EPSε,q
ϕ,ϕ
B,N where ε is defined as in Lemma
7.16, and qϕ(α) := ϕα− k − 1 for the least k < ϕα refuting
∀k < ϕα(Depthϕα−k(T[α](k))→ Depthϕα−k−1(T[α](k+1))). (7.18)
Then αϕ and nϕ := ϕαϕ satisfy
∃s(|s| = n ∧ T (s))→ T ([α](ϕα))
and therefore realize the functional interpretation of WKL.
Proof. Suppressing the parameter on αϕ, by Spector’s equations, substituting s = [α](ϕα−
qϕα− 1), p = ps into (7.17) we have
Depthqϕα+1(T[α](ϕα−qϕα−1))→ Depthqϕα(T[α](ϕα−qϕα)).
But this implies (7.18) must hold by definition of qϕ. Now ∃s(|s| = nϕ ∧ T (s)) →
Depthϕα(T〈〉), and by induction on (7.18) from k = 0 to k = ϕ− 1 we have
Depthϕα(T〈〉)→ Depth0(T[α](ϕα)).
But Depth0(T[α](ϕα))→ T ([α](ϕα)) and we’re done.
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This computational interpretation of WKL corresponds to a binary game. The strategy
εs at position s defined by the selection functions given in Lemma 7.16 is to pick a boolean
b such that if s extends to a branch in T of length |s|+ p(b) + 1 then s ∗ b also extends to
a branch of length |s|+ p(b) + 1.
Given ϕ, by choosing qϕ suitably as in Theorem 7.17, the optimal play of the game
determined by the εn is a sequence αϕ such that for all k ≤ ϕαϕ, whenever [αϕ](k) extends
to a branch of length ϕαϕ, so does [αϕ](k+ 1). If T is infinite then 〈〉 extends to a branch
of length ϕαϕ. Hence, by induction the relevant part [αϕ](ϕαϕ) of this optimal play must
be in T β, and is therefore an approximation to an infinite branch.
This interpretation of WKL is certainly more complex than Howard’s realizer, and in
particular to verify that it works one makes use of the property that T is prefix closed
in several places (which means that using it in our realizer for Σ01-WKL would require
a more carefully calibrated approximation to the characteristic function β). However, it
has the advantage that when used instead of the usual binary bar recursion one obtains
computational interpretations of Σ01-WKL and therefore also Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
and Ramsey’s theorem that can be described purely in terms of sequential games. For the
latter in particular, given that the finite product of selection functions is used to interpret
IPHP, we obtain the correspondence
Π01-countable choice 7→ EPSN,N (unbounded sequential game)
weak Ko¨nig’s lemma 7→ EPSB,N (binary unbounded sequential game)
infinite pigeonhole principle 7→ EPSfinN,N (finite sequential game)
and so we are able to produce a realizer for the functional interpretation of RT2n purely
in terms of three symbiotic games, each representing one of the non-trivial axioms in its
formal proof. This construction, along with a description of the realizer, is given in full in
[68].
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EIGHT
The Minimal-Bad-Sequence Argument
In our final case study we investigate the computational content of the ‘minimal-bad-
sequence’ argument, a consequence of dependent choice best known for its use in Nash-
Williams’ proof of Higman’s lemma and Kruskal’s theorem [64]. Our main contribution
is the construction of a bar recursive realizer for Go¨del’s functional interpretation of the
minimal-bad-sequence argument over arbitrary well-founded relations. We analyse the
behaviour of our program, and then suggest a different approach based on Berger’s realiz-
ability interpretation of the classically equivalent principle of open induction. We conclude
by applying our realizer to extract a new bound for Higman’s lemma.
The minimal-bad-sequence argument (MBS) is of central importance in the theory of
well-quasi-orders, and as such has become a focal point of research into computational
aspects of classical reasoning used in combinatorics. The constructive content of the
minimal-bad-sequence argument has been widely analysed (see for instance [20, 91]), and
programs have been extracted from its classical proof using a variety of formal methods
including the A-translation [63] and inductive definitions [23]. An extensive study of MBS
has been carried out by Berger and Seisenberger [13, 82], who extend and improve the
aforementioned techniques and implement them in the Minlog proof assistant. We make
no effort to provide an exhaustive list of the research that has been done in this area (for a
more detailed account see [82]), but we must be careful to highlight the motivating factors
behind the work in this chapter.
To begin with, our constructive proof of the minimal-bad-sequence argument is new,
and the first based on Go¨del’s functional interpretation. Moreover, to our knowledge it
constitutes one of the first applications of the functional interpretation in the theory of
well-quasi-orderings, and as such our interpretation may pave the way for new applica-
tions of proof theory in combinatorics - although admittedly this is not our primary goal.
Nevertheless, we give a practical illustration of how our realizer can be used to witness
Higman’s lemma and bound the length of bad sequences of words over arbitrary decidable
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well-quasi-orders.
More importantly, as in previous chapters our aim is to produce a realizer that can
be feasibly understood on a human level and which provides us with genuine insight into
the constructive meaning of mathematical proofs. The substantial logical complexity of
the minimal-bad-sequence argument (which in the language of second order arithmetic
is equivalent to Π11-CA0 [62]) means that such practical program extraction poses quite a
challenge. Indeed, many existing case studies are essentially a formalisation of the proof of
the minimal-bad-sequence argument, the program extraction itself being carried out with
the help of a proof assistant. This approach often results in output that is not easy to
comprehend (one of the first realizers obtained by Murthy [63] ran to 12MB of computer
code). In contrast, our interpretation is carried out by hand and yields a realizer in terms
of the product of selection functions that is somewhat easier to describe in qualitative
terms.
The minimal-bad-sequence argument is an interesting case study for the extraction of
programs from proofs because it is classically equivalent to the principle of open induction:
induction over the lexicographic ordering on sequences restricted to open predicates. As
demonstrated by Berger [10], a concise realizability interpretation of open induction is
naturally given by open recursion over the lexicographic ordering, and this provides us
with a direct alternative means of extracting programs from classical proofs based on MBS
with which we can avoid the route through dependent choice and bar recursion. We discuss
the possibility of a similar technique in the context of the functional interpretation, and
suggest an alternative to Spector’s bar recursion based on open recursion that can be used
when interpreting proofs based on the minimal-bad-sequence argument.
8.1 The minimal bad sequence construction
Suppose that we are given a decidable binary relation < : ρ × ρ → B that is provably
well-founded - in other words the schema of transfinite induction TI< over <
TI< : ∀yρ(∀z < yA(z)→ A(y))→ ∀xA(x)
for arbitrary A is valid in our formal system. Note that transfinite induction is classically
equivalent to the least element principle over < given by
LEP< : ∃xA(x)→ ∃y(A(y) ∧ ∀z < y¬A(z))
The lexicographic ordering over < is a binary relation on infinite sequences of type ρN
defined by
u<lexv :≡ ∃n([u](n) = [v](n) ∧ u(n) < v(n)).
While the relation <lex is neither decidable nor well-founded (apart from trivial cases),
transfinite induction over <lex is valid provided we restrict ourselves to a certain class of
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formulas called the open formulas. In the presence of classical logic, an open formula is a
predicate on sequences of type ρN that is equivalent to one of the form
B(u) ≡ ∀nC([u](n))→ ∃nD([u](n))
for C and D arbitrary predicates on ρ∗. The schema of open induction is given by
OIρ,< : ∀vρN(∀w<lexvB(w)→ B(v))→ ∀uB(u)
where B ranges over open formulas. Open induction was formulated by Raoult in [76],
and is investigated from an intuitionistic perspective in [10, 20], where one typically has to
work with a restricted definition of open formulas: for instance in [20] an open formula is
simply defined to be a predicate of the form B(u) ≡ ∃nB0([u](n)) where B0 is a decidable.
Example 8.1. The open predicate on sequences of words which we use in Section 8.4 to
prove Higman’s lemma is given by
B(u(X
∗)N) :≡ ∃n(∃i < j < n(ui ≤X∗ uj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B0([u](n))
)
for some well-quasi-ordering (X,≤X).
We call a sequence u bad relative to an open predicate B if ¬B(u) holds (and good
otherwise). Open induction is classically equivalent to the so-called minimal bad sequence
argument
MBSρ,< : ∃u¬B(u)→ ∃v(¬B(v) ∧ ∀w<lexvB(w))
which is the statement that whenever a bad sequence u exists, then a minimal bad sequence
v exists relative to <lex. The existence of a minimal bad sequence follows classically from
LEP< and dependent choice, via a famous construction due to Nash-Williams.
Theorem 8.2 (Nash-Williams [64]). Dependent choice proves the minimal-bad-sequence
argument.
Proof. Suppose that B(u) = ∀nC([u](n)) → ∃nD([u](n)) is open, and that there exists a
bad sequence u (i.e. satisfying ¬B(u)). Construct a sequence v recursively as follows:
1. By the least element principle on <, choose a minimal element v0 : ρ such that v0
extends to a bad sequence, but all sequences extending y for y < v0 are good.
2. Given v0, . . . , vn−1, choose vn such that v0, . . . , vn−1, vn extends to a bad sequence,
but all sequences extending v0, . . . , vn−1, y for y < vn are good.
By dependent choice we obtain an infinite sequence v such that w is good for any w<lexv.
But for each n, [v](n) extends to a bad sequence, so by classical logic we must have
in particular C([v](n)) ∧ ¬D([v](n)), and therefore ∀n(C([v](n)) ∧ ¬D([v](n))) which is
equivalent to ¬B(v), so v itself is a bad sequence.
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In the main part of this chapter we extract bar recursive realizers for the functional
interpretation of MBS by analysing the computational content of Nash-Williams’ proof.
Our first step is to restate Nash-Williams’ construction in a more logically explicit form,
which we give as Theorem 8.4. Note that we do not consider this to be a full formalisa-
tion of the minimal-bad-sequence construction (in the sense of e.g. [82]) - this would be
unnecessary here as we extract our realizer ‘by hand’. Our formalisation acts only as a
guide for how to proceed in the program extraction.
Remark 8.3. (i) Because we impose no restriction on the type ρ in OIρ,<, for higher-
types ρ the predicate <lex contains additional quantifiers belonging to =ρ∗ (this is
slightly different to the situation in [10, 82] who work in a neutral variant of PAω
where higher-type equality is taken as primitive). To address this, we note that over
E-HAω we have
∀w<lexvB(w)↔ [∀w, n(w(n) < v(n)→ B([v](n) @ w))]
so we will reformulate MBS as
∃u¬B(u)→ ∃v(¬B(v) ∧ ∀w, n(w(n) < v(n)→ B([v](n) @ w))).
(ii) We extract a realizer for MBS for the restricted class of open predicates defined in
[20] to be those of the form B(u) ≡ ∃nB0([u](n)) for B0 quantifier-free. This form
of MBS is sufficient for many applications, including Higman’s lemma (see Section
8.4).
(iii) In our formal proof we will use the sequential variant of dependent choice DCseq
introduced in Section 5.3.
Theorem 8.4. WE-PAω + QF-AC + DCseq ` MBSρ,< for any decidable relation such that
TI< is provable in WE-PA
ω + QF-AC + DCseq.
Proof. There are three main parts to our formalisation of the minimal-bad-sequence con-
struction: 1. Establishing the inductive step via the least element principle; 2. Using
dependent choice to construct a minimal bad sequence; 3. Verifying that this sequence
has the required properties.
For the inductive step, suppose we are given a finite sequence s : ρ∗. Define As(vρ
N
) :≡
¬B(s @ v), which denotes that s @ v is a bad extension of s. Then by LEP<|s| applied to
As, where w <|s| v :≡ w(|s|) < v(|s|) we have
∃rAs(r)→ ∃v(As(v) ∧ ∀w <|s| v¬As(w))
from which we obtain (quantifying over s),
∀s, r∃v(As(r)→ As(v) ∧ ∀w <|s| v¬As(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cs,r(v)
).
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Note that < well-founded clearly implies that <|s| is well-founded, and we could have
alternatively used LEP< applied to the formula A˜s(x) = ∃v¬B(s ∗ x @ v). Written out
fully, Cs,r(v) is equivalent to
¬B(s @ r)→ ¬B(s @ v) ∧ ∀w(w(|s|) < v(|s|)→ B(s @ w)), (8.1)
and denotes that whenever s has a bad extension r, it also has a minimal bad extension
v. Now, to construct a minimal bad sequence from an initial bad sequence u : ρN, define
the predicate C˜u on (ρN)∗ × ρN by
C˜u〈t0,...,tn−1〉(v) :≡ (n = 0→ C〈〉,u(v)) ∧ (n > 0→ C〈t0(0),...,tn−1(n−1)〉,tn−1(v)).
It is clear that ∀s, r∃vCs,r(v)→ ∀t∃vC˜ut (v), and by DCseq applied to C˜u we have
∃vsN→ρN∀nC˜u[vs](n)(vsn)
Therefore there exists vs such that, defining v¯ :=ρN λn . vsn(n),
∀n(¬B([v¯](n) @ vsn−1)→ ¬B([v¯](n) @ vsn)∧∀w(w(n) < v¯(n)→ B([v¯](n) @ w))).
using the convention vs−1 := u. Finally, we want to verify that v¯ is a minimal bad
sequence. We use induction to show that we have
¬B(u)→ ∀n[¬B([v¯](n) @ vsn) ∧ ∀w(w(n) < v¯(n)→ B([v¯](n) @ w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
D(n)
].
We have ¬B(u)→ D(0), and because [v¯](n) @ vsn = [v¯](n)∗ v¯(n) @ vsn = [v¯](n+1) @ vsn
we derive
D(n)→ ¬B([v¯](n) @ vsn)
→ ¬B([v¯](n+ 1) @ vsn)
→ D(n+ 1)
where the last implication follows from C[v](n+1),vsn(vsn+1). Therefore ¬B(u)→ ∀nD(n),
or equivalently
¬B(u)→ ∀n¬B([v¯](n) @ vsn) ∧ ∀n,w(w(n) < v¯(n)→ B([v¯](n) @ w)).
Now, using the fact that B(w) = ∃kB0([w](k)) is open we have
∀n¬B([v¯](n) @ vsn)→ ∀n, k¬B0([[v¯](n) @ vsn](k))
→ ∀n¬B0([[v¯](n) @ vsn](n))
→ ∀n¬B0([v¯](n))
→ ¬B(v¯)
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and therefore
¬B(u)→ ¬B¯(v¯) ∧ ∀n,w(w(n) < v¯(n)→ B([v¯](n) @ w)).
from which we obtain
∃u¬B(u)→ ∃v(¬B(v) ∧ ∀n,w(w(n) < v(n)→ B([v](n) @ w))).
8.2 The functional interpretation of MBS
We now extract a realizer for the functional interpretation of MBS. To avoid nested
expressions like [[v](n) @ w](k) we use the abbreviation B¯0(u, k) :≡ B0([u](k)), and so
B(u) = ∃kB¯0(u, k). With all the quantifiers made explicit, the negative translation of
MBS is equivalent (over MPω) to
(∗) ∃u∀k¬B¯0(u, k)→ ¬¬∃v(∀k¬B¯0(v, k) ∧
C[v]︷ ︸︸ ︷
∀w, n(w(n) < v(n)→ ∃kB¯0([v](n) @ w, k)).
The functional interpretation of C[v] is given by
|C[v]|γn,w ≡ w(n) < v(n)→ B¯0([v](n) @ w, γnw)
for γ : N× ρN → N, and therefore the conclusion of (∗) is equivalent to
¬¬∃v, γ∀k, n, w(¬B¯0(v, k) ∧ |C[v]|γn,w)
which is partially interpreted as
∀F,N,W∃v, γ(¬B¯0(v, Fvγ) ∧ |C[v]|γNvγ ,Wvγ )
for F : κ → N, N : κ → N and W : κ → ρN, where κ :≡ ρN × (N × ρN → N). This means
that the functional interpretation of (∗) is given by
|MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,N,W :≡ ¬B¯0(u,Φu)→ ¬B¯0(Vu, FVuΓu) ∧ |C[Vu]|ΓuNVuΓu ,WVuΓu
for Φ: κ′ → N, V : κ′ → ρN and Γ: κ′ → (N×ρN → N) where κ′ is the type of 〈u, F,N,W 〉.
Note that in the preceding formula and throughout we suppress the full dependencies on
Φ, V and Γ, so by Vu we mean Vu,F,V,Γ. Written fully, |MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,N,W becomes¬B¯0(u,Φu)→ ¬B¯0(Vu, FVuΓu) ∧ (WVuΓu(NVuΓu) < Vu(NVuΓu)→ B¯0([Vu](NVuΓu) @WVuΓu ,ΓuNVuΓuWVuΓu)).
Roughly speaking, this states that for a proposed bad sequence u there exists an approx-
imation Vu to a minimal bad sequence whose minimality is witnessed by Γu, where the
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counterexample F challenges that Vu is approximately bad, while N and W challenge
it being approximately minimal, calibrating in a sense the ‘length’ and ‘depth’ of the
approximation respectively.
Our task is to construct terms Φ, V and Γ parametrised by u, F , V and Γ (and of
course implicitly by the characteristic function tB0 for the quantifier-free formula B0), that
satisfy |MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N .
The functional interpretation of the least element principle
The minimal-bad-sequence argument contains two non-trivial classical principles: depen-
dent choice and the least element principle. We can interpret the former using the product
of selection functions as described in Chapter 5, but it remains to determine how we can
interpret the latter. We now solve the ND interpretation of LEP<, recalling that LEP< is
given by
∃xρA(x)→ ∃y(A(y) ∧ ∀z < y¬A(z)).
To do so we introduce a symbol R(ρ,<),σ for transfinite recursion of type σ over (ρ,<) with
defining equation
Rg<(x
ρ)
σ
:= gx(λy . R
g
<(y) if y < x).
where as usual ‘ if y < x’ is shorthand for if y < x, else 0σ’ (note that for the usual or-
dering (N, <) on natural numbers R(N,<),σ is equivalent to the primitive recursor Rσ). A
similar approach is used by Schwichtenberg in [81] where transfinite recursion is used to
solve the functional interpretation of the rule of transfinite induction, and we imagine that
his realizer is somewhat similar to ours. We restrict ourselves to instances of LEP< over
Π1-formulas as this is sufficient for our application of the least element principle.
Remark 8.5. In fact, it is also sufficient for the general case: Suppose that A(x) has ND
interpretation ∃aρ˜∀bσ|A(x)N|ab . Then the least element principle for A is equivalent to
∃xρ, aρ˜∀bσ|A(x)N|ab → ∃y, a(∀b|A(y)N|ab ∧ ∀z < y∀a∃b¬|A(z)N|ab )
which is just the least element principle for the Π1-formula A˜(x
ρ, aρ˜) :≡ ∀bσ|A(x)N|ab on
the well-founded order 〈x, a〉<˜〈y, a′〉 :≡ x < y.
Let A(x) ≡ ∀kA0(x, k). We want to realize the negative translation of LEP<, which is
equivalent to
∃xρ∀kA0(x, k)→ ¬¬∃y(∀kA0(y, k) ∧ ∀z < y∃k¬A0(z, k)). (8.2)
Partially interpreting the conclusion gives us
∃x∀kA0(x, k)→ ∀p∃y, g(A0(y, p0yg) ∧ (p1yg < y → ¬A0(p1yg, g(p1yg))))
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where p : σ → τ × ρ for σ := ρ× (ρ→ τ). Finally, we have
|LEPN< |ε,Kx,p ≡

A0(x,Kxp)→
A0(ε
0
x(p), p
0(εxp)) ∧ (p1(εxp) < ε0x(p)→ ¬A0(p1(εxp), ε1xp(p1(εxp))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dεx,p
.
where ε : ρ× (σ → τ × ρ)→ σ and K : ρ× (σ → τ × ρ)→ τ .
Lemma 8.6. Given u and p, define εx : Jτ×ρσ via transfinite recursion as
εx(p
σ→τ×ρ) σ:=
〈x, f
p
x〉 if φ(p, x)
εp1(x,fpx )(p) otherwise,
where φ is the quantifier-free formula defined by
φ(p, x) :≡ p1(x, fpx) < x→ ¬A0(p1(x, fpx), fpx(p1(x, fpx)))
and fpx : ρ→ τ is also defined via transfinite recursion as
fpx := λy . p
0(y, fpy ) if y < x.
Note that εx is well-defined since ¬φ(p, x) → p1(x, fpx) < x. Finally, define Kxp :=
p0(x, fpx). Then ε and K satisfy ∀x, p|LEPN< |ε,Kx,p , or more specifically, the formula ∀x, pEε,Kx,p
where
Eε,Kx,p :≡
 (φ(p, x)→ |LEPN< |
ε,K
x,p )∧
(¬φ(p, x)→ Dεx,p)
(for Dεx,p the conclusion of |LEPN< |ε,Kx,p as defined above) which clearly implies ∀x, p|LEPN< |ε,Kx,p .
Remark 8.7. We show that our realizer for LEP< satisfies a seemingly stronger formula
Eε,Kx,p . This formula makes explicit the fact that our realizer only uses the premise for
|LEPN< |ε,Kx,p in the first case that φ(p, x) holds, where 〈x, fpx〉 already suffices to solve it.
This property will become useful when it comes to verifying inductively that our main
realizer, which is a product of selection functions εxp corresponding to instances of LEP<,
forms a minimal-bad-sequence - as we will require the conclusion of one instance of |LEPN< |
to form the premise of the next. This ‘short-cut’ allows us to suppress additional formalism
that would be present in a rigid extraction from a fully formal proof.
Proof of Lemma 8.6. For arbitrary fixed p we use (quantifier-free) transfinite induction on
Eε,Kx,p to prove ∀xEε,Kx,p . All we need to do is show that Eε,Kx,p is progressive i.e. that for
each x we have
∀y < xEε,Ky,p → Eε,Kx,p .
92
8.2. The functional interpretation of MBS
We must deal with two cases.
(a) φ(p, x) holds, in which case εxp = 〈x, fpx〉. Then we have
A0(x, p
0(x, fpx))→ A0(x, p0(x, fpx)) ∧ φ(p, x)
which is equivalent to |LEPN< |ε,Kx,p .
(b) φ(p, x) fails, and therefore p1(x, fpx) < x ∧ A0(p1(x, fpx), fpx(p1(x, fpx))) and εxp = εyp
for y = p1(x, fpx) < x. Then by hypothesis we have E
ε,K
y,p and hence |LEPN< |ε,Ky,p , which is
A0(y, p
0(y, fpy ))→ Dεy,p. (8.3)
ButA0(p
1(x, fpx), fx(p
1(x, fpx))) is equivalent toA0(y, p
0(y, fpy )) since fx(p
1(x, fpx)) = fx(y) =
p0(y, fpy ). This is the premise of (8.3), so Dεy,p, and therefore D
ε
x,p holds since εxp = εyp
implies Dεx,p ↔ Dεy,p.
Realizing ∀u, F,W,N |MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N
We are now ready to extract a realizer from Nash-Williams’ proof of the minimal-bad-
sequence argument. Each of the following results correspond intuitively to one of the
main steps in our formalisation of the proof. Our first step is to interpret the instance of
the least element principle used in the classical construction of the minimal bad sequence
(8.1).
Lemma 8.8. Define the selection function εs,v : JN×ρNσ, where σ := ρN × (ρN → N) via
transfinite recursion on <|s|, where as before v′ <|s| v :≡ v′(|s|) < v(|s|), as
εs,v(p
σ→N×ρN) σ:=
〈v, f
p
|s|,v〉 if φ(s, v, p)
εs,p1(v,fp|s|,v)
(p) otherwise
where
φ(s, v, p) :≡ p1(v, fp|s|,v)(|s|) < v(|s|)→ B¯0(s @ p1(v, fp|s|,v), fp|s|,v(p1(v, fp|s|,v))))
and fp|s|,v is defined using transfinite recursion on <|s| as
fp|s|,v := λw . p
0(w, fp|s|,w) if w(|s|) < v(|s|).
Define Ks,vp := p
0(v, fp|s|,v). Then we have ∀s, v, pEε,Ks,v,p where Eε,Ks,v,p is defined as in
Lemma 8.6 by
Eε,Ks,v,p :≡
 (φ(s, v, p)→ (¬B¯0(s @ v,Ks,vp)→ Dεs,v,p))∧(¬φ(s, v, p)→ Dεs,v,p)
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for
¬B¯0(s @ ε0s,vp, p0(εs,vp)) ∧ (p1(εs,vp)(|s|) < ε0s,vp(|s|)→ B¯0(s @ p1(εs,vp), ε1s,vp(p1(εs,vp))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dεs,v,p
Proof. This is entirely analogous to the proof of Lemma 8.6, setting<:≡<|s| andA0(v, k) :≡
¬B¯0(s @ v, k). As before, we note that TI<|s| follows from TI<, and similarly R<|s| is easily
definable from R<.
The formula Eε,Ks,v,p is a computational interpretation of the statement that if s has a bad
extension v, then it has a bad extension that is minimal with respect to <|s|. The formula
Dεs,v,p says that the term ε
0
s,vp represents an approximation to this minimal extension
with ε1s,vp witnessing its minimality, all relative to the counterexample p. The term Ks,vp
indicates how we use the assumption that s @ v is bad to construct the approximation -
in particular this assumption is not required at all if ¬φ(s, v, p) holds, which is the case if
we find an approximate bad extension to s less than v (cf. Remark 8.7).
Now, we use EPS to interpret the instance of DCseq used to construct the minimal-bad-
sequence itself. Our selection functions are capable of constructing minimal bad extensions
at each point, so their unbounded product gives us an approximation to a bad sequence
approximately minimal over all points.
Lemma 8.9. Define ε˜u : σ∗ → JN×ρNσ parametrised by u : ρN as
ε˜u
Tσ∗ (p
σ→N×ρN) σ:=
ε〈〉,u(p) if |T | = 0ε〈pi0T0(0),...,pi0Tn−1(n−1)〉,pi0Tn−1(p) if |T | > 0.
where the type σ and the selection function εs,v are defined as in Lemma 8.6. Note that
pi0T is analogous to the variable t in the formal proof, while pi1T represents a sequence of
functionals witnessing minimality that are hidden in the formal proof. Now given q : σN →
N× ρN and ϕ : σN → N define
vsu
(ρN)N
:= pi0EPS
ε˜u,q,ϕ(〈〉)
fsu
(ρN→N)N
:= pi1EPS
ε˜u,q,ϕ(〈〉).
Then by Theorem 5.7, using the abbreviation vu :≡ λn.vsun(n) and the convention vsu−1 :≡
u, and setting pn = p[vsun,fsun](n) as defined as in Theorem 5.7, for all n ≤ ϕ(vsu, fsu) we
have
〈vsun, fsun〉 = ε˜u[vsu,fsu](n)(pn) = 〈ε0[vu](n),vsun−1(pn), ε
1
[vu](n),vsun−1
(pn)〉
pn(ε[vu](n),vsun−1(pn)) = q(vs
u, fsu)
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This implies that for all n ≤ ϕ(vsu, fsu), vsu and fsu satisfy (suppressing the parameter
u) φ([v](n), vsn−1, pn)→ (¬B¯0([v](n) @ vsn−1,K[v](n),vsn−1pn)→ D˜
vs,fs
n,q )
¬φ([v](n), vsn−1, pn)→ D˜vs,fsn,q
where K is defined as in Lemma 8.6 and
D˜vs,fsn,q :≡
¬B¯0([v](n) @ vsn, q0(vs, fs))∧(q1(vs, fs)(n) < v(n)→ B¯0([v](n) @ q1(vs, fs), fsn(q1(vs, fs)))).
Proof. The lemma follows by substituting, for each n ≤ ϕ(vsu, fsu), s = [vu](n), v = vn−1
and p = pn into Lemma 8.8. We have
D˜vs
u,fsu
n,q ↔ Dε[vu](n),vsn−1,pn
by Spector’s equations.
Now we verify by induction that from our initial assumption that if u is bad the
diagonal sequence v is minimal bad. The next lemma is the constructive analogue of the
statement that ¬B(u)→ ∀nD(n) in the formal proof.
Lemma 8.10. Given u, q and ϕ let everything be defined as in Lemma 8.9. Then
¬B¯0(u, q0(vsu, fsu))→ ∀n ≤ ϕ(vsu, fsu)D˜vsu,fsun,q .
Proof. This is done by Lemma 8.9 and induction on D˜vs
u,fsu
n,q . First we show that (sup-
pressing the parameter u in vs, fs)
¬B¯0(u, q0(vs, fs))→ D˜vs,fs0,q .
This follows from Lemma 8.9 for n = 0. Assume that φ(〈〉, u, p0) (if not then we get
D˜vs,fs0,q anyway). Then by definition ε〈〉,u(p0) = 〈u, fp00,u〉, which implies that K〈〉,up0 =
p00(ε〈〉,u(p0)) = q0(vs, fs) and so
¬B¯0(u, q0(vs, fs))→ ¬B¯0(u,K〈〉,up0)→ D˜vs,fs0,q .
Now for n < ϕ(vs, fs) we show that
D˜vs,fsn,q → D˜vs,fsn+1,q.
First, since [v](n) @ vsn = [v](n+ 1) @ vsn we have
D˜vs,fsn,q → ¬B¯0([v](n) @ vsn, q0(vs, fs))→ ¬B¯0([v](n+ 1) @ vsn, q0(vs, fs)).
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Now, by Lemma 8.9, assuming that φ([v](n + 1), vsn, pn+1) (otherwise we get D˜
vs,fs
n+1,q
anyway) we have ε[v](n+1),vsn(pn+1) = 〈vsn, fpn+1n+1,vsn〉 and therefore K[v](n+1),vsnpn+1 =
p0n+1(ε[v](n+1),vsn(pn+1)) = q
0(vs, fs) and so
¬B¯0([v](n+ 1) @ vsn, q0(vs, fs))→ ¬B¯0([v](n+ 1) @ vsn,K[v](n+1),vsnpn+1)→ D˜vs,fsn+1,q.
Therefore by induction from n = 0 to n = ϕ(vsu, fsu) − 1 we get D˜vs,fs0,q → ∀n ≤
ϕ(vsu, fsu)D˜vs,fsn,q , and the result follows.
Finally, we define q and ϕ in terms of the counterexample functionals F , W and N in
order to complete the construction.
Theorem 8.11. Suppose we have an arbitrary sequence u : ρN and functionals F : κ→ N,
N : κ → N and W : κ → ρN where κ : ρN × (N × ρN → N). Define qF,W , and ϕF,N on
〈vs, fs〉 : (ρN)N × (ρN → N)N ∼= σN by
qF,W (vs, fs)
N×ρN
:= 〈F (v, fs),W (v, fs)〉
ϕF,N (vs, fs)
N
:= max{F (v, fs), N(v, fs)}
where v := λn . vsn(n). Finally, define vs
u (ρ
N)N
:= pi0EPS
ε˜u,qF,W ,ϕF,N (〈〉), fsu (ρ
N→N)N
=
pi1EPS
ε˜u,qF,W ,ϕF,N (〈〉) and vu := λn . vsun(n), for ε˜ defined as in Lemma 8.9. Then
ΦF,N,Wu := F (v
u, fsu)
ΓF,N,W,u := fs
u
VF,N,W,u := v
u
satisfy |MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N .
Proof. By Lemma 8.10 we have (suppressing dependencies F , N and W )
¬B0(u,Φu)→ ∀n ≤ max{FVuΓu , NVuΓu}D˜vs
u,Γu
n,qF,W
.
Firstly, setting n = FVuΓu yields
¬B¯0(u,Φu)→ D˜vs
u,Γu
FVuΓu ,q
F,W → ¬B¯0([Vu](FVuΓu) @ vsuFVuΓu , FVuΓu)→ ¬B¯0(Vu, FVuΓu)
where for the last implication we use [[Vu](n) @ v](n) = [Vu](n). Secondly, setting n =
NVuΓu yields
¬B¯0(u,Φu)→ D˜vs
u,Γu
NVuΓu ,q
F,W
→WVuΓu(NVuΓu) < Vu(NVuΓu)→ B¯0([Vu](NVuΓu) @WVuΓu ,Γu(NVuΓu ,WVuΓu)).
Combining the two yields¬B¯0(u,Φu)→ ¬B¯0(Vu, FVuΓu) ∧ (WVuΓu(NVuΓu) < Vu(NVuΓu)→ B¯0([Vu](NVuΓu) @WVuΓu ,Γu(NVuΓu ,WVuΓu)))
which is |MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N .
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An analysis of our bar recursive realizer
Having carried out the formal construction of our realizer, we now aim to describe in more
intuitive terms how it behaves, and to demonstrate that it forms a clear computational
analogue to the minimal-bad-sequence construction of Nash-Williams. As before we can
use the semantics of EPS to identify various parts of the realizer with game-theoretic
concepts, associating our computational interpretation of MBS with a single partially
defined sequential game G[u, F,N,W ].
The functional interpretation of MBS asks for an approximation of the minimal bad
sequence construction. Given an initial bad sequence u we must construct a bad sequence
Vu and a functional Γu witnessing its minimality relative to counterexample functionals
F , N and W , and must also produce a point Φu such that all this can be verified from
¬B0([u](Φu)).
The basic idea. We build Vu and Γu as optimal plays in the sequential game whose selection
functions are given by ε˜u. Moves in this game consist of a sequence v : ρN and a functional
f : ρN → N. The idea is that for an optimal play 〈vsu, fsu〉 of type (ρN)N × (ρN → N)N,
setting vu := λn.vsun(n) the sequence vs
u
n represents a minimal bad extension of [v
u](n)
whose minimality is witnessed by λw.fsunw, and therefore Vu = v
u represents a minimal-
bad-sequence whose minimality as a whole is witnessed by Γu = λn,w.fs
u
nw.
The role of the selection functions is to interpret pointwise instances of LEP< in the
minimal-bad-sequence construction and produce approximations to minimal bad exten-
sions of [Vu](n) in the construction relative to ‘local’ counterexample functions p. The
product of selection functions enables us to construct a whole sequence Vu that is minimal
bad relative to the global counterexample functions q and ϕ, which are in turn defined in
terms of the F , N and W so that Vu is an approximation of sufficient quality to ensure
that it is ‘bad’ at point FVuΓu and approximately minimal at pointNVuΓu relative toWVuΓu .
classical proof sequential game G[u, F,N,W ]
least element principle selection functions ε˜u
minimal bad sequence unbounded product EPSε˜
u,qF,W ,ϕF,N
Table 8.1: Functional interpretation of MBS
How the realizer works. The behaviour of our realizer mimics the classical construction of
the minimal bad sequence. It is based on a main instance of bar recursion which interprets
the overall construction, each step in the bar recursion involving an instance of transfinite
recursion implemented by the selection functions to interpret the least element principle.
Given that we have computed a proposed initial segment 〈vsu0 , fsu0〉, . . . , 〈vsun−1, fsun−1〉
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for our minimal-bad-sequence, where vsun−1 is an approximately bad extension of [vu](n)
relative to F , the selection function ε[vu](n),vsun−1 picks an extension v of [v
u](n) and a
functional f satisfying
¬B¯0([vu](n) @ v, Fαv,f ) ∧ (Wαv,f (n) < v(n)→ B¯0([vu](n) @Wαv,f , f(Wαv,f ))
where αv,f is obtained from the optimal extension that results from choosing 〈v, f〉 at
round n. Then [v¯u](n) ∗ v(n) extends the our approximation by one element, and f wit-
nesses its minimality at point n relative to W . The selection function ε[vu](n),vun−1 computes
v and f by first trying as default 〈v, f〉 = 〈vsun−1, fpnn,vsun−1〉, depending on whether or not
φ([v¯u](n), vsun−1, pn) holds. Testing this condition corresponds to testing whether or not
(approximate) minimality of [vu](n) ∗ vsun−1(n) is satisfied. If it is, the computation ter-
minates, with the truth of ¬B¯0([vu](n) @ v, Fαv,f ) relying on the assumption that vsn−1 is
approximately bad relative to the global counterexample function F . Otherwise the selec-
tion function changes its mind and chooses 〈v, f〉 = 〈t, fpnn,t〉 where t := W (αvsun−1,fpnn,vun−1 ).
This time, if 〈t, fpnn,t〉 is chosen then ¬B¯0([vu](n) @ v, Fαv,f ) is guaranteed by the fail-
ure of minimality of vsun−1, since this implies ¬B¯0([vu](n) @ t, fpnn,vsun−1(t)) and we have
fpnn,vsun−1
(t) = p0n(t, f
pn
n,t) = Fαv,f . The selection function now tests minimality of 〈t, fpnn,t〉,
and if this fails the whole procedure repeats until a suitable minimal extension of [vu](n)
is finally found. Termination of the search is guaranteed by well-foundedness of <.
The product of selection functions implements a backtracking procedure over these
selection functions that constructs an approximation to the whole minimal-bad-sequence,
comprising a constructive analogue of the inductive procedure carried out in the classical
proof. On a global level we claim the functionals fpnn,v are essentially devices that make
recursive calls over the lexicographic ordering, and therefore one could potentially char-
acterise our bar recursive realizer as an algorithm that implements some kind of open
recursion (see Section 8.3 below), although making this intuition precise would involve a
much more detailed analysis of the realizer.
The functional Φ. One important component of our realizer that we have ignored so far is
the functional Φ, which interprets the assumption that the initial sequence u is bad and
is crucial to enabling us to carry out the first step in the computation. In Lemma 8.10
and Theorem 8.11 we show that if Φ(u) = FVu,Γu then ¬B0(u,Φu) guarantees that our
minimal bad sequence Vu is satisfies ¬B0(Vu, FVu,Γu). However, actually we only require
that ¬B0(u,Φu) holds in the case that φ(n, vsun−1, pn) is true for sufficiently many steps in
the computation. The failure of this condition is the constructive analogue of discovering
a new bad sequence lexicographically less than u, which means that we no longer require
the assumption that u is bad. While our construction of Vu and Γu seems quite natural,
our definition of Φu is in fact rather crude, and it would be instructive to give a more
intelligent reformulation of Φu based on a more careful logical analysis of the classical
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proof. However, in this dissertation we will not go into any more details on potential
computational inefficiencies in our realizers. For now we are satisfied to have obtained
an intuitive constructive analogue of Nash-Williams’ proof of the minimal-bad-sequence
argument in terms of the product of selection functions.
8.3 Open induction and open recursion
As we pointed out in Section 8.1, the minimal-bad-sequence argument is classically equiv-
alent to the principle of open induction, which for our restricted form of open predicate is
written fully as
(∗)
D︷ ︸︸ ︷
∀v(∀w, n(w(n) < v(n)→ ∃kB¯0([v](n) @ w, k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C[v]
)→ ∃kB¯0(v, k))→ ∀u∃kB¯0(u, k).
From an intuitionistic point of view, the two principles behave quite differently. The
computational content of open induction is explored by Berger in [10], who demonstrates
that unlike dependent choice or MBS, open induction is closed under the negative and
A-translations, and can be given a direct realizability interpretation using the schema of
open recursion defined by:
ORF (u)
N
:= Fu(λn, v . OR
F ([u](n) @ v) if v(n) < u(n)).
This offers a simple and elegant alternative to program extraction from classical proofs
involving the minimal-bad-sequence argument without having to go through the usual bar
recursive interpretation of dependent choice. We quickly sketch Berger’s idea, although
the reader is encouraged to consult [10] for details. The formula C[v] (defined in (∗) above)
has modified realizability interpretation
γ mr C[v] ≡ ∀n,w(w(n) < v(n)→ B¯0([v](n) @ w, γnw))
↔ ∀n,w|C[v]|γn,w,
where γ : N× ρN → N, and therefore the subformula D (cf. (∗)) is interpreted as
F mr D ≡ ∀v, γ(γ mr C[v]→ B¯0(v, Fvγ))
where F : ρN × (N× ρN → N)→ N. Finally, Φ mr OI ≡ ∀F (F mr D → ∀uB¯0(u,ΦFu)), or
alternatively:
Φ mr OI ≡ ∀F (∀v, γ(∀n,w|C[v]|γn,w → B¯0(v, Fvγ))→ ∀uB¯0(u,ΦFu)).
where Φ: (ρN × (N× ρN → N)→ N)× ρN → N.
Theorem 8.12 (Berger [10]). E-HAω + Cont + OI + OR ` Φ mr OI where Φ is a closed
term of E-HAω + OR.
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Proof. In [10] this theorem holds generally for open predicates of the form ∀nC([u](n))→
∃nB([u](n)) for C arbitrary and B a Σ-formula (∀, → free and only containing predicates
ranging over variables of type level 0). In our restricted case of Σ01-open formulas, Φ := OR
does the trick. To see this, suppose that F mr D - we must show that ∀uB¯0(u,ORF (u)).
Now assuming continuity, the truth of predicate P (u) :≡ B¯0(u,ORF (u)) depends only on
a initial segment of u, which means that P is equivalent to an open predicate, so we can
use open induction on P (u). Given v, suppose by the induction hypothesis that P (w)
holds for all w<lexv i.e. ∀n,w(w(n) < v(n)→ B¯0([v](n) @ w,ORF ([v](n) @ w))). Then
γ = λn,w . ORF ([v](n) @ w) if w(n) < v(n)
realizes C[v], and therefore since F mr D we have B¯0(v, Fvγ) ≡ B¯0(v,ORF (v)) which is
P (v). This verifies progressiveness of P , and so we have ∀uP (u) and we’re done.
‘Explicitly controlled’ open recursion
It is not difficult to show that open induction is equivalent to its negative translation over
QF-AC + MPω, and therefore by the soundness theorems for the ND interpretation and
the fact that open induction is classically provable from dependent choice a direct realizer
for its functional interpretation can be found1. In fact, the functional interpretation of
OI coincides with the ND interpretation of its contrapositive MBS, so our bar recursive
realizer for MBS also realizes OI. However, it is natural to ask whether an analogue to
Theorem 8.12 can be found, whereby a direct realizer for the functional interpretation
of open induction can be given in terms of open recursion as opposed to bar recursion.
For the functional interpretation, in light of Spector’s soundness proof we would expect
to be able to construct a form of open recursion that is ‘explicitly’ well-founded using
Spector’s condition as opposed to implicitly relying on continuity, and would therefore
be computationally weaker than full open recursion in the same way that Spector’s bar
recursion is weaker than modified bar recursion (see Chapter 9).
This short section contains some preliminary results and ideas in the spirit of [10]
that explore the idea of whether an alternative to Spector’s bar recursion based on open
recursion can be devised to extract witnesses for the functional interpretation of proofs
involving open induction or the minimal-bad-sequence argument. What follows should be
considered nothing more than a starting point for future research, and many details below
are merely sketched or left as conjectures. Our aim is simply to design, in an informal
manner, a procedure that directly realizes the functional interpretation of open induction
and perhaps reflects the computational content of this principle more naturally than our
bar recursive realizer would.
1Note that the prima facie existence of a bar recursive realizer for OI is already implicitly established in
[10, 20] in which it is shown that OI follows from bar induction. Similarly, in [44, 92] it is shown directly
that open induction on the Cantor space follows from the double negation shift and Markov’s principle.
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Let us first establish some notation. For a functional Φ: ρN → N and a sequence ρN,
define Φ{u} : ρN × (ρN → N)N by
Φ{u} := 〈u;λn,w . Φ([u](n) @ w) if w(n) < u(n)〉
so Φ{u} consists of the sequence u along with the functional Φ restricted to arguments
lexicographically less than u. In this way we can concisely write the defining equation of
open recursion as
ORF (u) = F (ORF {u}).
Now, treating Φ{u} as a sequence of type σN for σ := ρ× (ρN → N), we have
Φ{u},M σN= 〈u,M ;λn < M,w . Φ([u](n) @ w) if w(n) < u(n)〉.
where (λn < M.fn)(m) = 0 for m ≥M . Given a functional ϕ : σN → N let
Φ{u}ϕ σ
N
:= Φ{u}, µSp(Φ{u}, ϕ)
where M := µSp(Φ{u}, ϕ) is the least number satisfying ϕ(Φ{u},M) < M . Note that
Φ{u}ϕ is primitive recursively definable in Φ: for arbitrary α : σN we can write
αϕ(i) :=
0σ if ∃k ≤ i(ϕ(α, k) < k)α(i) otherwise
and we obtain αϕ = α, µSp(ϕ, α) provably in Spec, which we need to confirm the existence
of µSp(ϕ, α) (cf. Proposition 4.2). Let us now define a variant of open recursion EOR that
is explicitly controlled by the functional ϕ:
EORF,ϕ(u) = F (EORF,ϕ{u}ϕ).
While open recursion OR in the sense of Berger is implicitly well-founded by open induction
and continuity of F (see Chapter 9 or [10] for the proof that OR is total), EOR is explicitly
well-founded because we specify, via ϕ, the finite portion of u we wish to use and therefore
totality of EORF,ϕ is by definition an open property on u.
Remark 8.13. While the functional EOR is definable from OR, we conjecture that EOR is
in fact of the same computational strength as Spector’s bar recursion, whereas as we show
in Chapter 12, full open recursion is equivalent to the stronger modified bar recursion.
A partial functional interpretation of OI, in which we do not extract realizers for v and
γ, is given by
(†) ∃Φ∀u, F,N,W (∀v, γ(|C[v]|γNvγ ,Wvγ → B¯0(v, Fvγ))→ B¯0(u,Φ(u))
which of course differs from the modified realizability interpretation in that the quanti-
fiers ∀n,w, not permitted by the functional interpretation, are eliminated in favour of
counterexample functionals N and W . We show that (†) can be realized using EOR.
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Proposition 8.14. Define ϕN,F : σN → N by ϕN,F vγ := max{Fvγ , Nvγ}. Then ΦF,N (u) :=
EORϕ,F (u) realizes (†), provably in Spec + OI.
Proof. We suppress the parameters on ϕN,F . Fix F , N and W and assume that
(+) ∀v, γ(|C[v]|γNvγ ,Wvγ → B¯0(v, Fvγ))
holds. We use open induction on the open predicate P (u) := B¯0(u,EOR
F,ϕ(u)) (P is
open because by definition EOR only looks at a finite initial segment of u). To establish
progressiveness, let’s assume that P (w) holds for all w lexicographically less than u. Now,
define
〈v, γ〉 := EORF,ϕ{u}ϕ
= 〈u,M ;λn < M,w . EORF,ϕ([u](n) @ w) if w(n) < u(n)〉
where (assuming Spec) M = µSp(EOR
F,ϕ{u}, ϕ) and therefore ϕvγ < M . Using that
Nvγ ≤ ϕvγ < M we see that |C[v]|γNvγ ,Wvγ is equivalent to
Wvγ(Nvγ) < u(Nvγ)→ B¯0([u](Nvγ) @Wvγ ,EORF,ϕ([u](Nvγ) @Wvγ))
which is true by P ([u](Nvγ) @Wvγ). By (+) this implies B¯0(v, Fvγ) which by Fvγ ≤
ϕvγ < M and the fact that EORF,ϕ(u) = Fvγ implies B¯0(u,EOR
F,ϕ(u)). Therefore by
open induction we have (+)→ ∀uB¯0(u,EORF,ϕ(u)), from which (†) follows.
For the full functional interpretation of OI, given by
|OI|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N ≡ (|C[Vu]|ΓuNVuΓu ,WVuΓu → B¯0(Vu, FVuΓu))→ B¯0(u,Φ(u))
(which is equivalent to |MBSN|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N ), we must also extract realizers Vu,F,W,N and Γu,F,W,N
for v and γ in (†). Let Φu,F,W,N := EORϕN,F ,F (u) as before, and (suppressing fixed pa-
rameters F , W and N on Φ, V , Γ and ϕ) and let us define candidates for Vu and Γu
recursively on <lex by
〈Vu,Γu〉 σ
N
:=
Φ{u}ϕ if |C[pi0Φ{u}ϕ]|
pi1Φ{u}ϕ
NΦ{u}ϕ ,WΦ{u}ϕ
〈Vt,Γt〉 otherwise
for t := [pi0Φ{u}ϕ](NΦ{u}ϕ) @WΦ{u}ϕ . One argues that 〈Vu,Γu〉 is well-defined by open
induction and Spec. Note that Φ{u}ϕ = Φ{u},M for M = µSp(Φ{u}, ϕ) so by the fact
that NΦ{u}ϕ ≤ ϕ(Φ{u}ϕ) < M we have t := [u](NΦ{u}ϕ) @WΦ{u}ϕ , and we only make a
recursive call on t in the case that WΦ{u}ϕ(NΦ{u}ϕ) < u(NΦ{u}ϕ). Therefore if 〈Vt,Γt〉 is
well-defined for all t<lexu then so is 〈Vu,Γu〉. The statement that 〈Vu,Γu〉 is well-defined
is an open property, since 〈Vu,Γu〉 depends only on u,M .
Proposition 8.15. Φ, V and Γ as defined above satisfy ∀u, F,W,N |OI|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N , provably
in Spec + OI.
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Proof. For arbitrary F , W and N we use open induction on the open predicate P (u) =
|OI|Φ,V,Γu,F,W,N . We have only to prove progressiveness. Let us assume that (suppressing the
fixed parameters F , W and N as before)
(++) |C[Vu]|ΓuNVuΓu ,WVuΓu → B¯0(Vu, FVuΓu)
holds. We want to derive B¯0(u,Φ(u)). There are two cases to consider.
Case (a) |C[pi0Φ{u}ϕ]|pi1Φ{u}ϕNΦ{u}ϕ ,WΦ{u}ϕ holds. Then 〈Vu,Γu〉 = Φ{u}ϕ and |C[Vu]|
Γu
NVuΓu ,WVuΓu
holds, so by (++) we have B¯0(u,M,FΦ{u}ϕ) (for M = µSp(Φ{u}, ϕ). But Φ(u) =
EORϕ
N,F ,F (u) = FΦ{u}ϕ and FΦ{u}ϕ ≤ ϕ(Φ{u}ϕ) < M , and therefore we get B¯0(u,Φ(u)).
Case (b) |C[pi0Φ{u}ϕ]|pi1Φ{u}ϕNΦ{u}ϕ ,WΦ{u}ϕ fails, which implies:
(i) 〈Vu,Γu〉 = 〈Vt,Γt〉 for t = [pi0Φ{u}ϕ](NΦ{u}ϕ) @WΦ{u}ϕ
NΦ{u}ϕ<Mu
= [u](NΦ{u}ϕ) @WΦ{u}ϕ
with t(NΦ{u}ϕ) < u(NΦ{u}ϕ);
(ii) ¬B¯0(t, pi1Φ{u}ϕNΦ{u}ϕWΦ{u}ϕ) and therefore ¬B¯0(t,Φ(t)) since
pi1Φ{u}ϕNΦ{u}ϕWΦ{u}ϕ
NΦ{u}ϕ<M
= pi1Φ{u}NΦ{u}ϕWΦ{u}ϕ
W (N)<u(N)
= Φ([u](NΦ{u}ϕ) @WΦ{u}ϕ)
= Φ(t).
We can assume P (t) = |OI|Φ,V,Γt,F,W,N by hypothesis, and by 〈Vu,Γu〉 = 〈Vt,Γt〉 and (++) we
see that the premise of |OI|Φ,V,Γt,F,W,N is true, and therefore we obtain B¯0(t,Φ(t)). But this
contradicts (ii).
Remark 8.16. We tentatively put forward the idea that this computational interpretation
of OI is analogous to the computational interpretation of TI< (given via its contrapositive
LEP<) in Lemma 8.6, where in some sense we can identifyKxp defined via transfinite recur-
sion with EORF (u) defined via open recursion, and also εx(p) with Vu(FNW ),Γu(FNW ).
We reiterate that this section is only an informal illustration that alternative modes of
recursion could potentially be used instead of Spector’s bar recursion for obtaining more
intuitive programs from classical proofs involving the minimal-bad-sequence argument.
However, there are many factors to consider before one can claim in any sense that a
mode of recursion is ‘better’ than Spector’s bar recursion for interpreting principles in
mathematical analysis, and we leave a more detailed study of the relationship between
bar recursion and open recursion to future work.
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8.4 Higman’s lemma
The minimal bad sequence argument is best known in mathematics for its role in the
theory of well-quasi-orders. We call a preorder (X,≤X) a well-quasi-order (WQO) if any
infinite sequence (xi) in X has the property that xi ≤X xj for some i < j. The theory
of WQOs contains several results which state that certain constructions on WQOs inherit
well-quasi-orderedness, the most famous being Kruskal’s tree theorem [59]. A special case
of this theorem is what is colloquially known as Higman’s lemma:
Theorem 8.17 (Higman, [38]). If (X,≤X) is a WQO, then so is the set (X∗,≤X∗) of
words in X under the embeddability relation ≤X∗, where 〈x0, . . . , xm−1〉 ≤X∗ 〈x′0, . . . , x′n−1〉
iff there is a strictly increasing map f : [m]→ [n] with xi ≤X x′fi for all i < m.
Nash-Williams used the minimal-bad-sequence argument to give elegant proofs of both
Higman’s lemma and Kruskal’s theorem [64], and many proof-theoretic investigations into
the minimal-bad-sequence argument tend to focus specifically on its role WQO theory.
We conclude this chapter by demonstrating how one obtains a bound for Higman’s
lemma from the ND interpretation of the minimal-bad-sequence argument (or equivalently
the functional interpretation open induction). By substituting in our realizer from Section
8.2 we obtain an explicit bar recursive term that finds an embedded pair in sequences of
words over arbitrary WQOs. We do not claim to derive any new quantitave bounds for
Higman’s lemma (optimal bounds in certain cases are given in [19, 80]), but we believe that
on a qualitative level at least our algorithm, the first based on the functional interpretation,
is quite different to those discovered previously.
Formalising Higman’s lemma
Let us assume that a WQO (X,≤X) can be encoded as by type of level 0, and that ≤X
and therefore also ≤X∗ are decidable. We call a sequence u : XN good if ui ≤X uj for some
i < j, and bad if it is not good. The statement that u is good can be written as the open
predicate B(u) := ∃kB0([u](k)) where
B0(s) :≡ ∃i < j < |s|(si ≤X sj).
The set X is a WQO if it satisfies the predicate WQO[X] :≡ ∀uXNB(u). In Nash-Williams’
proof of Higman’s lemma the hypothesis WQO[X] used in the following, alternative form:
Lemma 8.18. The property WQO[X] is classically equivalent to the property MonSeq[X],
where
MonSeq[X] :≡ ∀u∃gN→N∀k∀i < j ≤ k(gi < gj ∧ ugi ≤X ugj).
In other words, X is a WQO if and only if every infinite sequence contains an infinite
increasing subsequence.
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Proof. One direction is clear. The other direction WQO[X] → MonSeq[X] is an easy
consequence of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs, applied to the colouring
c(i, j) := 0 if ui ≤X uj , else 1.
Let g be the increasing function that defines a pairwise monochromatic set i.e. c(gi, gj) = b
for all i < j. If b = 1 then this would contradict the fact that X is a WQO, therefore
b = 0 and g defines a monotone sequence. Note that in special case that X is finite the
result is is provable using the infinite pigeonhole principle and can therefore be formalised
in WE-PAω + QF-AC.
Theorem 8.19. WE-PAω + QF-AC + MBS ` MonSeq[X]→WQO[X∗].
Proof (Nash-Williams). We use the minimal-bad-sequence argument of type (X∗,≺) where
≺ denotes the prefix relation on words:
xX
∗ ≺ y :≡ |x| < |y| ∧ ∀i < |x|(xi = yi).
Note that ≺ is decidable by our assumption that X has type level 0, and is provably
well-founded in WE-HAω, so that in particular R≺ is primitive recursively definable. We
use the following notation: that for x = 〈x0, . . . , xm−1〉 : X∗ with m > 0
x˜
X∗
:= 〈x0, . . . , xm−2〉 x¯ X:= xm−1
and for x = 〈〉 we have x˜ = 〈〉, x¯ = 0X .
Let us assume for contradiction that MonSeq[X] holds but WQO[X∗] is not true,
and that we have a bad sequence u satisfying ∀n¬B0([u](n)) where B0(s) :≡ ∃i < j <
|s|(si ≤X∗ sj). Then by MBS(X∗,≺) there exists a minimal bad sequence v with respect
to ≺. We show that v cannot be bad, and therefore our original sequence u was good,
contradicting ¬WQO[X∗].
First, by MonSeq[X] applied to the sequence (v¯i) there exists monotone g such that
v¯gi ≤X v¯gj for all i < j. Now consider the sequence w := [v](g0) ∗ (λi.v˜gi). Either vg0 = 〈〉
in which case w is trivially good, or v˜g0 ≺ vg0 and therefore w is lexicographically less
than v at point g0, and is good by minimality of v.
But if w is good then v must also be good: it is easy to show that if wi ≤X∗ wj for some
i < j < n i.e. B0([w](n)), then vi′ ≤X∗ vj′ for some i′ < j′ < g(n)+1 i.e. B0([v](g(n)+1)).
This is obvious if i < g(0). Otherwise we have v˜gi ≤X∗ v˜gj for i < j < n − g0 ≤ n, in
which case vgi ≤X∗ vgj follows from v¯gi ≤X v¯gj , unless |vgi| = 1 and vgj = 〈〉. But in this
case vgj ≤X∗ vgj+1.
105
Chapter 8. The Minimal-Bad-Sequence Argument
Extracting a realizer for WQO[X∗]
The functional interpretation of MonSeq[X] (now using the symbol x for the variable u)
is given by
∃G∀x, ωNN→N∀i < j ≤ ωGx,ω(Gx,ωi < Gx,ωj ∧ xGx,ωi ≤X xGx,ωj) (8.4)
for G : XN × (NN → N) → (N → N). The computational challenge we face is that given
G witnessing (8.4), and an arbitrary sequence of words u, we must extract xG,u, ωG,u
and ΦG,u such that (8.4) applied to xG,u, ωG,u implies B0([u](ΦG,u)). We show that this
can be done using the functional interpretation of MBS given in the previous section, by
constructing suitable counterexample functionals F , N , Y and W .
Theorem 8.20. Suppose we are given G (dependent on x and ω) satisfying (8.4). Define
xv and ωv,γ parametrised by variables v : (X
∗)N, γ : N× (X∗)N → N as
xv
XN
:= (v¯i),
ωvγ
NN→N
:= λg . γ(g0, [0(X∗)N ](g0) ∗ (λi.v˜gi)).
Now let Gvγ := Gxv ,ωv,γ and define functionals F : κ→ N, N : κ→ N and W : κ→ N (for
κ = (X∗)N × (N× (X∗)N → N) by
FGvγ
N
:= Gvγ(ωvγGvγ) + 1,
NGvγ
N
:= Gvγ0,
WGvγ
(X∗)N
:= [0](Gvγ0) ∗ (λi.v˜Gvγ i).
Then whenever Φ, V and Γ satisfy |MBSN|Φ,V,Γ
FG,NG,WG,u
, we have that
∀i < j ≤ ωV ΓGV Γ(GV Γi < GV Γj ∧ V¯GV Γi ≤X V¯GV Γj)
for V = VFG,NG,WG,u, Γ = ΓFG,NG,WG,u implies
∃i < j < ΦFG,NG,WG,u(ui ≤X∗ uj).
Proof. Let Φ abbreviate ΦFG,NG,WG,u and V , Γ similarly. Then by |MBSN|Φ,V,ΓFG,NG,WG,u (in
its contrapositive form) applied to B0 as in the proof of Theorem 8.19, we have
(∗)
[(WVΓ(NV Γ) ≺ V (NV Γ)→ B¯0([V ](NV Γ) @WV Γ,ΓNV ΓWV Γ))→ B¯0(V, FV Γ)]→ B¯0(u,Φ)
and so it suffices to prove the premise of (∗), which substituting definitions of F , N and
W is
(V˜GV Γ0 ≺ VGV Γ0 → B¯0([V ](GV Γ0) ∗ (λi.V˜GV Γi), ωV ΓGV Γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)→ B¯0(V,GV Γ(ωV ΓGV Γ) + 1).
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Now, we use that GV Γ satisfies
(†) ∀i < j ≤ ωV ΓGV Γ(GV Γi < GV Γj ∧ V¯GV Γi ≤X V¯GV Γj)
Assuming C, there are two cases: either VGV Γ0 = 〈〉 which implies B¯0(V,GV Γ(ωV ΓGV Γ)+1)
since GV Γ0 ≤ GV Γ(ωV ΓGV Γ) by (†), or V˜GV Γ0 ≺ VGV Γ0.
In the second case we have B¯0([V ](GV Γ0) ∗ (λi.V˜GV Γi), ωV ΓGV Γ), and using (†) it is
straightforward to show, as in the proof of Theorem 8.19, that this implies
B¯0(V,GV Γ(ωV ΓGV Γ) + 1).
This proves the premise of (∗), so we’re done.
Remark 8.21. By combining Theorem 8.20 with Theorem 8.11 we are able to extract an
explicit bar recursive realizer in G that bounds the length of bad sequences in X∗. In
individual cases the complexity of G will depend on the underlying well-quasi-ordering X.
For the case where X = [m] one proves using the infinite pigeonhole principle that any
sequence (xi) of type X
N contains an infinite subsequence xg0 = xg1 = . . ., and therefore
G can be constructed as usual using finite bar recursion (see Lemma 7.14, [67]).
Remark 8.22. Nash-Williams’ proof would still work if we carried out the minimal bad
sequence argument on the weaker relation |x| < |y|, which is decidable even if we allow X
to range over higher-type objects (although we still need to insist on ≤X being decidable).
Remark 8.23. Higman’s lemma provides us with a good opportunity to analyse the be-
haviour of our realizers for MBS in more detail. In this context, the role of our bar
recursive realizer from Section 8.2 would be to attempt the construction of a minimal-bad-
sequence to obtain a contradiction, from which we can infer that the initial assumption
¬B¯0(u,Φu,FG,NG,WG) is false, and therefore Φu is a bound for Higman’s lemma.
G[u, FG, NF ,WG] Nash-Williams’ proof of Higman’s lemma
ε˜un find least prefix extending to a bad sequence
EPSε attempt to construct a minimal bad sequence
FG, NG,WG contradict construction of minimal bad sequence
Φ(u) contradict hypothesis ¬B(u)
Table 8.2: Functional interpretation of Higman’s lemma
On the other hand, if instead of our bar recursive realizer we use the open recursor
ΦG := λu . EORF
G,ϕ(u) as in Section 8.3 we end up with an intuitive inductive algorithm
that computes the bound Φ(u) in terms of Φ(w) for w<lexu, the functionals F
G, NG and
WG using G to validate well-foundedness of the algorithm.
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It would of course be illuminating to give a more detailed description of our realizers,
even just for simple cases, and compare them to other programs for Higman’s lemma in
the literature, but we leave this to future work.
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CHAPTER
NINE
Extensions of Go¨del’s system T
The second main part of this dissertation is concerned with establishing definability results
for variants of bar recursion and related extensions of system T.
In the preceding chapters we encountered Spector’s variants of bar recursion GBR
and SBR, along with the explicitly iterated product of selection functions EPS. In the
remainder of this dissertation the term bar recursion refers to a more general class of
functionals that can be informally described by the scheme
BT (s) =
G(s) if s is a leaf of TH(s, λx . BT (s ∗ x)) otherwise
where T is some well-founded tree. Spector’s bar recursion is just a specific instance of
this type of recursion, over the well-founded tree T (s) :≡ ∀t ≺ s(|t| ≤ ϕ(t̂)). A somewhat
different instance of bar recursion is the Γ functional of Gandy and Hyland [35]:
Γq(sN
∗
)
N
:= q(s ∗ 0 ∗ λn . Γq(s ∗ (n+ 1)))
which rather than appealing to an explicit stopping condition as in Spector’s bar recursion,
is well-founded by assuming continuity of q, and as such its underlying tree is given
implicitly via the points of continuity of q. Generalisations of the Γ functional to higher
types have been considered in the context of proof theory in order to give a realizability
interpretation to the axiom of dependent choice - these include modified bar recursion
[11, 12] and more recently the implicitly iterated product of selection functions
IPSε,q(sρ
∗
) := s @ λn . εtn(λx . q(IPS
ε,q(tn ∗ x)))
for tn = [IPS
ε,q(s)](n). A key feature shared by all these variants of bar recursion is that
the recursion is carried out ‘backwards’ over finite sequences, each recursive call extending
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the current sequence with one more piece of information. An interesting ‘demand driven’
alternative to bar recursion is the so-called BBC functional:
BBCε,q(u) := u @ λn . εn(λx . q(BBC
ε,q(uxn))),
devised in [8] to give a more efficient computational interpretation to countable choice.
The BBC functional takes as input finite partial functions u and makes recursive calls
on updates uxn of u. As demonstrated by Berger [10], the BBC functional belongs to a
family of extensions of system T that seem more closely related to open recursion over
lexicographic orderings (as discussed in Chapter 8) than bar recursion in the usual sense.
In recent decades a several advances have been made in the computability theory of
bar recursion and its variants, particularly in clarifying the relationship between these
modes of recursion. In the late 1980s Bezem confirmed that several different formulations
of Spector’s bar recursion GBR that had been considered in the literature were indeed
equivalent [16], while on the other hand Kohenbach devised an interesting a variant of
GBR based on a novel stopping condition that could no longer be defined from GBR
[46]. Later, Berger and Oliva proved that their modified bar recursion is strictly stronger
than Spector’s bar recursion due to the fact that the latter is S1-S9 computable in the
total continuous functionals C ω while the former S1-S9 defines the FAN functional, which
is known to be non-computable in C ω. Recently, Escardo´ and Oliva [28] have given a
detailed account of the relationship between bar recursion and the products of selection
functions. However, many questions on the interdefinability of variants of bar recursion
remain unanswered.
In this dissertation we address some of these open questions. Our contributions are
divided into three parts. We begin with a study of finite bar recursion, in which we
construct a hierarchy of fragments of system T based on restricted finite bar recursion
and prove that they are in one-to-one correspondence with the usual fragments based on
restricted primitive recursion (Chapter 10). Next, we show that Spector’s ‘special’ and
‘general’ form of bar recursion are in fact primitive recursively equivalent (Chapter 11).
Finally, we succeed in relating extensions of system T based on open recursion with those
based on bar recursion, and prove that over the continuous functionals the BBC functional
and open recursion are equivalent to the implicitly iterated product of selection functions
(Chapter 12).
In the present chapter we acquaint the reader with some important definitions, and
provide a short summary of known facts about extensions of system T in order to put our
results in context. Our account is very concise, and the reader is encouraged to consult the
original sources where indicated and also e.g. [65] for general background on bar recursion
and computability theory in the type structures of continuous functionals.
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9.1 Primitive recursive definability
Suppose we state a defining equation F(~x) := Ω(F, ~x) for some mode of recursion F, which
contains free variables ~x for the parameters of F. By F[Φ] we mean that the term Φ satisfies
the defining equation of F i.e.
F[Φ] :≡ ∀~x(Φ(~x) = Ω(Φ, ~x)).
We consider F to be an abstract symbol representing a mode of recursion, and technically
when we extend some theory S with the functional F, we mean that we add to S a constant
Φ along with the axiom F[Φ], although usually we implicitly identify Φ with the symbol
F.
Definition 9.1. Let S be some theory and ∆ a (possibly empty) set of additional axioms
in the language of S.
(a) The functional G is S-definable from F (G ≤S F) over ∆ if there exists a closed term
t ∈ S such that
S + ∆ + F[Ψ] ` G[t(Ψ)].
(b) More generally, if we are given defining equations for two collections of functionals
F ≡ (Fρ1,...,ρk), G ≡ (Gσ1,...,σl) where ρi, σj range over some subsets Xi, Yj of the
finite types respectively, then G is S-definable from F (G ≤S F) over ∆ if for any
σ1, . . . , σl : ΠjYj there exists ρ1(σ1, . . . , σl), . . . , ρk(σ1, . . . , σl) : ΠiXi such that
Gσ1,...,σl ≤S Fρ1(σ1,...,σl),...,ρk(σ1,...,σl)
If ∆ is empty then we simply say that G is S-definable from F. If G ≤S F and F ≤S G
over ∆ then F and G are S-equivalent over ∆ and we write F =S G.
Definition 9.2 (Primitive recursive definability). We say that G is primitive recursively
definable from F over ∆ if it is E-HAω-definable from F over ∆. We will usually write ≤T
instead of the more cumbersome ≤E-HAω .
Remark 9.3. In many cases, when G ≤T F it turns out that we actually only use a very
weak (essentially recursion-free) fragment of E-HAω to construct G from F. However, we
don’t make any effort to calibrate the weakest theory in which the construction can be
done.
The definability relation ≤S over fixed ∆ is clearly transitive. Suppose we are given
F ≡ (Fρ1....,ρk), G ≡ (Gσ1....,σl) and H ≡ (Hκ1....,κm) with G ≤S F and H ≤S G. Then H ≤S G
tells us that
S + ∆ + Gσ1,...,σl [Φ] ` Hκ1,...,κm [t0(Φ)]
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for some t0 ∈ S and σi(κ1, . . . , κm), and G ≤S F tells us that
S + ∆ + Fρ1,...,ρk [Ψ] ` Gσ1,...,σl [t1(Ψ)]
for some t1 ∈ S and ρi(σ1, . . . , σl). Putting these together and setting Φ := t1(Ψ) we
obtain
S + ∆ + Fρ1,...,ρk [Ψ] ` Hκ1,...,κm [(t0 ◦ t1)(Ψ))]
for ρi(κ1, . . . , κm) = ρi(σ1(κ1, . . . , κm), . . . , σl(κ1, . . . , κm)). A consequence of this is that
the relation =S is an equivalence relation.
Note that the notion of definability is model independent, although we can talk of
definability in a particular model as follows.
Definition 9.4. LetM be some a model of S. Then G is S-definable from F inM if G ≤S F
over ∆ where ∆ is valid in M.
In Chapter 12 we shall require ∆ :≡ QF-BI+Cont to prove that certain implicitly well-
founded modes of recursion are primitive recursively equivalent, and so our definability
results will in particular be valid in the model C ω of continuous functionals.
9.2 Spector’s bar recursion and its variants
In Section 9.3 we introduce, for the first time in this dissertation, some modes of bar
recursion which, unlike Spector’s bar recursion, do not come with an explicitly defined
stopping condition. Before doing so we survey some of the relevant known definability
and non-definability results concerning variants of Spector’s bar recursion. Let us quickly
recall the main definitions from Part II. Spector’s general bar recursor GBRρ,τ has defining
equation
GBRφ,q,ϕρ,τ (s
ρ∗)
τ
:=
q(s) if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|φs(λx . GBRφ,q,ϕ(s ∗ x)) otherwise,
while his special bar recursor SBRρ is defined by
SBRφ,ϕρ (s
ρ∗)
ρN
:= s @
0ρN if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|SBRφ,ϕρ (s ∗ as) otherwise
where as := φs(λx . SBR(s ∗ x)). Finally, the explicitly iterated product of selection
functions EPSρ,τ is defined as
EPSε,q,ϕ(sρ
∗
)
ρN
= s @

0ρN if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|
EPSε,q,ϕ(s ∗ as) otherwise,
for as := εs(λx . q(EPS(s ∗ x))). In the above definitions, ρ and τ range over all finite
types.
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Example 9.5. It is easy to see that EPS is primitive recursively equivalent to SBR, which
we prove now as a warm-up example. First we show that SBR ≤T EPS. Let
Φρ := t(EPSρ,ρN) = λφ, ϕ, s . EPS
φ,id,ϕ
ρ,ρN (s).
Note that we technically we mean to define Φ = t(Ψ) for some variable Ψ satisfying
EPSρ,ρN [Ψ], but for readability we identify Ψ with the symbol EPS. It is easy to see
that E-HAω proves that SBRρ[Φ], and therefore SBRρ ≤T EPSρ,ρN . If ϕ(ŝ) < |s| then
Φφ,ϕ(s) = s @ 0, and if ϕ(ŝ) ≥ |s| then
Φφ,ϕ(s) = s @ EPSφ,id,ϕ(s ∗ as)
= s @ Φφ,ϕ(s ∗ as)
where as = φs(λx . id(EPS
φ,id,ϕ(s ∗ x))) = φs(λx . Φφ,ϕ(s ∗ x)). Conversely, to prove that
EPSρ,τ ≤T SBRρ, let
Φρ,τ := t(SBRρ) = λε
ρ∗→Jτρ, q, ϕ, s . SBRφ
ε,q ,ϕ
ρ (s)
where φε,qs (pρ→ρ
N
)
ρ
:= εs(λx . q(p(x))). Then ϕ(ŝ) < |s| implies that Φε,q,ϕ(s) = s @ 0, and
ϕ(ŝ) ≥ |s| implies
Φε,q,ϕ(s) = s @ SBRφ
ε,q ,ϕ(s ∗ as)
= s @ Φ(s ∗ as)
where as = φs(λx . SBR(s ∗ x)) = εs(λx . q(Φ(s ∗ x))). Therefore EPSρ,τ [Φ] is provable in
E-HAω, from which we conclude SBR =T EPS.
Definability between modes of recursion in all finite types may appear to be quite a
weak property, in the sense that we impose no restriction on the level of types. To prove
that SBR ≤T EPS we could have equally well demonstrated that EPSρN,(ρN)N defines SBRρ,
even though EPSρ,ρN suffices. However, primitive recursive definability is indeed a non-
trivial and subtle property that yields interesting insights into the relationship between
extensions of system T. A variant of ‘explicitly controlled’ bar recursion was given by
Kohenbach in [46], which has defining equation
KBRφ,q,ϕρ,τ (s
ρ∗)
τ
:=
q(s) if ϕ(ŝ) = ϕ(sˇ)φs(λx . KBRφ,q,ϕρ,τ (s ∗ x)) otherwise
and is based on a novel stopping condition ϕ(ŝ) = ϕ(sˇ) (where sˇ := s @ 1ρN). It turns out
that while KBR defines GBR, this adjustment of the stopping condition means that the
converse is not true, and KBRρ,τ cannot be defined from GBRρ′,τ ′ for any types ρ
′, τ ′. This
is due to the fact that a term Φ satisfying GBR[Φ] exists in the majorizable functionals
M ω, but this is not the case for KBR. For all this see [46]. Note that while KBR will
not feature in later chapters here, it plays an important role in the definability results of
[11, 12].
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Theorem 9.6. (a) SBR is primitive recursively equivalent to EPS.
(b) GBR primitive recursively defines SBR.
(c) KBR primitive recursively defines GBR, but the converse does not hold.
Proof. Part (a) is proved in Example 9.5, (b) is similarly straightforward, and for (c) see
[46].
In Chapter 11 we improve Theorem 9.6 by proving the converse of (b), that GBR
is primitive recursively definable from SBR. An important property of these explicitly
well-founded modes of bar recursion is that they are computable in the total continuous
functionals (see [12] for details).
Theorem 9.7. Each of SBR, GBR and KBR are S1-S9 computable in the total continuous
functionals C ω.
Finally, we note that while SBR in general is not primitive recursively definable, the
special finite instance of SBR given by setting the control functional ϕ to be constant:
SBRε,q(s) := s @
0 if n < |s|SBR(s ∗ as) otherwise.
is primitive recursive. Finite bar recursion and its relationship with Go¨del’s primitive
recursor is the main topic of Chapter 10.
9.3 Modified bar recursion and the implicitly controlled product of se-
lection functions
Variants of bar recursion which, rather than relying on a stopping condition as in Spector’s
bar recursion, are ‘implicitly’ well-founded by a continuity argument have been used in
proof theory to give a modified realizability interpretation to countable dependent choice.
Modified bar recursion, developed in [11, 12] (and in turn based on a form of bar recursion
considered in [8]), is given by the defining equation
MBRψ,qρ,τ (s
ρ∗)
τ
:= q(s @ ψs(λx
ρ . MBR(s ∗ x)))
for ψ : ρ∗ → ((ρ → τ) → ρN) and q : ρN → τ . Provided τ is restricted to being a discrete
type, MBR exists in the model of continuous functionals C ω by the continuity principle
Cont (see [11]). In what follows we focus on an alternative formulation of implicitly
controlled bar recursion considered by Escardo´ and Oliva called the implicitly controlled
product of selection functions, given by the defining equation
IPSε,qρ,τ (s
ρ∗)
ρN
:= s @ IPSε,qρ,τ (s ∗ as) (9.1)
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for as := εs(λx . q(IPS
ε,q
ρ,τ (s ∗ x))), where ε : ρ∗ → Jτρ, q : ρN → τ and τ is restricted
to being discrete. It is shown in [28] that IPS is equivalent to MBR, although IPS has
the advantage of providing us with a uniform transition between explicitly and implicitly
defined bar recursion in that it is essentially EPS without the stopping condition. As such
it also satisfies a useful analogue of Theorem 5.7.
Lemma 9.8. Let α = IPSε,q(s). Then for all n ≥ |s|,
α = IPSε,q([α](n)). (9.2)
Proof. Induction on n. For n = |s| we have [α](n) = [IPS(s)](|s|) = s by definition, and
therefore (9.2) holds by definition. Now assume that (9.2) holds for n ≥ |s|. Then
α
IH
= IPS([α](n)) = [α](n) @ IPS([α](n) ∗ a) (∗)= IPS([α](n) ∗ a)
where a = ε[α](n)(λx . q(IPS([α](n) ∗ x))) and (∗) holds because [α](n) is a prefix of
IPS([α](n) ∗a). Now α(n) = IPS([α](n) ∗a)(n) = a and therefore α = IPS([α](n) ∗α(n)) =
IPS([α](n+ 1)).
Theorem 9.9. Define α : ρN and ps : ρ→ τ by
α := IPSε,qρ,τ (〈〉)
ps := λx . q(IPS
ε,q
ρ,τ (s ∗ x)).
.
Then for all n we have
α(n) = ε[α](n)(p[α](n))
p[α](n)(α(n)) = q(α).
(9.3)
Proof. For the first inequality we have
α(n)
L9.8
= IPS([α](n))(n)
(9.1)
= ([α](n) @ IPS([α](n) ∗ a[α](n)))(n)
(9.1)
= a[α](n)
where a[α](n) = ε[α](n)(λx . q(IPS([α](n) ∗ x))) = ε[α](n)(p[α](n)). For the second, we have
qα
L9.8
= q(IPS([α](n+ 1)))
= q(IPS([α](n) ∗ α(n)))
= p[α](n)(α(n)).
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The equations (9.3) are of course analogous to Spector’s equations for EPS. A class
of sequential games for which IPS computes optimal strategies is discussed in [31]. In
the remaining chapters we are no longer concerned with the semantics of the products of
selection functions, but Lemma 9.8 and Theorem 9.9 will be used in Chapter 12 to prove
that IPS defines open recursion.
If we unwind the definition of IPS we can view it in an alternative form in which it is
given using course of values recursion.
Proposition 9.10. The product of selection functions IPS can be equivalently defined by
the equation
IPSε,q(s) := s @ λn . εtn(λx . q(IPS
ε,q(tn ∗ x))) (9.4)
where tn := [IPS(s)](n).
Proof. Technically what we mean is that any functional Φ satisfying (9.1) also satisfies
(9.4), and vice-versa, provably in E-HAω. The proof of this fact is straightforward and can
be found in Appendix A.
While it is easy to verify that IPS defines a total continuous functional by the continuity
axiom applied to q (recalling that the outcome type τ of q is restricted to being discrete),
it turns out that it is not S1-S9 computable in the total continuous functionals C ω. This
follows from the equivalent fact that MBR is not S1-S9 definable in C ω, which was proved
in [11] using properties of the FAN functional. The FAN functional is a functional of type
(BN → N)→ N that computes a point of uniform continuity for continuous functionals on
on the Cantor space, i.e. has defining axiom
FAN[Φ] : ∀qBN→N, α, β([α](Φ(q)) = [β](Φ(q))→ q(α) = q(β)).
While FAN exists in C ω, it is well-known that the FAN functional is not S1-S9 computable
in the total continuous functionals (see [35, 65]).
Theorem 9.11 (Berger/Oliva [11, 12]). The FAN functional is primitive recursively de-
finable from KBR+MBR in Cont+QF-BI, and therefore by Theorem 9.7 is S1-S9 definable
from MBR in C ω. But this means that MBR is not S1-S9 computable in C ω.
We now summarise the known definability results concerning MBR and IPS in the
following theorem.
Theorem 9.12. (a) IPS and MBR are primitive recursively equivalent over QF-BI+Cont.
(b) Both IPS and MBR primitive recursively define GBR over QF-BI + Cont.
(c) MBR does not define KBR.
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(d) None of SBR, GBR or KBR primitive recursively define IPS or MBR over QF-BI+Cont
or any theory validated by C ω.
Proof. (a) This is proved in [28] using a slightly different formulation sIPS of IPS. We
confirm in Appendix A that sIPS and IPS are equivalent over QF-BI + Cont.
(b) Definability of GBR from MBR is given in [12]. Definability of GBR from IPS follows
from part (a) or is proven directly in [28].
(c) Proved in [12] by the fact that MBR exists in M ω.
(d) By Theorem 9.11 and the fact that S1-S9 computable functionals in C ω are closed
under primitive recursion, MBR is not definable from any S1-S9 computable functional
over any theory ∆ validated by C ω, so the result follows by Theorem 9.7. See [12] for
details. An analogous result follows for IPS (and indeed any functional that defines
MBR over C ω).
9.4 The Berardi-Bezem-Coquand functional and update recursion
In [8], Berardi, Bezem and Coquand consider two different computational interpretations
of choice, for AC and DC respectively. The latter is the basis of modified bar recursion as
formalised in [11]. The former, on the other hand, is a remarkable form of recursion that
constructs a sequence using a demand-driven, symmetric algorithm that is quite different
to bar recursion. We call this the BBC functional.
In order to define BBC we require a few preliminary definitions. We view the type
ρ¯N where ρ¯ :≡ B × ρ as the type of partial sequences over ρ. A partial sequence u : ρ¯N is
defined at n, or n is in the domain of u, if and only if u(n)0 = 1. We define the decidable
predicates n ∈ dom(u) :≡ (u(n)0=1) and n /∈ dom(u) :≡ ¬(n ∈ dom(u)) ↔ (u(n)0 = 0).
If n ∈ dom(u) then the value of u at n is u(n)1 : ρ. We define u[n] :≡ u(n)1. We
redefine the overwrite operator @ in the context of partial sequences as the functional
@ : ρ¯N × ρN → ρN defined by
(u @ α)(n)
ρ
:=
u[n] if n ∈ dom(u)α(n) otherwise.
It will always be clear from the context which @ we are using. Finally, given a partial
sequence u : ρ¯N and x : ρ, the partial sequence uxn is defined by
uxn(m)
ρ¯
:=
(1, x) if m = nu(m) otherwise.
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We say that uxn is an update of u whenever n /∈ dom(u). The functional BBCρ,τ is given
by the defining equation
BBCε,qρ,τ (u
ρ¯N)
ρN
:= u @ λn . εn(λx
ρ . q(BBCε,q(uxn))),
where ε : N → Jτρ, q : ρN → τ and τ is restricted to being discrete. Originally, BBC was
defined in a slightly different form sBBC.
Proposition 9.13. The functional BBCρ,τ is primitive recursively equivalent to sBBCρ,τ
defined by
sBBCε,qρ,τ (u)
τ
:= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . sBBC
ε,q(uxn))).
Proof. Define Φε,q(u) := q(BBCε,q(u)). Then sBBC[Φ] follows because
Φε,q(u) = q(u @ λn . εn(λx . q(BBC
ε,q(uxn))))
= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . Φ
ε,q(uxn))).
Conversely, by defining Φε,q(u) := u @ λn . εn(λx . sBBC
ε,q(uxn)) one obtains a functional
satisfying BBC[Φ]:
Φε,q(u) = u @ λn . εn(λx . q(u
x
n @ λm . εm(λy . sBBC
ε,q((uxn)
y
m))))
= u @ λn . εn(λx . q(Φ
ε,q(uxn))).
Remark 9.14. Whenever u has finite domain, the computation of BBC(u) only ever makes
recursive calls on partial sequences with finite domain - in particular BBC(〈〉) is defined
in terms of BBC restricted to arguments with finite domain. In fact BBC was originally
defined purely in terms of partial sequences with finite domain (see [8, 9]) which can be
encoded as finite sequences of type (N×ρ)∗. Thus our definition of BBC is slightly different
to some definitions found in the literature (notably the original paper [8] itself), although
both formulations are discussed in [9, 10].
Berger demonstrated that BBC is easier to understand and its totality elegantly proven
when it is viewed as a special instance of update recursion. Update recursion is the
computational content of the principle of update induction UI, which is defined in [10] as
the schema
UI : ∀wρ¯N(∀w<upvB(w)→ B(v))→ ∀uB(u)
where B ranges over open predicates (cf. Chapter 8) on partial sequences of type ρ¯N and
w<upv iff w is an update of v. Accordingly, update recursion has defining equations
URGρ,τ (u
ρ¯N)
τ
:= Gu(λn, x
ρ . URG(uxn) if n /∈ dom(u))
where G : ρ¯N × (N× ρ→ τ)→ τ and τ is restricted to being discrete.
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Theorem 9.15 (Berger [10]). Update recursion exists in the total continuous functionals
C ω.
Proof. Update recursion can be defined in the partial continuous functionals Cˆ ω as a
suitable fixpoint. To prove totality of UR in Cˆ ω (and therefore the existence of UR in C ω),
the basic idea is that given total G, the predicate ‘u total→ URG(u) total’ is equivalent to
an open predicate B(u) by the continuity axiom. Now clearly B(u) is update progressive
by definition of UR, therefore by update induction we have that URG must be total.
In [10] it is shown that UI implies ACN, and moreover that the update-recursive program
extracted from this proof is essentially the BBC functional, so in particular UR defines the
BBC functional.
Proposition 9.16. The BBC functional is primitive recursively definable from UR.
Proof. Define Φε,q(u) := URG
ε,q
ρ,τ (u) where
Gε,qu (P
N×ρ→τ ) τ:= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . Pnx)).
Then we have sBBCρ,τ [Φ] because
Φε,q(u) = Gε,qu (λn, x . UR
Gε,q(uxn) if n /∈ dom(u))
(∗)
= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . UR
Gε,q(uxn)))
= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . Φ
ε,q(uxn))),
where (∗) follows from the fact that u @ λn . εn(λx . URGε,q(uxn)) only makes recursive
calls on URG
ε,q
(uxn) for n /∈ dom(u).
Corollary 9.17. The BBC functional exists in the total continuous functionals C ω.
Remark 9.18. The defining equations for BBC are similar to those of IPS, but the two
functionals differ in a fundamental way. The product of selection functions makes recursive
calls in sequential manner - the value of IPS(s)(n) depends on IPS(s)(m) for all m < n. On
the other hand, BBC makes recursive calls symmetrically, so that for m 6= n, BBC(u)(n)
and BBC(u)(m) are computed independently over distinct computation trees.
However, the order of computation is essentially the only way in which they differ.
Indeed, both arise from the same construction - which we illustrate very informally as fol-
lows. Suppose that ≺ organises N into a well-founded tree i.e. the set pd(n) of predecessors
of n is finite and well-ordered, and define F≺ on ≺-closed partial functions u : N→ ρ by
Fε,q≺ (u)
ρN
:= u @ λn . εn,Sn(λx . q(F≺(u @ (Sn ∪ 〈n, x〉)))
where Sn := {〈m,F≺(u)(m)〉 | m ∈ pd(n)} and the partial function Sn ∪ 〈n, x〉 is defined
in the obvious sense.
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Then when ≺ is the usual order <, we can identify <-closed partial functions with
finite sequences ρ∗, Sn with tn = [F<(s)](n) and s @ (tn ∪ {n, x}) = tn ∗ x for n ≥ |s|, so
the defining equations of F are essentially those for IPS.
Similarly, when ≺ is the discrete order •, <-closed partial functions are just partial
functions in the usual sense, Sn is empty, and u @ (∅ ∪ {n, x}) = uxn for n /∈ dom(u), so
the defining equation for • is the defining equation for BBC.
9.5 Open recursion
The final form of recursion that we study in this part of the dissertation is open recursion,
which has already been discussed in Chapter 8 in terms of the computational content of
open induction. It is given by the defining equation
ORF(ρ,<),τ (u
ρN)
τ
:= Fu(λn, y, v . OR
F ([u](n) ∗ y @ v) if y < u(n))
where F : ρN × (N × ρ × ρN → τ) → τ , τ is discrete and < is a decidable well-founded
relation on ρ (note that unlike Chapter 8 we make the variable y explicit, so that now OI
is exactly as defined in [10]).
Theorem 9.19 (Berger [10]). Open recursion exists in the total continuous functionals
C ω.
Proof. See [10, Proposition 5.1]. This follows in analogous fashion to the proof that update
induction is total, although this time we appeal to open induction.
It is easily seen (as pointed out in [10]) that update induction is an instance of open
induction on sequences of type ρ¯N with the well-founded relation (a, x) < (b, y) :≡ (a =
1 ∧ b = 0). It follows immediately from this observation that update recursion is an
instance of open recursion.
Proposition 9.20. Update recursion is primitive recursively definable from open recur-
sion.
Proof. Given G : ρ¯N × (N× ρ→ τ)→ τ define
FGu (P
N×ρ¯×ρ¯N→τ ) τ:= Gu(λn, x . Pn(1, x)u).
Then ΦG(u) := ORF
G
ρ¯,τ,<(u) where < is defined as above satisfies URρ,τ [Φ] because
ΦG(u) = FGu (λn, y, v . OR
FG([u](n) ∗ y @ v) if y < u(n))
= Gu(λn, x . OR
FG([u](n) ∗ (1, x) @ u) if (1, x) < u(n))
(∗)
= Gu(λn, x . OR
FG(uxn) if n /∈ dom(u))
= Gu(λn, x . Φ
G(uxn) if n /∈ dom(u)).
Note that we have (∗) because (1, x) < u(n) ↔ u(n)0 = 0 ↔ n /∈ dom(u) and [u](n) ∗
(1, x) @ u = uxn (note that here @ denotes overwrite on sequences).
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9.6 Summary of interdefinability results
Figure 9.1 summarises the known definability results between the extensions of system
T discussed in this section, and highlights the new results that will be presented in the
following chapters with dotted lines. Here ∆ :≡ QF-BI + Cont. We prove that:
• Finite bar recursion fPn of type level n is equivalent to Go¨del’s primitive recursion
Rn+1 of type level n+ 1 (Chapter 10);
• Spector’s special bar recursion SBR defines his general bar recursion GBR, and so
the two are in fact equivalent (Chapter 11);
• The implicitly iterated product of selection functions defines open recursion, and
conversely the BBC functional defines IPS, both over ∆ (Chapter 12). This means
that IPS, MBR, OR, UR and BBC all lie in the same equivalence class over ∆.
OR // UR

MBR oo
∆ //
∆

:
xx
IPS
∆ Ch. 12
OO
BBC
∆
Ch. 12oo
KBR
,,
∆:
88
GBRll
,,
∆_
JJ
SBR
Ch. 11
ll oo // EPS

Rn+1 oo
Ch. 10
// fPn
∆_
TT
Figure 9.1: Summary of definability results
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CHAPTER
TEN
Finite Bar Recursion and the Primitive Recursive Functionals
In [66] Oliva demonstrated that an elegant description of the primitive recursive realizer for
the functional interpretation of the infinite pigeonhole principle IPHP is given by a finite
form of Spector’s bar recursion. The reason for this is that the infinite pigeonhole principle
is a direct consequence of the axiom of bounded collection, whose negative translation
follows from the finite double negation shift - a principle naturally interpreted by finite
bar recursion.
In this chapter we study finite bar recursion and its relationship to Go¨del’s primitive
recursion. It is clear that unlike the usual bar recursion, finite bar recursion is primitive
recursively definable. We prove the converse: that finite bar recursion defines, essentially
over the λ-calculus, all primitive recursive functionals. More specifically we define a hi-
erarchy Pn of fragments of system T based on finite bar recursors of restricted type, and
show that these fragments are in one-to-one correspondence with the usual fragments Tn+1
based on primitive recursion.
We then clarify how finite bar recursion can be used to interpret fragments of arithmetic
based on bounded collection or finite choice principles. Parsons demonstrated that the
induction based fragment of arithmetic IΣn has a functional interpretation in the fragment
Tn−1 of system T [73]. We provide an analogous result for choice-based fragments of
arithmetic and bar recursive fragments of T.
We believe that our alternative construction of system T has several key benefits.
1. Finite bar recursion is equivalent to a finite product of selection functions which
can be viewed as a functional that computes optimal strategies in finite sequential
games. This correspondence gives us an illuminating characterisation of the primitive
recursive functionals. In particular the fragment Pn, equivalent to Tn+1, is built from
functionals that compute optimal strategies in sequential games whose moves have
type level n.
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2. Finite bar recursion can be used as an alternative to (or in conjunction with) prim-
itive recursion in order to extract readable and intuitive programs from proofs in
arithmetic that involve bounded collection or finite choice principles.
3. The equivalence of the finite product with the recursor allows for a smooth transi-
tion from the functional interpretation of arithmetic (product with a fixed number
of iterations) to that of analysis (product with a finite but unbounded number of
iterations). Therefore, we obtain the correspondence
Finite product of selection functions
Arithmetic
=
Unbounded product of selection functions
Analysis
10.1 Finite bar recursion and its fragments
We begin by constructing a new hierarchy of fragments of T based on finite bar recursion.
First, let’s recall the standard hierarchy based on primitive recursion.
Definition 10.1. System T consists of the terms of E-HAω. The fragment Tn consists the
subclass of T with recursion Rρ restricted to types with deg(ρ) ≤ n.
Definability results between primitive recursive functionals will be officially carried out
in the lowest fragment T0 of T as we require basic recursive operations on sequences and
definition by cases, although it is clear that a weak fragment of T0 suffices for all the
constructions that follow. Similarly, we allow ourselves the whole of E-HAω to verify our
results and make no effort to establish the weakest fragment of Heyting arithmetic over
which they can be proved.
The finite bar recursor fBρ has defining equation
fBφ,nρ (s
ρ∗)
ρ∗
:= s @
〈〉 if |s| > nfBφ,n(s ∗ as) if |s| ≤ n
for as := φs(λx . fB
φ,n(s ∗ x)), where φ : ρ∗ → Jρ∗ρ.
Definition 10.2. The fragment Pn of T consists of T0 extended with the finite bar recursor
fBρ restricted to types with deg(ρ) ≤ n.
Similarly to fBρ, the finite product of selection functions fPρ,τ has defining equation
fPε,q,nρ,τ (s)
ρ∗
:= s @
〈〉 if |s| > nfPε,q,n(s ∗ as) if |s| ≤ n
for as := εs(λx . q(fP(s ∗ x))), where ε : ρ∗ → Jτρ and q : ρ∗ → τ .
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Proposition 10.3. The finite bar recursor fBρ defines fPρ,τ for arbitrary τ , and conse-
quently the fragment Pn contains fPρ,τ for τ arbitrary and deg(ρ) ≤ n. Conversely the
finite product fPρ,ρ∗ defines fBρ, therefore one can alternatively define Pn as T0 plus fPρ,τ
for deg(ρ) ≤ n.
Proof. This follows entirely analogously from the equivalence of the corresponding un-
bounded bar recursors (see Example 9.5).
By Proposition 10.3 we will use fBρ and fPρ,τ interchangeably in the remainder of this
Chapter. From a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 5.7 one easily derives a finitary
analogue for the main theorem on EPS for fP and fB.
Proposition 10.4. If s = fPε,q,n(〈〉) and pt = λx . q(fPε,q,n(t ∗ x)) then for all i ≤ n we
have
si = ε[s](i)(p[s](i))
p[s](i)(si) = q(s).
Because fBφ,nρ is just fP
φ,id,n
ρ,ρ∗ , note that if s = fB
φ,n(〈〉) and pt = λx . fBφ,n(t ∗ x) then
similarly
si = φ[s](i)(p[s](i))
p[s](i)(si) = s.
for i ≤ n.
Finite bar recursion was originally defined slightly differently in [66], as a functional
sfB with defining equation
sfBε,∆,nρ,τ (s)
ρ∗
:=
〈〉 if |s| > nXs ∗ sfB(s ∗Xs) if |s| ≤ n
for Xs := ε|s|(λx . ∆|s|(s∗x∗ sfB(s∗x))), where ε : N→ Jτρ and ∆: N→ (ρ∗ → τ). While
quite similar to fPρ,τ , it differs in the (obviously inessential) fact that it only returns the
tail of the recursion, and more significantly in that the selection functions are not allowed
access to previously computed values s. Since finite bar recursion has often been given in
this form in the literature, we include the following result.
Proposition 10.5. fBρ defines sfBρ,τ for arbitrary τ , and conversely sfBρ,ρ∗ defines fBρ.
Proof. Firstly, define Φε,∆,n(s) := tail|s|(fBφ
ε,∆,n
ρ (s)) where tailn(t) denotes the finite se-
quence t without its first n elements (or just 〈〉 whenever |t| ≤ n) and
φε,∆s (p
ρ→ρ∗) := ε|s|(λx . ∆|s|(Px)).
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Then we have sfBρ,τ [Φ]. If |s| > n then Φε,∆,n(s) = tail|s|(s) = 〈〉, and otherwise (sup-
pressing parameters)
Φ(s) = tail|s|(s @ fB(s ∗ as))
= as ∗ tail|s|+1(fB(s ∗ as))
(∗)
= Xs ∗ tail|s|+1(fB(s ∗Xs))
= Xs ∗ Φ(s ∗Xs)
where for (∗) we have
as = φ
ε,∆
s (λx . fB(s ∗ x))
= ε|s|(λx . ∆|s|(fB(s ∗ x)))
= ε|s|(λx . ∆|s|(s ∗ x ∗ tail|s|+1(fB(s ∗ x))))
= ε|s|(λx . ∆|s|(s ∗ x ∗ Φ(s ∗ x)))
= Xs.
For the converse, define Φφ,n(s) := s ∗ sfBεφ,∆ρ,ρ∗ (s) where ∆n
ρ∗→ρ∗
:= id and
εn(p
ρ→ρ∗) := φ[p(0)](n)(p).
Then we have fBρ[Φ]. If |s| > n then Φ(s) = s ∗ 〈〉, and otherwise
Φ(s) = s ∗Xs ∗ sfB(s ∗Xs)
(∗)
= s ∗ as ∗ sfB(s ∗ as)
= s @ Φ(s ∗ as)
where for (∗) we have
Xs = ε|s|(λx . s ∗ x ∗ sfB(s ∗ x))
= φ[s∗x∗sfB(s∗0)](|s|)(λx . s ∗ x ∗ sfB(s ∗ x))
= φs(λx . Φ(s ∗ x))
Characterising the terms of Pn
The recursor Rρ can be viewed as an object that implements computations on a infinite
array of type ρN. It assigns a value Rρ(0) := y to position 0, and proceeds to write values
sequentially along the whole array, where Rρ(n) := zn(Rρ(0), . . . ,Rρ(n− 1)) is determined
by the function zn which can make its decision based on the values of (potentially all)
previous positions on the array.
The finite bar recursor fBρ carries out computations along the same array ρ
N. However,
having already assigned values 〈s0, . . . , sn−1〉 to the first n positions, the value at n is given
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by fBρ(s) := φs(λx . fB(s∗x)). Not only does fB have access to previously computed values,
but it can test the outcome of playing potential values x at |s| courtesy of the function
λx . fB(s ∗ x).
This suggests that fBρ is a stronger form of recursion than Rρ. In the next section we
make this precise by demonstrating that fBρ is capable of not only defining the primitive
recursive functionals of level deg(ρ), but all primitive recursive functionals of level deg(ρ)+
1.
10.2 The equivalence of the fragments Pn and Tn+1.
Notation. Given two fragments X and Y of system T, we write X ⇒ Y if all terms in Y
can be defined in X.
It is clear that finite bar recursion is primitive recursively definable. More specifically:
Theorem 10.6. The recursor Rρ∗→ρ∗ defines fBρ, and therefore Tn+1 ⇒ Pn.
Proof. It is apparent from its defining equations that fBφ,nρ is just a standard recursion of
type ρ∗ → ρ∗ in which the quantity1 n+ 1− |s| decreases until it reaches 0. Define
y := λs . s
zφ,ni (F
ρ∗→ρ∗) := λs . s @ F (s ∗ as)
where as := φ[F (s)](n−i)(λx . F (s ∗ x)). Define Φφ,n(s) := Ry,z
φ,n
ρ∗→ρ∗(n + 1 − |s|)(s). Then
fBρ[Φ] holds. For |s| > n we have
Φ(s) = R(0)(s) = y(s) = s,
and for |s| ≤ n:
Φ(s) = R(n+ 1− |s|)(s)
= zn−|s|(R(n− |s|))(s)
= s @ R(n− |s|)(s ∗ as)
= s @ Φ(s ∗ as)
where
as = φ[R(n−|s|)(s)](n−n+|s|)(λx . R(n− |s|)(s ∗ x))
= φs(λx . Φ(s ∗ x)).
Before we prove the converse to Theorem 10.6, let us first show how fBρ easily defines
Rρ without any kind of backtracking.
1By ‘−’ we always mean truncated subtraction, with n− i = 0 for i ≥ n.
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Proposition 10.7. The finite bar recursor fBρ defines Rρ, and therefore Pn ⇒ Tn.
Proof. Define φy,zs as the constant function
φy,zs (p
ρ→ρ∗)
ρ
:=
y if |s| = 0z|s|−1(s|s|−1) if |s| > 0
and let Φy,z(n):=fBφ
y,z ,n
ρ (〈〉)n. We have Rρ[Φ] because
Φ(0) = fBφ,0(〈〉)0 = φ〈〉(λx . fBφ,0(〈x〉)) = y
and for n > 0
Φ(n+ 1) = fBφ,n(〈〉)n
P.10.4
= φ[fBφ,n(〈〉)](n)(λx . [fB
φ,n(〈〉)](n) ∗ x)
= zn−1(fBφ,n(〈〉)n−1)
(∗)
= zn−1(fBφ,n−1(〈〉)n−1)
= zn−1(Φ(n− 1)).
For (φ) we need to verify that fBφ,n(〈〉)n−1 = fBφ,n−1(〈〉)n−1, which is easily done by
induction on fBφ,n(〈〉)i = fBφ,n−1(〈〉)i.
Already we get the following key result.
Corollary 10.8. Go¨del’s system T can be equivalently defined by using the finite bar
recursors fB instead of the primitive recursors R.
However, if we appeal to the full power of fB and allow backtracking, we strengthen
Proposition 10.7.
Theorem 10.9. The finite bar recursor fBρ defines Rρ→ρ.
Proof. Given y : ρ→ ρ, z : N→ (ρ→ ρ) and an argument a : ρ, define φn,a,y,zs by
φn,a,y,zs (p
ρ→ρ∗)
ρ
:=

zn−1(λx . p(x)1)(a) if |s| = 0
zn−|s|−1(λx . p(x)|s|+1)(|s||s|−1) if 0 < |s| < n
y(s|s|−1) if |s| = n
0ρ otherwise
for n > 0, and
φ0,a,y,zs (p
ρ→ρ∗)
ρ
:=
y(p(a)0) if |s| = 00ρ otherwise.
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Note that technically for the ε to be well defined we should add
p(x)i := p(x) if i < |p(x)|, else 0ρ.
Now, define Φy,z(n)
ρ→ρ
:= λa . fBφ
n,a,y,z ,n(〈〉)0. Then we have Rρ→ρ[Φ]. For n = 0
Φ(0)(a) = fBφ
0,a,0(〈〉) P.10.4= φ0,a〈〉 (λx . fBφ
0,a,0(〈x〉)) = y(fBφ0,a,0(〈a〉)0) = y(a)
and therefore Φ(0) = y. For n > 0 we have
Φ(n)(a) = fBφ
n,a,n(〈〉)0
= φn,a〈〉 (λx . fB
φn,a,n(〈x〉))
= zn−1(λx . fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉)1)(a)
(∗)
= zn−1(λx . fBφ
n−1,x,n−1(〈〉)0)(a)
= zn−1(Φ(n− 1))(a)
and therefore Φ(n) = zn−1(Φ(n− 1)). The main content of the proof is the verification of
(∗), in which we carry out finite bar induction on the formula
P (s) :≡ fBφn,a,n(〈x〉 ∗ s)|s|+1 = fBφ
n−1,x,n−1(s)|s|.
Then λ-abstracting from P (〈〉) we obtain
(∗) λx . fBφn,a,n(〈x〉)1 = λx . fBφn−1,x,n−1(〈〉)0.
First note that by Proposition 10.4, for |s| ≤ n− 1 the formula P (s) is equivalent to
φn,a〈x〉∗s(λx
′ . fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉 ∗ s ∗ x′)) = φn−1,as (λx′ . fBφ
n−1,x,n−1(s ∗ x′))
Now, inspecting the definition of φs we see P (s) clearly holds for |s| = n− 1 by
y((〈x〉 ∗ s)n−1) = y(sn−2).
To establish the bar induction step there are two cases to deal with. For 0 < |s| < n− 1
P (s) follows by
zn−|〈x〉∗s|−1(λx′ . fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉 ∗ s ∗ x′)|〈x〉∗s|+1)((〈x〉 ∗ s)|〈x〉∗s|−1)
B.I.H.
= zn−|s|−2(λx′ . fBφ
n−1,x,n−1(s ∗ x′)|s|+1)(s|s|−1)
and finally for |s| = 0 by
zn−2(λx′ . fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉 ∗ x′)2)(〈x〉0) B.I.H.= zn−2(λx′ . fBφn−1,x,n−1(x′)1)(x)
which completes the proof.
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Corollary 10.10. Pn ⇔ Tn+1
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorems 10.6 and 10.9. For the direction Pn ⇒
Tn+1 note that using the product type any type σ of degree n + 1 is equivalent to one
of the form ρ → N where deg(ρ) = n, which can clearly be encoded in the type ρ → ρ.
Therefore Rσ can be defined from Rρ→ρ and hence from fBρ.
A consequence of Theorem 10.9 is that the Ackermann function can be defined from
finite bar recursion of lowest type, and moreover by inspection we can construct it explicitly
in terms of fBN.
Example 10.11 (Ackermann function in P0). Given natural numbers a and n, define φ
n,a
s
by
φn,as (p
N→N∗) N:=

(λx . p(x)1)
(a+1)(1) if |s| = 0
(λx . p(x)|s|+1)(s|s|−1+1)(1) if 0 < |s| < n
s|s|−1 + 1 if |s| = n
0 otherwise
for n > 0, and
φ0,as (p)
N
:=
a+ 1 if |s| = 00 otherwise,
where f (i) is defined in T0 as usual by f
(0)(x) = x and f (i+1)(x) = f(f (i)(x)). Then by
Theorem 10.9,
A(n, a)
N
:= fBφ
n,a,n
N (〈〉)0
satisfies the defining equations of the Ackermann function (cf. Example 2.7). To see this,
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note that (using (∗) from the proof of Theorem 10.9)
A(0, a) = ϕ0,a〈〉 (λx . fB
φ0,a,0(〈x〉))
= a+ 1;
A(n, 0) = φn,0〈〉 (λx . fB
φn,0,n(〈x〉))
= (λx . fBφ
n,0,n(〈x〉)1)(1)
= fBφ
n,0,n(〈1〉)1
(∗)
= fBφ
n−1,1,n−1(〈〉)0
= A(n− 1, 1)
A(n, a) = φn,a〈〉 (λx . fB
φn,a,n(〈x〉))
= (λx . fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉)1)(a+1)(1)
= fBφ
n,a,n(〈(λx . fBφn,a,n(〈x〉)1)(a)(1)〉)1
(∗)
= fBφ
n−1,b,n−1(〈〉)0
= A(n− 1, b)
where b = (λx . fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉)1)(a)(1). But by (∗) we have
fBφ
n,a,n(〈x〉)1 = fBφn−1,x,n−1(〈〉)0 = fBφn,a−1,n(〈x〉)1
and therefore
b = (λx . fBφ
n,a−1,n(〈x〉)1)(a)(1)
= φn,a−1〈〉 (λx . fB
φn,a−1,n(〈x〉))
= fBφ
n,a−1,n(〈〉)0
= A(n, a− 1)
This construction of the Ackermann function using fBN gives us an intuitive way of visu-
alising the function as a backtracking procedure over sequences of natural numbers. For
example, we sketch the computation of A(3, a) using fBφ
3,a,3 below:
fB(〈x0, x1, x2〉)3 = φ〈x0,x1,x2〉(λx . 〈x0, x1, x2, x〉3) = x2 + 1;
fB(〈x0, x1〉)2 = φ〈x0,x1〉(λx . fB(〈x0, x1, x〉)2) = (λx . x+ 1)(x1+1)(1) = x1 + 2;
fB(〈x0〉)1 = φ〈x0〉(λx . fB(〈x0, x〉)2) = (λx . x+ 2)x0+1(1) = 2x0 + 3
fB(〈〉)0 = φ〈〉(λx . fB(〈x〉)1) = (λx . 2x+ 3)(a+1)(1) = 2(a+3) − 3.
10.3 Interpreting fragments of arithmetic.
We conclude by calibrating which fragments of finite bar recursion are necessary for inter-
preting fragments of arithmetic based on bounded collection, or equivalently finite choice.
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In fact the latter is most naturally interpreted using finite bar recursion, so we focus
purely on this principle (the functional interpretation of bounded collection using finite
bar recursion is discussed in e.g. [31]). We begin with a standard result.
Lemma 10.12. A formula A in the language of Peano arithmetic PA has ND interpreta-
tion |AN|xy where x and y are (tuples of) variables in the language of all finite types. For
n > 1:
(a) If A is a Π0n formula then the tuple x contains variables of type degree at most n− 1
and the tuple y contains variables of type degree at most n− 2;
(b) If A is a Σ0n formula then the tuple x contains variables of type degree at most n and
the tuple y contains variables of degree at most n− 1.
Proof. Straightforward induction on n, although we always eliminate unnecessary nega-
tions. In the case that A is Π0n it is clear that A
N ↔ A∗ using the intuitionistic law
¬¬∀x¬¬A(x)↔ ∀x¬¬A(x).
C. Parsons uses this lemma to extend Go¨del’s functional interpretation to the induction
based fragments of arithmetic.
Theorem 10.13 (Parsons [73]). The functional interpretation of Πn-IND requires only
the recursor Rρ of type level deg(ρ) = n − 1. Therefore IΠn (or equivalently IΣn) has a
functional interpretation is Tn−1.
We now provide an analogue of Parsons’ result for the principle of finite choice.
Definition 10.14. Let P˜n be the subset of Pn containing the finite product fPρ,τ restricted
to simple selection functions (i.e. those with εs = ε|s| only dependent on the length of s)
and with deg(ρ) ≤ n and deg(τ) ≤ n− 1.
Remark 10.15. Note that it is not clear whether fBρ for deg(ρ) = n lies in P˜n as its
construction in Proposition 10.3 depends on fPρ,ρ∗ .
Theorem 10.16. (a) The functional interpretation of Π1-FAC requires only the finite
product of selection functions fPN,N of lowest type. Therefore FΠ1 (or equivalently
FΣ2, BΠ1 etc.) has a functional interpretation in P0.
(b) The functional interpretation of Πn-FAC for n > 1 requires only the finite product
of simple selection functions fPρ,τ of type level deg(ρ) = n − 1 and deg(τ) = n − 2.
Therefore FΠn (or equivalently FΣn+1, BΠn etc.) has a functional interpretation in
P˜n−1 ⊆ Pn−1.
Proof. The negative translation of finite choice
∀i ≤ m∃xNAi(x)→ ∃sN∗∀i ≤ mAi(si)
134
10.3. Interpreting fragments of arithmetic.
for a Π0n formula Ai(x) is equivalent to the formula
∀i ≤ m¬¬∃xAi(x)N → ¬¬∃s∀i ≤ mAi(si)N,
which is partially interpreted as
∀i ≤ m¬¬∃xN, x˜ρ∀y˜τ |Ai(x)N|x˜y˜ → ¬¬∃sN
∗
, s˜ρ˜
∗∀i ≤ m, y˜|Ai(si)N|s˜iy˜
Relabelling variables and setting Bi(x, y) := |Ai(x0)N|x1y this is equivalent to
∀i ≤ m¬¬∃xρ∀yτBi(x, y)→ ¬¬∃sρ∗∀i ≤ m, yBi(si, y)
where (assuming n > 1) by Lemma 10.12, deg(ρ) = n − 1 and deg(τ) = n − 2. But this
has functional interpretation equivalent to
∀ε, q, ϕ∃s, p, i((i ≤ m→ Bi(εip, p(εip)))→ (ϕ(s) ≤ m→ Bϕ(s)(sϕ(s), q(s)))).
which can be solved by s := fPε,q,mρ,τ (〈〉), i := ϕ(s) and p := λx . q(fPε,qρ,τ,m([s](i) ∗ x)), since
by Proposition 10.4 for ϕ(s) ≤ m we have sϕ(s) = εi(p) and p(εip) = q(s).
For the case n = 1 we have ∃xNAi(x)N ≡ ∃xN∀yNAi(x, y), and therefore by an analo-
gous argument the functional interpretation of Π1-FAC can be solved by the finite product
fPN,N of lowest type.
We sketch the results of this Chapter (in conjunction with those in [71, 72, 73]) in
Figure 10.1.
IΣ1

FΠ1oo

IΣnoo

FΠnoo
Th.10.16

IΣn+1oo

PAoo

P˜n−1

T0 P0ks Tn−1oo Pn−1Prop. 10.7
ks Tn+3Th. 10.6, 10.9
ks Too
Figure 10.1: Fragments of Peano arithmetic and corresponding fragments of system T.
Remark 10.17. Our work in this section is nowhere near as extensive as Parsons’ work on
the induction fragments [72, 73]. Here, among other things, a more refined result is given
for the functional interpretation of fragments based on the induction rule, and also a proof
that the interpretation of IΣn in Tn−1 is faithful, from which we can calibrate precisely
the provably recursive functions of IΣn as those of Tn−1.
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Remark 10.18. We leave open the question of whether P˜n−1 is weaker than Pn−1 (and
hence Tn). If not, then it is still possible that FΠn could be interpreted in a weaker
fragment of T. For the case of FΠ1 it is completely open whether or not Π1-FAC can be
interpreted in some system F strictly between T0 and T1.
Remark 10.19. Finally, we observe that Theorem 10.16 can be easily adapted to show that
the full, dependent product of selection functions interprets the following finite analogue
of dependent choice:
FDC : ∀i ≤ m,x∃yAi(x, y)→ ∃s∀i ≤ mAi(si, si+1).
Kreuzer [55, Chapter 4.2] points out that FDC for Π01 formulas is, unlike Π1-FAC, equivalent
to Σ2-IND, which implies that fPN,N (or equivalently fBN,N) defines all provably recursive
functions of IΣ2. In particular this yields an alternative proof that fBN,N defines the
Ackermann function, although of course we are able to give an explicit construction here.
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ELEVEN
On Spector’s ‘Special’ and ‘General’ Forms of Bar Recursion
In his original paper on the computational interpretation of analysis [86], Spector intro-
duces a general scheme of bar recursion GBR but draws attention to the fact that only a
‘special’ form of bar recursion SBR is required to interpret countable choice (cf. Chapter
4).
It is clear that SBR is definable from GBR. In this short chapter we prove the converse,
namely that SBR is actually strong enough to primitive recursively define GBR over system
T. This result follows firstly from the fact that the Kreisel/Howard trick for defining
Spector’s search functional µSp using GBR (Proposition 4.1) can in fact be carried out using
SBR, and secondly from the result that a bound for the search functional when it exists
can be defined in system T (Proposition 4.2). This allows us to define an intermediate
form of ‘finite but unbounded’ bar recursion FBR, which is capable of defining full bar
recursion GBR.
11.1 The Kreisel/Howard trick via SBR
The first part of the proof involves adapting the Kreisel/Howard construction of Spector’s
search functional µSp using SBR. This uses ideas from the previous chapter, in which
bar recursion was viewed as a device that carries out backtracking computations along an
array of type ρN (see Section 10.1).
Proposition 11.1. For any type ρ there exists a term t of E-HAω + SBR such that
∃n ≤ tϕ,α(ϕ(α, n) < n) (11.1)
for any ϕ : ρN → N, α : ρN. Therefore Spector’s search term µSp(ϕ, α) that finds the least
n satisfying Spector’s condition can be defined in E-HAω + SBR.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that ρ = σ → N and let nρ denote the constant
functional λxσ . n of type ρ (and just the natural number n if ρ = N). Furthermore,
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given f : ρ let nρ + f denote the functional λx
σ . n+ fx. Define the sequence of selection
functions φϕ,α : N→ JρNρ by
φϕ,αi (p
ρ→ρN)
ρ
:=
0ρ if ∃n ≤ i(ϕ(α, n) < n)1ρ + p(αi)i+1 otherwise
and let β(i)
N
:= SBRφ
ϕ,α,id,ϕ
ρ ([α](i))i(0σ) where ρ = σ → N (or just β(i)
N
:= SBRφ
ϕ,α,id,ϕ
ρ ([α](i))i
if ρ = N). We claim that β satisfies
βi =
0 if ∃n ≤ i(ϕ(α, n) < n)1 + β(i+ 1) otherwise,
then from this we are able to show that ∃n ≤ β(0)(ϕ(α, n) < n) as in the proof of
Proposition 4.1, and so t := β(0) satisfies (11.1). It remains to prove the claim.
If ∃n ≤ i(ϕ(α, n) < n) then either ϕ(α, i) < i, in which case
βi = EPS([α](i))i(0σ) = 0ρ(0σ) = 0
or ϕ(α, i) ≥ i and ∃n < i(ϕ(α, n) < n), in which case
βi = SBR([α](i))i(0σ) = φi(λx . SBR([α](i) ∗ x))(0σ) = 0ρ(0σ) = 0.
On the other hand, if ∀n ≤ i(ϕ(α, n) ≥ n) we must have
βi = SBR([α](i))i(0)σ)
= φi(λx . SBR([α](i) ∗ x))(0σ)
= (1ρ + SBR([α](i+ 1))i+1)(0σ)
= 1 + SBR([α](i+ 1))i+1(0σ)
= 1 + β(i+ 1).
Corollary 11.2. For each k there is a term µ˜kSp of E-HA
ω such that, provably in E-HAω +
SBR, µ˜kSp(ϕ, α) is the least integer N > k satisfying Spector’s condition ϕ(α,N) < N .
Proof. Define µ˜0Sp := µ˜Sp as in Proposition 4.2. Then analogous to the proof of Proposition
4.2, but this time using Proposition 11.1, we can show that
E-HAω + SBR ` ϕ(α, µ˜0Sp(ϕ, α)) < µ˜0Sp(ϕ, α) ∧ (n < µ˜0Sp(ϕ, α)→ ϕ(α, n) ≥ n).
It is easy to see that µ˜kSp is definable from µ˜
0
Sp for any k > 0. Simply set
µ˜kSp(ϕ, α) := µ˜
0
Sp(λβ . ϕ([α](k) ∗ β)− k︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ˜
, tailk(α))
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where we recall that tailk removes the first k entries of α. Then noting that
ϕ˜(tailk(α), N) = ϕ([α](k) ∗ tailk(α), N)− k = ϕ(α, k +N)− k
we see that the leastN satisfying ϕ˜(tailk(α), N) < N is also the least satisfying ϕ(α, k +N) <
k +N .
11.2 Defining GBR from SBR
The primitive recursive definability of µSp allows us to devise a variant of Spector’s special
bar recursion which embodies the stopping condition: returning a finite instead of infinite
sequence. The constant FBRρ has defining equation
FBRφ,ϕρ (s)
ρ∗
:= s @
〈〉 if ϕ(sˆ) < |s|FBRφ,ϕ(s ∗ as) otherwise
for as := φs(λx . FBR(s ∗ x)), where φ : ρ∗ → Jρ∗ρ and ϕ : ρN → N.
Lemma 11.3. SBR primitive recursively defines FBR.
Proof. Given parameters φ, ϕ for FBR, define φ˜ : ρ∗ → JρNρ by
φ˜s(p
ρ→ρN)
ρ
:= φs(λx . [p(x)](Np(x),|s|))
where Nα,k := µ˜
k−1
Sp (ϕ, α) i.e. Nα,k ≥ k is the least satisfying ϕ(α,Nα,k) < Nα,k (provably
in E-HAω + SBR). Then the term Φφ,ϕ(s)
ρ∗
:= [SBRφ˜,ϕ(s)](N
SBRφ˜,ϕ(s),|s|) satisfies FBRρ[Φ].
For ϕ(sˆ) < |s| we have NSBR(s),|s| = |s| and therefore
Φ(s) = [SBR(s)](|s|) = s.
On the other hand, if ϕ(sˆ) > |s| then NSBR(s),|s| = NSBR(s),|s|+1 and
Φ(s) = [SBR(s)](NSBR(s),|s|+1)
= [SBR(s ∗ a˜s)](NSBR(s∗a˜s),|s|+1)
(∗)
= [SBR(s ∗ as)](NSBR(s∗as),|s|+1)
= Φ(s ∗ as)
where for (∗) we have
a˜s = φ˜s(λx . SBR(s ∗ x))
= φs(λx . [SBR(s ∗ x)](NSBR(s∗x),|s|)
= φs(λx . [SBR(s ∗ x)](NSBR(s∗x),|s|+1)
= φs(λx . Φ(s ∗ x))
= as.
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We now have everything we need to prove our main theorem. The intuition behind
the proof is as follows. Spector’s general bar recursion assigns a value Vs := Y (s) to the
nodes of the tree defined by Spector’s condition, and computes the value Zs(λx . Vs∗x) at
intermediate nodes by querying the value of its children nodes. The special form of bar
recursion involves the particular case where the value Vs is an infinite path extending s.
We simulate GBR using FBR by encoding the value Vs as the first element in the path
extending s. While this tactic would have been impossible using SBR, we can search for
this value using FBR because here path extensions are always finite.
Theorem 11.4. A single instance of FBR primitive recursively defines GBR.
Notation. We need to extend E-HAω to contain sum types ρ+τ (which are easily definable
from the usual types). Given a : ρ and b : τ define [a]ρ : ρ+τ , [b]τ : ρ+τ to be the standard
injections into ρ + τ , and assume we have predicates x ∈ ρ and x ∈ τ that allow us to
decide which type x : ρ+ τ belongs to. Finally:
• Let sˇ : (ρ+ τ)∗ denote the embedding of s : ρ∗ in ρ+ τ ;
• Given α : (ρ+ τ)N, define α˜ : ρN as
α˜(i)
ρ
:=
0ρ if α(i) ∈ τα(i) if α(i) ∈ ρ.
Define s˜ : ρ∗ for s : (ρ+ τ)∗ similarly
Proof of Theorem 11.4. Given parameters Z : ρ∗ → ((ρ → τ) → τ), Y : ρ∗ → τ and
ϕ : ρN → N, primitive recursively define φ : (ρ+ τ)∗ → J(ρ+τ)∗(ρ+ τ), q : (ρ+ τ)∗ → τ and
ϕ˜ : (ρ+ τ)N → N by
φs(p
(ρ+τ)→(ρ+τ)∗)
ρ+τ
:= [Zs˜(λx
ρ . q(p([x]ρ)))]τ
q(s)
τ
:=
Y (s˜) if ∀i < |s|(si ∈ ρ)si for least i < |s| such that si ∈ τ .
ϕ˜(α)
τ
:= ϕ(α˜)
We claim that Φ(s)
τ
:= q(FBRφ,qρ+τ (sˇ)) satisfies GBR
Z,Y,ϕ
ρ,τ [Φ]. Noting that
(†) ϕ(sˆ) < |s| ↔ ϕ˜(ˆˇs) < |sˇ|,
for ϕ(sˆ) < |s| we have
Φ(s) = q(sˇ) = Y (s),
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and for ϕ(sˆ) ≥ |s|
Φ(s) = q(sˇ ∗ [asˇ]τ @ FBR(sˇ ∗ asˇ))
= asˇ
= φsˇ(λx
ρ+τ . FBR(s ∗ x))
= Zs(λx
ρ . q(FBR(sˇ ∗ [x]ρ)))
= Zs(λx
ρ . q(FBR( ˇs ∗ x)))
= Zs(λx
ρ . Φ(s ∗ x)).
Corollary 11.5. GBR, FBR and SBR are all primitive recursively equivalent.
Remark 11.6. The functional FBR is of interest in its own right as it forms a powerful
equivalent formulation of the usual SBR in that it embodies Spector’s search functional
µSp, which can be defined as
µSp(ϕ, α) := |FBRεα,ϕρ (〈〉)|
for εs(p) := p(α(|s|)).
Remark 11.7. While we have shown that Spector’s ‘special’ bar recursion is in fact as
general as his ‘general’ bar recursion in terms of T-definability, Spector was nevertheless
correct to single out the fact that his solution to the functional interpretation of the
double negation shift only makes use of SBR. In particular we know that SBRN (which
is definable from GBRN,NN) suffices to solve the functional interpretation of arithmetical
comprehension, and despite our equivalence result this still does not follow from the fact
that GBRN,NN also suffices to interpret arithmetic comprehension. This is because to define
GBRN,NN we need SBRNN , which is stronger than SBRN and in fact also capable of defining
GBRNN,NN (see [70, Remark 5.4]). This point demonstrates quite nicely that while primitive
recursive definability is a non-trivial relation between modes of recursion in all finite types,
it leaves completely open the relative strength of equivalent modes of recursion at the level
of types.
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CHAPTER
TWELVE
Implicitly Controlled Bar Recursion and Open Recursion
The final chapter of this dissertation contains the main results of Part III, where we prove
that modified bar recursion, the implicitly controlled product of selection functions, update
recursion, open recursion and the BBC functional are all primitive recursively equivalent.
The equivalence of IPS and MBR (along with several other definability results) is
established in [28], where it is also shown that IPS is equivalent to the so-called simple
product ips in which selection functions εs = ε|s| can only depend on the length of s.
Moreover (as we recalled in Chapter 9) Berger [10] shows that BBC is definable from UR,
which is in turn an instance of OR. The difficulty that lies ahead is in relating these
two groups of functionals, namely those based on bar recursion proper (IPS, MBR) with
those based on open recursion (BBC, UR, OR). We manage to do this in both directions,
proving that OR< is definable from IPS (whenever the transfinite recursor R< can be
defined in system T), and conversely that the ‘weakest’ variant of open recursion, the BBC
functional, defines ips. Combined with the results just stated, these complete the chain of
equivalences.
Unlike previous chapters, we seem to require ∆ :≡ Cont + QF-BI in order to verify our
constructions (this has also been the case for previous results involving the equivalence of
implicit forms of bar recursion [12, 28]), so our equivalence results only holds in models
that validate ∆. Of course ∆ is admitted in the standard type structure C ω of total
continuous functionals, so we believe that our dependence on ∆ is reasonable. We leave
open whether it is indeed possible to modify our definability results so that they are valid
in type structures that do not satisfy Cont such as the strongly majorizable functionals.
We make no claims that our constructions are optimal at the level of types. For
instance, it may well be that either in special cases, or even in general, our definition
of OR from IPS can be done using a weaker instance of IPS than the one we have used.
Optimality in this sense is a secondary concern here, and is of course not necessary at all
to establish primitive recursive definability. However we believe that beneath the abstruse
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syntax that is inevitable for these kinds of result, our constructions are based on intuitive
ideas. We define OR from IPS using a minimal bad sequence style algorithm (similar to,
but simpler than the instance of EPS given in Chapter 8), and in turn ips is defined from
BBC using a natural diagonal computation over infinite arrays of partial functions.
There are several factors that have motivated the research presented in this chapter.
Each of the forms of recursion considered below have been used to give computational
interpretations to variants of the axiom of choice, and so by comparing these forms of
recursion we are able to give some insight into the differences between programs extracted
using these forms of recursion. However, our main goal has been to continue the work
carried out by various authors in the last few years ([11, 12, 30]) on establishing and classi-
fying the known variants of recursion according to whether or not they are interdefinable.
Our results are the first to relate bar recursive functionals with open recursive functionals
in this sense.
The organisation of this chapter is rather straightforward. We begin in Section 12.1 by
proving that IPS defines open recursion, and then outline the special case that IPS defines
BBC in Section 12.2. Finally, we prove that BBC defines ips in Section 12.3.
12.1 Defining open recursion from IPS
We show that we can primitive recursively construct the open recursor ORρ,τ,< from IPS
for any decidable, well-founded relation on arbitrary type ρ, provided that we have access
to the transfinite recursor R(ρ,<),σ over < of arbitrary type σ, which we recall is defined as
Rg(ρ,<),σ(x)
σ
:= gx(λy . R
g
<(y) if y < x)
(note that here, as always, ‘ if y < x’ is shorthand for if y < x, else 0σ). Whenever R<
is definable in T, it follows that ORρ,τ,< is primitive recursively definable from IPS. We
motivate our construction by sketching it in the simple case of open recursion on the
Cantor space.
Illustration: Open recursion on the Cantor space BN
The following discussion will be deliberately informal. In order to define open recursion
ORB,N,< on the Cantor space (that is sequences of booleans, lexicographically ordered on
the relation 0 < 1), we want to construct a term Φ := t(IPS) of type (BN × (N × BN →
N)→ N)→ (BN → N) which satisfies the following equation:
ΦF (u)
N
:= Fu(λn,w . Φ
F ([u](n) ∗ 0 @ w) if u(n) = 1).
Our basic idea is to use an instance of IPSu of type σ := BN × (BN → N) (for some ε, q
parametrised by u, F ) to construct a sequence IPSu(〈〉) = 〈vsu0 , fsu0〉, 〈vsu1 , fsu1〉, . . . where
〈vsun, fsun〉 : σ.
144
12.1. Defining open recursion from IPS
(a) Each vsun will represent a copy of u,
(b) Whenever u(n) = 1 the function fsun will represent the function λw . Φ
F ([u](n)∗0 @ w)
(and will just be the zero functional otherwise).
We construct parameters for IPSu so that vsu and fsu satisfy (a) and (b). First, define
qF : σN → N by
qF (vs(B
N)N , fs(B
N→N)N) := Fv˜s(λn,w . fsnw).
where v˜s is the diagonal sequence λn . vsun(n). Secondly, given s : B∗ and v : BN, define
the selection function εs,v : (σ → N)→ σ by
εs,v(p
σ→N)
BN×(BN→N)
:=
〈v, λw . p(s ∗ 0 @ w, 0BN→N)〉 if v(|s|) = 1〈v, 0〉 otherwise,
and from this define the dependent selection function ε˜u : σ∗ → JNσ by
ε˜u〈〉(p) := ε〈〉,u(p)
ε˜u〈v0,f0〉,...,〈vn−1,fn−1〉(p) := ε〈v0(0),...,vn−1(n−1)〉,vn−1(p).
Then we claim that we can define Φ(u) := qF (IPSε˜
u,qF (〈〉)). Let 〈vsu, fsu〉 = IPSε˜u,qF (〈〉).
By the characterising equations for IPS (9.3) vsu0 = u and vs
u
n = vs
u
n−1 for all n > 0,
therefore by induction we must have vsun = u for all n and in particular v˜s
u = u, which
means that
Φ(u) = qF (vsu, fsu) = Fu(λn,w . fsnw)
Now we want to show that whenever u(n) = 1, we have fsnw = Φ([u](n) ∗ 0 @ w). By
the second characterising equation (9.3), and the fact that u(n) = 1→ vsn−1(n) = 1 and
〈vs0(0), . . . , vsn−1(n− 1)〉 = [u](n) we have
fsnw = q
F (IPSε˜
u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈[u](n) ∗ 0 @ w, 0〉)).
Our main claim is that (using the abbreviation t = [u](n) ∗ 0 @ w)
(†) qF (IPSε˜u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈t, 0〉)) = qF (IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈t, 0〉))
where 〈vst, fst〉 σ
N
:= IPSε˜
t,qF (〈〉). If we can prove (†), then the result follows, since by
the first characteristic equation and the fact that vstn−1(n) = t(n) = 0 we clearly have
〈vstn, fstn〉 = 〈t, 0〉, so that (by Lemma 9.8)
qF (IPSε˜
t,qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈t, 0〉)) = qF (IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fst](n+ 1))) = qF (IPSε˜t,qF (〈〉))
and therefore fsnw = Φ(t) = Φ([u](n) ∗ 0 @ w). The claim (†) is by no means obvious, but
it is intuitively true for the following reasons. Firstly, if we assume inductively that
fsumw
′ = Φ([u](m) ∗ 0 @ w′) if u(m) = 1 fstmw′ = Φ([t](m) ∗ 0 @ w′) if t(m) = 1
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for m < n and arbitrary w′ then we can equate fsum and fs
t
m since [u](m+ 1) = [t](m+ 1),
and thereby reduce (†) to
(††) qF (IPSε˜u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈t, 0〉)) = qF (IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fsu](n) ∗ 〈t, 0〉))
Now the two sides of the (††) are evaluated by computing optimal extensions to the
sequences [vsu, fsu](n)∗〈t, 0〉 and [vst, fsu](n)∗〈t, 0〉 respectively. The crucial point is that
to do this qF , ε˜t and ε˜u only ever look at the first m values of vsum and vs
t
m respectively,
and [vsum](m) = [vs
t
m](m) for all m < n. Therefore the two sides must be equal.
We note that this reasoning only works in the continuous type-structures. In non-
continuous structures the two sides of (††) could well be interpreted as different elements,
despite that fact that they satisfy the same recursive equations. We require Cont to ensure
that they evaluate to the same thing.
Now we give the full definability result. We generalise our construction so that it works
for arbitrary types and well-founded relations, and give a detailed proof of the correctness
of our term (unlike the rather sketchy illustration above). Unsurprisingly, the proof of our
claim (†) involves a fairly lengthy induction argument, which we separate from the main
proof as Lemma 12.2.
The general construction
We define the type σρ,τ := ρ
N × (ρ× ρN → τ).
Theorem 12.1. Let ρ be an arbitrary type, and τ a discrete type. Then OR(ρ,<),τ is
T + R< definable from IPSσρ,τ ,τ , provably in Cont + QF-BI.
Proof. Suppose that F : ρN × (N × ρ × ρN → τ) → τ is a parameter for open recursion.
We define qF : σN → τ by
qF (vs, fs)
τ
:= Fv˜s(λn, y, v . fsnyv).
for vs : (ρN)N and fs : (ρ× ρN → τ)N, where v˜s ρ
N
:= λn . vsn(n). For the selection functions,
first define εs,v : Jτσ for s : ρ
∗, v : ρN by
εs,v(p
σ→τ ) σ:= 〈v, fp,sv(|s|)〉
where fp,s is defined as in Chapter 8 using R(ρ,<),ρ×ρN→τ as
fp,sx
ρ×ρN→τ
:= λy, v . p(s ∗ y @ v, fp,sy ) if y < x.
Note that if x is minimal with respect to < then fp,sx = 0. Then we can define, for u : ρN,
ε˜u : σ∗ → Jτσ by
ε˜u〈〉(p) := ε〈〉,u(p)
ε˜u〈〈v0,f0〉...,〈fn−1,vn−1〉〉(p) := ε〈v0(0),...,vn−1(n−1)〉,vn−1(p).
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Finally, let us define
ΦF (u) := qF (IPSε˜
u,qF
σ,τ (〈〉)).
We claim that OR(ρ,<),τ [Φ]. Let us use the abbreviation 〈vsu, fsu〉 σ
N
= IPSε˜
u,qF (〈〉) where
vsu : (ρN)N and fsu : (ρ× ρN → τ)N. First we prove that
(a) for arbitrary u, we have vsun = u and so in particular v˜s
u = u.
This is easily verified by induction and the characterising equations (9.3). First, let us use
the notation
pn,u = p[vsu,fsu](n) := λ〈w, g〉σ . qF (IPSε˜
u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉)).
Then by (9.3) vsu0 = ε˜
u
〈〉(p0,u)0 = u, and vs
u
n = ε˜
u
[vsu,fsu](n)(pn,u)0 = vs
u
n−1 for n > 0, so we
have vsun = u for all n. Secondly, we wish to prove
(b) fsunyv = q
F (IPSε˜
[u](n)∗y @ v ,qF (〈〉)) if y < u(n).
The result then follows, because
ΦF (u) = qF (vsu, fsu)
= Fv˜su(λn, y, v . fs
u
nyv)
(a),(b)
= Fu(λn, y, v . q
F (IPSε˜
[u](n)∗y @ v ,qF (〈〉)) if y < u(n))
= Fu(λn, y, v . Φ([u](n) ∗ y @ v) if y < u(n)).
The main difficulty of the proof lies in establishing (b), for which we need the following
additional claim:
(c) whenever [u](n) = [t](n) for arbitrary u, t we have pn,u = pn,t.
This is proved as Lemma 12.2 below. Continuing for now, by (9.3) and (a) again we have
fsu0 = ε˜
u
〈〉(p0,u)1 = f
p0,u,〈〉
u(0) fs
u
n = ε˜
u
[vsu,fsu](n)(pn,u)1 = ε˜
u
[u](n),u(pn,u) = f
pn,u,[u](n)
u(n)
therefore for arbitrary arguments y, v we have
fsunyv = f
pn,u,[u](n)
u(n) yv
= pn,u([u](n) ∗ y @ v, fpn,u,[u](n)y ) if y < u(n)
Lem.12.2
= pn,[u](n)∗y @ v([u](n) ∗ y @ v, fpn,[u](n)∗y @ v ,[u](n)y ) if y < u(n)
= pn,t(t, f
pn,t,[t](n)
t(n) ) if t(n) < u(n)
where for the last equation we substitute the abbreviation t := [u](n) ∗ y @ v. If we had
n = 0, then
p0,t(t, f
p0,t,[t](0)
t(0) ) = p0,t(ε˜
t
〈〉(p0,t))
(9.3)
= qF (vst, fst)
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and otherwise
pn,t(t, f
pn,t,[t](n)
t(n) ) = pn,t(ε[t](n),t(pn,t))
(a)
= pn,t(ε˜
t
[vst,fst](n)
(pn,t))
(9.3)
= qF (vst, fst).
Therefore we have established pn,t(t, f
pn,t,[t](n)
t(n) ) = q
F (vst, fst) = qF (vs [u](n)∗y @ v, fs [u](n)∗y @ v)
for all n, y and v, and therefore
fsunyv = q
F (IPSε˜
[u](n)∗y @ v ,qF (〈〉)) if y < u(n).
It remains to prove (c), and then we’re done. This involves a lengthy, but fairly
routine proof by combined induction and bar induction. It is here that we seem to require
continuity.
Lemma 12.2. For arbitrary sequences u, t of type ρN, whenever [u](n) = [t](n) we have
pn,u = pn,t, provably in Cont + QF-BI.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the formula
A(n) :≡ ∀u, t([u](n) = [t](n)→ pn,u = pn,t).
To establish A(0) we must show that p0,u = p0,t for arbitrary u, t. Given arguments g, w,
we run bar induction of type σ on the quantifier-free formula
P 0(〈ws, gs〉σ∗) :≡ (qF (IPSε˜u,qF (〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉) τ= qF (IPSε˜t,qF (〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉)),
then P (〈〉) yields p0,uwg = p0,twg. Given 〈vs, fs〉 : σN, by Cont applied to q〈w,g〉 :=
λ〈vs, fs〉 . q(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈vs, fs〉) there exists N such that
q(IPSε
u
(〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N))) = q(〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N) @ IPSε˜u(〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
Cont
= q(〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N) @ IPSε˜t(〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
= q(IPSε
t
(〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
and for the bar induction step we have
qF (IPSε
u
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉)) = qF (IPSε˜u(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ au))
(∗)
= qF (IPSε˜
u
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ at))
B.I.H.
= qF (IPSε˜
t
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ at))
L.9.8
= qF (IPSε˜
t
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉))
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where for (∗) we have
au = ε˜
u
〈w,g〉∗〈ws,gs〉(λb
σ . q(IPSε˜
u
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b)))
B.I.H.
= ε〈w(0),ws0(1),...,wsm−1(m)〉,wsm−1(λb
σ . q(IPSε˜
t
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b)))
= ε˜t〈w,g〉∗〈ws,gs〉(λb
σ . q(IPSε˜
t
(〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b)))
= at,
where m = |ws| and for m = 0 we replace wsm−1 by w. Therefore, by bar induction we
have A(0). The main induction step follows a similar pattern. For n > 0 we derive A(n),
assuming that A(m) holds for all m < n.
Suppose that [u](n) = [t](n). For arbitrary w, g we run bar induction on the formulaPn(〈ws, gs〉) :≡(qF (IPSε˜u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉) τ= qF (IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉)),
then Pn(〈〉) yields pn,uwg = pn,twg. The main induction hypothesis is used to verify that
fsum = fs
t
m for all m < n. To see this, note that for 0 < m < n
fsum = ε˜
u
[vsu,fsu](m)(pm,u)1
= ε〈vsu0 (0),...,vsum−1(m−1)〉,vsum−1(pm,u)1
(a)
= f
pm,u,[u](m)
u(m)
I.H.
= f
pm,t,[t](m)
t(m)
(a)
= ε〈vst0(0),...,vstm−1(m−1)〉,vstm−1(pm,t)1
= ε˜t
[vst,fst](m)
(pm,t)1
= fstm.
Similarly for m = 0 we get fsu0 = ε〈〉,u(p0,u)1 = f
p0,u,〈〉
u(0)
I.H.
= f
p0,t,〈〉
t(0) = fs
t
0. Now we continue
as before. Given 〈vs, fs〉 : σ, by Cont applied to q[vsu,fsu](n)∗〈w,g〉 there exists N such that
qF (IPSε˜
u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
= qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N) @ IPSε˜u,qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
Cont
= qF ([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N) @ IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
= F ˜[vsu](n)∗w∗[vs](N) @ vs′([fs
u](n) ∗ g ∗ [fs](N) @ fs ′)
(†)
= F ˜[vst](n)∗w∗[vs](N) @ vs′([fs
t](n) ∗ g ∗ [fs](N) @ fs ′)
= qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N) @ IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N)))
= qF (IPSε˜
t,qF ([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ [vs, fs](N))),
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where we abbreviate 〈vs ′, fs ′〉 = IPSε˜t,qF ([vst, fst](n)∗〈w, g〉∗ [vs, fs](N)), and (†) holds be-
cause [fsu](n) = [fst](n) and because for m < n we have vsum(m) = u(m) = t(m) = vs
t
m(m)
(by (a) as in Theorem 12.1) and therefore ˜[vsu](n) = ˜[vst](n). So we have established that
for all 〈vs, fs〉 there exists N such that Pn([vs, fs](N)) holds.
The bar induction step is routine:
qF (IPSε˜
u
([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉))
= qF (IPSε˜
u
([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ au))
(∗)
= qF (IPSε˜
u
([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ at))
B.I.H.
= qF (IPSε˜
t
([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ at))
= qF (IPSε˜
t
([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉))
where for (∗) we have
au = ε˜
u
[vsu,fsu](n)∗〈w,g〉∗〈ws,gs〉(λb . q
F (IPSε˜
u
([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b))
= ε ˜[vsu](n)∗w∗ws,wsm−1(λb . q
F (IPSε˜
u
([vsu, fsu](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b))
B.I.H.
= ε ˜[vsu](n)∗w∗ws,wsm−1(λb . q
F (IPSε˜
t
([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b))
(∗∗)
= ε ˜[vst](n)∗w∗ws,wsm−1(λb . q
F (IPSε˜
t
([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b))
= ε˜t
[vst,fst](n)∗〈w,g〉∗〈ws,gs〉(λb . q
F (IPSε˜
t
([vst, fst](n) ∗ 〈w, g〉 ∗ 〈ws, gs〉 ∗ b))
= at
where of course (∗∗) follows because ˜[vsu](n) = ˜[vst](n), and as before m = |ws|, with
wsm−1 replaced by w for m = 0. This completes the bar induction, and therefore we
obtain ∀m < nA(m) → A(n), and so by induction we have ∀nA(n), which completes the
proof.
12.2 Defining UI and BBC from IPS
An immediate consequence of the previous section is the following.
Theorem 12.3. Both update recursion and the BBC functional are primitive recursively
definable from IPS, over Cont + QF-BI.
Proof. By Proposition 9.20, URρ,τ is definable from an instance of OR(ρ¯,<),τ on the relation
(a, xρ) < (b, y) :≡ (a = 1 ∧ b = 0). Clearly in this case R< is trivially definable in T,
therefore by Theorem 12.1 URρ,τ is primitive recursively definable from an instance of
IPSσρ¯,τ ,τ . By Proposition 9.16, an instance of IPS of the same type defines BBCρ,τ .
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Moreover by combining the proofs of these definability results we obtain an explicit
construction of UR and BBC from IPS. We state the construction of the latter below.
Given parameters q : ρN → τ and ε : N→ Jτρ for BBC, for σ := ρ¯N × (ρ¯× ρ¯N → τ), define
q : σN → τ and ε˜ : ρ¯N → (σ∗ → Jτσ) by
q˜(vs, fs)
τ
:= q(v˜s @ λn . εn(λx . fsn(1, x)v˜s))
ε˜u〈〉(p)
σ
:=
〈u, fp,〈〉〉 if 0 /∈ dom(u)〈u, 0〉 otherwise.
ε˜u〈v0,f0〉,...,〈vn−1,fn−1〉(p)
σ
:=
〈vn−1, fp,〈v0(0),...,vn−1(n−1)〉〉 if n /∈ dom(vn−1)〈vn−1, 0〉 otherwise.
where fp,s := λy, v . p(s∗(1, y) @ v, 0). Then Φε,q(u) := q˜(IPSε˜u,q˜(〈〉)) satisfies sBBCρ,τ [Φ].
Following the proof of Theorem 12.1 we see that
Φε,q(u) = q˜(vsu, fsu)
= q(v˜su @ λn . εn(λx . fs
u
n(1, x)v˜s
u))
(a)
= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . fs
u
n(1, x)u))
(b)
= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . Φ([u](n) ∗ (1, x) @ u)))
= q(u @ λn . εn(λx . Φ(u
x
n)))
and (b) follows because whenever n /∈ dom(u)
fsun(1, x)u = f
pn,u,[u](n)(1, x)u
= pn,u([u](n) ∗ (1, x) @ u, 0)
L.12.2
= pn,uxn(u
x
n, 0)
= pn,uxn(ε˜
uxn
[vsu
x
n ,fsu
x
n ](n)
(pn,uxn))
= q(vsu
x
n , fsu
x
n)
= Φ(uxn).
12.3 Defining IPS from BBC
Having proved that IPS defines BBC, we now establish the converse. The problem we
face is to capture the dependency implicit in IPS with BBC, which constructs a sequence
symmetrically, each element computed independently of the others. Due to a result of
Escardo´ and Oliva we can at least eliminate the dependency in the selection functions of
IPS, by reducing IPS to the simple product of selection functions ips. Given a family of
simple selection functions ε : N→ Jτρ, define the functional ipsρ,τ by
ipsε,q(s) := s @ ipsε,q(s ∗ as)
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where as := ε|s|(λx . q(ipsε,q(s∗x))). Note that as with IPS, ips can be equivalently defined
as
ipsε,q(s) := s @ λn . εn(λx . q(ips
ε,q(tn ∗ x)))
where tn := [ips(s)](n). It turns out that the simple product of selection functions ips
actually defines the general product IPS.
Proposition 12.4 ([28]). IPS and ips are primitive recursively equivalent over Cont +
QF-BI.
Note that technically this result is proved for variants sIPS, sips of IPS and ips. We
confirm that our variants are equivalent to these in Appendix A.
Illustration: finite bar recursion
We now give a short and very informal illustration in the finite case, and show how we
can simulate the finite product fPε,q,3N,N of length three with a finite variant of BBC. We ab-
breviate elements of N¯ as (0, x) = ⊥ and (1, x) = x. Note that fPε,q = 〈X,Y [X], Z[X,Y ]〉
where
X = ε0(λx . q(x, Y [x], Z[x, Y [x]])
Y [x] = ε1(λy . q(x, y, Z[x, y])
Z[x, y] = ε2(λz . q(x, y, z)
We can similarly define a finite variant fBBC3 of the BBC functional as
fBBCε,q,3ρ,N (u
ρ¯(3))
ρ(3)
:= u @ (ε0(p0), ε1(p1), ε2(p2))
where pi = λx
ρ.q(fBBC(uxi )). We define fP
ε,q
N,N with an instance fBBC
ε˜,q˜
ρ,N of fBBC type
ρ = N¯(3), which outputs a 3×3 matrix (c0, c1, c2) (where ci denotes the ith column) whose
entries lie in N¯, and takes as input a partial (and potentially empty) list of columns of this
matrix. Note that in this instance of fBBC, there are two kinds of ‘undefined’: individual
entries in a column can be undefined (and we write ⊥), and also columns themselves can
be undefined (which we write as ⊥c). We define parameters for fBBC as
ε˜i(p)
N(3)
= λn < 3 . εn(λx . p(〈[ε˜i(p)](n) ∗ x〉))
q˜(c0, c1, c2)
N
:= q(d(c0, c1, c2))
d(c0, c1, c2)
N(3)
:= λn < 3 .
cn,m for least m ≤ n with n 6= ⊥0 if no such m exists.
Note that for the first equation to type-check, technically ε˜i(p) should be viewed as a total
element of N¯(3), and also the finite sequence [ε˜i(p)](n) ∗x is extended using ⊥ to a column
N¯(3) if necessary.
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We claim that fPε,q(〈〉) = d(fBBCε˜,q˜(⊥c,⊥c,⊥c)). Writing fBBC(⊥c,⊥c,⊥c) = (c0, c1, c2)
we get d(c0, c1, c2) = c0 (since c0 = ε˜0(p0) is total) where
c0,0 = ε0(λx . q(d(fBBC(〈x,⊥,⊥〉,⊥c,⊥c)))
c1,0 = ε1(λy . q(d(fBBC(〈c0,0, y,⊥〉,⊥c,⊥c)))
c2.0 = ε2(λz . q(d(fBBC(〈c0,0, c1,0, z〉,⊥c,⊥c))).
Now, c2,0 = ε2(λz . q(c0,0, c1,0, z)) = Z[c0,0, c1,0]. To evaluate c1,0 must evaluate
d(fBBC(〈c0,0, y,⊥〉,⊥c,⊥c)) = d(〈c0,0, y,⊥〉 @ (c′0, c′1, c′2)) = 〈c0,0, y, c′2,1〉
where
c′2,1 = ε2(λz . q(d(fBBC(〈c0,0, y,⊥〉, 〈c′0,1, c′1,1, z〉,⊥c)))))
= ε2(λz . q(〈c0,0, y, z〉))
= Z[c0,0, y].
Therefore we have c1,0 = ε1(λy . q(〈c0,0, y, Z[c0,0, y]〉)) = Y [c0,0]. Finally, we must evaluate
d(fBBC(〈x,⊥,⊥〉,⊥c,⊥c)) = d(〈x,⊥,⊥〉 @ (c′′0, c′′1, c′′2)) = 〈x, c′′1,1, c′′2,1〉.
Similar calculations give us
c′′2,1 = ε2(λz . q(d(fBBC(〈x,⊥,⊥〉, 〈c′′0,1, c′′1,1, z〉,⊥c)))
= ε2(λz . q(〈x, c′′1,1, z〉)))
= Z[x, c′′1,1]
c′′1,1 = ε1(λy . q(d(fBBC(〈x,⊥,⊥〉, 〈c′′0,1, y,⊥〉,⊥c))))
(∗)
= ε1(λy . q(〈x, y, d2,2〉))
= ε1(λy . q(〈x, y, Z[x, y]〉)
= Y [x]
where for (∗) we have fBBC(〈x,⊥,⊥〉, 〈c′′0,1, y,⊥〉,⊥c) = 〈x,⊥,⊥〉, 〈c′′0,1, y,⊥〉 @ 〈d0, d1, d2〉.
Backtracking, we obtain c0,0 = ε0(λx . q(〈x, Y [x], Z[x, y]〉)) = X, and therefore c1,0 =
Y [X] and c2,0 = Z[X,Y [X]]. We illustrate the whole computation below.
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x⊥
⊥
 7→
x c
′′
0,1
⊥ y
⊥ ⊥
 7→
x c
′′
0,1 d0,2
⊥ y d1,2
⊥ ⊥ z
 ε27→
x c
′′
0,1 d0,2
⊥ y d2,1
⊥ ⊥ Z[x, y]

ε17→
x c
′′
0,1
⊥ Y [x]
⊥

7→
x c
′′
0,1
⊥ Y [x]
⊥ z
 ε27→
x c
′′
0,1
⊥ Y [x]
⊥ Z[x, Y [x]]

ε07→
X

7→
Xy
⊥
 7→
X c
′
0,1
y c′1,1
⊥ z
 ε27→
X c
′
0,1
y c′1,1
⊥ Z[X, y]

ε17→
 XY [X]

7→
 XY [X]
z
 ε27→
 XY [X]
Z[X,Y [X]]

The idea behind the construction is that fBBC computes fP using a matrix. Whenever
fP is ‘testing’ a variable in a column via a selection function, it carries the computation over
to the column on the right. Once it has decided on this value, it continues the computation
in the original column. In this sense it simulates a variant of fP30 which comes equipped
with markers indicating whether or not a variable is being checked, and the functional d
can be viewed as an operation which removes those markers.
We can clearly extend our idea to a matrix of arbitrary size and type, and therefore
simulate the general finite product fPnρ using a finite form of BBC over an n × n matrix.
The main result that follows is that our construction works just as well in an unbounded
matrix, and that the unbounded product ips can be defined from an instance of BBC that
computes an infinite array of partial functions.
The general construction
First we need some notation. Given a finite sequence s : ρ∗ let {s} : ρ¯N its standard em-
bedding into the partial sequences i.e.
{s}(n) :=
(1, sn) if n < |s|(0, 0ρ) otherwise.
154
12.3. Defining IPS from BBC
In the following we will often use a slight abuse of notation and just write s when it is
obvious that we’re treating it as an element of ρ¯N.
Theorem 12.5. Let ρ be an arbitrary type and τ a discrete type. Then ipsρ,τ is primitive
recursively definable from BBCρ¯N,τ , provably in Cont + QF-BI.
Proof. Suppose we are given ε : N→ Jτρ and q : ρN → τ . First, define q˜ : (ρ¯N)N → τ by
q˜(γ) := q(d(γ))
where the map d : (ρ¯N)N → ρN is defined by
d(γ)(n)
ρ
:=
γm[n] for least m ≤ n with n ∈ dom(γm)0ρ if no such m exists.
Second, using the primitive recursor Rρ define the selection function ε˜ : Jτ ρ¯
N as
ε˜(pρ¯
N→τ )
ρ¯N
:= λk . (1, εk(λx
ρ . p({t˜k ∗ x})))
where t˜0 = 〈〉 and t˜k ρ
∗
:= 〈ε˜(p)[0], . . . , ε˜(p)[k − 1]〉. We extend this to a family of identical
selection functions ε˜n := ε˜. Now define
Φε,q(sρ
∗
)
ρN
:=
d(BBCε˜,q˜(〈〉)) if s = 〈〉d(BBCε˜,q˜({〈{s}〉})) otherwise
We claim that ipsρ,τ [Φ]. Note that to cut down on excessive syntax, given a sequence
〈sρ∗0 , . . . , sk−1〉 of finite sequences we write BBC(〈s0, . . . , sk−1〉) when we implicitly mean
BBC applied to the partial array Γ := {〈{s0}, . . . , {sk−1}〉} : (ρ¯N)N defined by
Γm
B×ρ¯N
=
(1, {sm}) if m < k(0, 0ρ¯N) otherwise.
Now we prove the claim. For s = 〈〉 we have (suppressing parameters on Φ and BBC)
Φ(〈〉) (∗)= λn . ε˜0(λv . q˜(BBC(〈〉v0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
)[n]
= λn . εn(λx . q˜(BBC(〈〉{t˜n∗x}0 )))
= λn . εn(λx . q(d(BBC(〈t˜n ∗ x〉))))
(∗∗)
= λn . εn(λx . q(Φ(tn ∗ x)))
where (∗∗) we have t˜n = 〈ε˜0(p)[0], . . . , ε˜0(p)[n − 1]〉 = [Φ(〈〉)](n) = tn. Note that (∗)
follows because n ∈ dom(BBC(〈〉)0) for all n and therefore d(BBC(〈〉))(n) = BBC(〈〉)0[n].
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Now, for |s| > 0 we have
Φ(s)
(∗)
= s @ λn . ε˜1(λv . q˜(BBC(〈s〉v1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
)[n]
= s @ λn . εn(λx . q˜(BBC(〈s〉{t˜n∗x}1 )))
= s @ λn . εn(λx . q(d(BBC(〈s, t˜n ∗ x〉)))
(†)
= s @ λn . εn(λx . q(d(BBC(〈s @ (t˜n ∗ x)〉)))
= s @ λn . εn(λx . q(Φ(s @ (t˜n ∗ x))))
(∗∗)
= s @ λn . εn(λx . q(Φ(tn ∗ x)))
where for (∗∗) we have (for n ≥ |s|)
s @ (t˜n ∗ x) = s @ (〈ε˜1(p)[0], . . . , ε˜1(p)[n− 1]〉 ∗ x)
= s ∗ 〈ε˜1(p)[|s|], . . . , ε˜1(p)[n− 1]〉 ∗ x
= [Φ(s)](n) ∗ x
= tn ∗ x.
Note that (∗) follows because n ∈ dom(BBC(〈s〉)0) iff n < |s|, but n ∈ dom(BBC(〈s〉)1) =
dom(ε˜1(. . .)) for all n. Therefore
d(BBC(〈s〉))(n) =
{s}[n] = sn if n < |s|ε˜1(p)[n] if n ≥ |s|.
Note that ε˜1(p)[n] is always included in the bounded search since n ≥ |s| implies n ≥ 1.
It remains to justify (†), which follows from the claim that whenever 0 < |s| < |t| we have
q˜(BBC(〈s, t〉)) = q˜(BBC(〈s @ t〉)).
Written informally, we’re asserting that
q˜(BBC

...
⊥
tj
...
...
⊥ ti+1
si ti
...
...
s0 t0 . . .

) = q˜(BBC

...
⊥
tj
...
ti+1
si
...
s0 . . .

)
This intuitively follows because q˜ never looks at the elements below the cut-off diagonal
d, so in particular ignores 〈t0, . . . , ti〉. We now prove the claim, using bar induction on
sequences u : (ρ∗)∗ relativised to those consisting only of non-empty sequences i.e. S(u) :≡
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∀i < |u|(|ui| > 0). Given such a sequence, define u•, u◦ : (ρ∗)∗ with |u•| = |u◦| = |u|
primitive recursively in BBC as
u•i
ρ∗
:= [pi1ε˜(λv . q˜(BBC(〈s, t, u•0, . . . , u•i−1, v〉))](ki) ∗ ui
u◦i
ρ∗
:= [pi1ε˜(λv . q˜(BBC(〈s @ t, u◦0, . . . , u◦i−1, v〉))](ki) ∗ ui
where as before we implicitly mean embeddings in ρ¯N of s, t, u•i , u
◦
i (and in turn 〈s, t, u•0, . . . , u•i−1, v〉
is embedded as a partial sequence over ρ¯N) in the arguments of BBC, and ki := |t| +∑i−1
j=0 |uj | for i < |u|. The purpose of these constructions is actually to simplify the bar
induction: The first ki entries of u
•
i (similarly u
◦
i ) represent ‘dummy’ values that would be
computed by BBC(〈s, t, u•0, . . . , u•i−1, v〉) but never seen by the outcome functional q˜, and
so should not affect the value of q˜(BBC(〈s, t〉 ∗ u•)). We carry out bar induction on the
quantifier-free predicate
P (u) :≡ q˜(BBC(〈s, t〉 ∗ u•)) = q˜(BBC(〈s @ t〉 ∗ u◦)).
which we can informally visualise as
q˜(BBC

...
un−1,ln−1
...
un−1,0
•
...
...
u1,l1−1
...
u1,0
u0,l0−1 •
...
...
...
⊥ u0,0
tj •
...
...
...
⊥ ti+1
si ti
...
...
...
...
...
...
s0 t0 •︸︷︷︸
u•0
•︸︷︷︸
u•1
. . . •︸︷︷︸
u•n−1

) = q˜(BBC

...
un−1,ln−1
...
un−1,0
◦
...
...
u1,l1−1
...
u1,0
u0,l0−1 ◦
...
...
...
⊥ u0,0
tj ◦
...
...
ti+1
si
...
...
...
...
...
s0 ◦︸︷︷︸
u◦0
◦︸︷︷︸
u◦1
. . . ◦︸︷︷︸
u◦n−1

)
The claim then follows from P (〈〉) since 〈〉• = 〈〉◦ = 〈〉. First, to establish the bar, suppose
that α : (ρ∗)N is an infinite sequence of non-empty sequences, and let N be the point of
continuity of qs @ t on α˜ : ρ
N defined by
α˜(n)=αi(n− li) for least i ≤ n(li ≤ n < li+1) (12.1)
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for l0 = 0 and li :=
∑i−1
j=0 |αj |. Note that α˜ is just α0 ∗α1 ∗α2 . . ., and because|αi| > 0 for
all i we must have [α˜](N) ≺ α0 ∗ α1 ∗ . . . ∗ αN−1. Now,
d(BBC(〈s, t〉 ∗ [α](N)•)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
)
ρN
= (s @ t) ∗ α0 ∗ . . . ∗ αN−1 @ . . . .
This follows because n ∈ dom(γ0) ↔ n < |s|, n ∈ dom(γ1) ↔ n < |t| and for i < N ,
n ∈ dom(γi+2) ↔ n ∈ dom({[α](N)•i }) ↔ n < ki + |αi| = |t| + li+1, and therefore (for
ki = |t|+ li)
d(γ)(n) =

γ0[n] = sn if n < |s|
γ1[n] = tn if |s| ≤ n < |t|
γi+2[n] = αi(n− li − |t|) if i < N ∧ ki ≤ n < ki+1
. . . otherwise
(note that we always have i + 2 ≤ |t| + li < n so γi+2 is included in the bounded search
performed by d). By an analogous argument we see that
d(BBC(〈s @ t〉 ∗ [α](N)◦)) = (s @ t) ∗ α0 ∗ . . . ∗ αN−1 @ . . .
and therefore by continuity
q˜(BBC(〈s, t〉 ∗ [α](N)•)) = qs @ t([α˜](N) @ . . .) = q˜(BBC(〈s @ t〉 ∗ [α](N)◦)),
which establishes P ([α](N)), and therefore we have ∀α ∈ S∃nP ([α](n)).
For the induction step we prove P (u) assuming that each ui is non-empty. Setting
ki = |t|+ li = |t|+
∑i−1
j=0 |uj | and m = |u|, as before we have
d(BBC(〈s, t〉 ∗ u•)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
) = (s @ t) ∗ u0 ∗ . . . ∗ um−1 ∗ β
where β(n) = γm+2(km + n). This follows as before because n ∈ dom(γ0)↔ n < |s|, n ∈
dom(γ1)↔ n < |t|, and for i < m, n ∈ dom(γi+2)↔ n ∈ dom(u•i )↔ n < ki + |ui| = ki+1.
Finally, we have n ∈ dom(γm+2) = dom(ε˜m+2(. . .)) for all n, therefore
d(γ)(n) =

γ0[n] = sn if n < |s|
γ1[n] = tn if |s| ≤ n < |t|
γi+2[n] = ui(n− ki) if i < m ∧ ki ≤ n < ki+1
γm+2[n] = β(n− km) if km ≤ n.
Now,
β(n) = ε˜m+2(λv . q˜(BBC((〈s, t〉 ∗ u•)vm+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
)[km + n]
= εkm+n(λx . q˜(BBC((〈s, t〉 ∗ u• ∗ 〈t˜km+n ∗ρ x〉)))
(+)
= εkm+n(λx . q˜(BBC((〈s, t〉 ∗ (u ∗ 〈[β](n) ∗ρ x〉)•))).
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Note that in the latter two formulas concatenation of type ρ∗ is not to be confused with
concatenation of type ρ, which we carefully highlight. For (+) we clearly have u•i =
(u∗〈[β](n)∗ρx〉)•i for i < m since the operation (−)• is carried out recursively on sequences,
and
t˜km+n ∗ x = 〈ε˜(p)[0], . . . , ε˜(p)[km − 1]〉 ∗ 〈ε˜(p)[km], . . . , ε˜(p)[km + n− 1]〉 ∗ x
= [pi1ε˜(λv . q˜(BBC(〈s, t, u•0, . . . , u•m−1, v〉)))](km) ∗ [β](n) ∗ x
= (u ∗ 〈[β](n) ∗ρ x〉)•m
By an analogous argument we have
d(BBC(〈s @ t〉 ∗ u◦)) = (s @ t) ∗ u0 ∗ . . . ∗ um−1 ∗ β′
where β′(n) = εkm+n(λx . q˜(BBC(〈s @ t〉 ∗ (u ∗ 〈[β′](n) ∗ρ x〉)◦)). We can now use the bar
induction hypothesis to prove that β(n) = β′(n) for all n. Assume by normal induction
that β(m) = β′(m) for m < n. Then
β(n) = εkm+n(λx . q˜(BBC((〈s, t〉 ∗ (u ∗ 〈[β](n) ∗ρ x〉)•)))
B.I.H.
= εkm+n(λx . q˜(BBC((〈s @ t〉 ∗ (u ∗ 〈[β](n) ∗ρ x〉)◦)))
I.H.
= εkm+n(λx . q˜(BBC((〈s @ t〉 ∗ (u ∗ 〈[β′](n) ∗ρ x〉)◦)))
= β′(n).
Finally, then, we have
q˜(BBC(〈s, t〉 ∗ u•)) = q((s @ t) ∗ u0 ∗ . . . um−1 ∗ β)
β=β′
= q((s @ t) ∗ u0 ∗ . . . ∗ um−1 ∗ β′)
= q˜(BBC(〈s @ t〉 ∗ u◦))
and we complete the induction step, and hence the proof.
Remark 12.6. We conjecture that the above instance of BBC naturally defines a variant
of ips0 of ips which is augmented to include boolean markers which indicate whether or
not points are being ‘tested’ by selection functions, given by
ipsε,q0 (〈b, s〉(B×ρ)
∗
)
(B×ρ)N
:= 〈b, s〉 @ ips0(〈b, s〉 ∗ 〈1, as〉)
where as := ε|s|(λx . q¯(ips0(〈b, s〉 ∗ 〈0, x〉))), q¯(α) := q(pi1α) and the parameters have type
εn : Jτρ, q : ρ
N → τ . The idea is that the 0-marker would coincide with a ‘shift’ to the
column on the right. Given a sequence 〈b, s〉 with zeroes bn0 = . . . = bnm−1 = 0, and
assuming w.l.o.g. that the last element of 〈b, s〉 has marker 0, we claim the one could
define
ipsε,q0 (〈b, s〉) = BBCε˜,q˜(u•)
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where u0 := 〈s0, . . . , sn0〉, ui := 〈sni+1, . . . , sni+1〉 and u• is defined as in the preceding
proof (but without the initial entries s and t). Then, the bar induction (and reliance of
Cont) would simply be needed to show that the value of q¯(ips0(〈b, s〉)) is independent of
the markers b (and therefore ips0 defines ips), and thus one could adapt our proof to show
that BBC defines ips0 in E-HA
ω alone.
Theorem 12.7. IPS, OR, UR and BBC are all primitive recursively equivalent over Cont+
QF-BI.
Proof. We have the following chain of definability results:
IPS
Thm. 12.1≥ OR
Prop. 9.20
≥ UR
Prop. 9.16
≥ BBC Thm. 12.5≥ ips
Prop. 12.4
≥ IPS.
Remark 12.8. In fact, by inspection one will notice that each of these results is true
instance-wise, so IPS, OR, UR and BBC are also instance-wise equivalent.
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APPENDIX
A
Omitted Proofs
Proposition A.1. Let IPS be defined by
IPSε,qρ,τ (s
ρ∗)
ρN
:= s @ IPSε,qρ,τ (s ∗ as)
where as := εs(λx . q(IPS(s ∗ x))) and I˜PS be defined by
I˜PS
ε,q
(s) := s @ λn . εtn(λx . q(I˜PS
ε,q
(tn ∗ x)))
where tn := [I˜PS(s)](n). Then E-HA
ω + IPS[Φ] ` I˜PS[Φ] and E-HAω + I˜PS[Φ] ` IPS[Φ].
Proof. We first show that I˜PS[IPS]. By definition IPSε,q(s)(n) = sn for all n < |s|, and for
n ≥ |s| we have
IPS(s)(n)
L.9.8
= IPS(tn)(n)
= (tn @ IPS(tn ∗ atn))(n)
= atn
= εtn(λx . q(IPS(tn ∗ x))).
Conversely, to show that IPS[I˜PS], we use course of values induction on tn = t˜n where
tn = [I˜PS(s)](n) and t˜n = [I˜PS(s∗as)](n), and then the result immediately follows. Clearly
this is true for n = |s|. Now
I˜PS(s)(|s|) = εs(λx . q(I˜PS(s ∗ x))) = as = I˜PS(s ∗ as)(|s|)
and therefore t|s|+1 = t˜|s|+1. For the induction step, assume that tn = t˜n for n ≥ |s| + 1.
Then
I˜PS(s)(n) = εtn(λx . q(I˜PS(tn ∗ x))) I.H.= εt˜n(λx . q(I˜PS(t˜n ∗ x))) = I˜PS(s ∗ as)(n)
and therefore tn+1 = tn ∗ I˜PS(s)(n) I.H.= t˜n ∗ I˜PS(s ∗ as)(n) = t˜n+1, which completes the
induction, and the result follows.
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Equivalence of our products of selection functions and those of Escardo´ and
Oliva
In much of the existing literature [28, 29, 30] products of selection functions are constructed
slightly differently to ours. In particular, the implicit product of selection functions is
defined as
sIPSερ,τ (q)(s)
ρN
:= λn . εs∗tn(λx . qtn∗x(sIPS
ε(qtn∗x)(s ∗ tn ∗ x))),
where tn := [sIPS
ε(q)(s)](n) and qs(α) := q(s ∗ α), while the simple product is given by
sipsερ,τ (q)(m)
ρN
:= λn . εm+n(λx . qtn∗x(sips
ε(qtn∗x)(m+ n+ 1))).
where tn := [sips
ε(q)(m)](n). Here there are two essential differences, namely that the
function q updates with computes values, and only the tail end of the product is given
as output. However, these versions are easily (though rather tediously) shown to be
equivalent to our formulation in the continuous functionals.
Proposition A.2. IPS, sIPS, ips and sips are all primitive recursively equivalent over
Cont + QF-BI.
Proof. In [28, Theorem 4.5] it is proved that sIPS =T sips over E-HA
ω. To complete the
proof we show that IPS ≥T ips, sIPS ≥T IPS and ips ≥T sips. The first of these is trivial,
and the second is not much more difficult. Defining Φε,q(s) := s ∗ sIPSερ,τ (qs)(s) we see
that IPSρ,τ [Φ]: For n < |s| we have Φ(s)(k) = sk, and for n = |s|+ k we have
Φ(s)(n) = s ∗ sIPS(qs)(s)(|s|+ k)
= εs∗tk(λx . (qs)tn∗x(sIPS((qs)tk∗x)(s ∗ tk ∗ x)))
= εs∗tk(λx . q(s ∗ tn ∗ x ∗ sIPS(qs∗tk∗x)(s ∗ tk ∗ x)))
= εs∗tk(λx . q(Φ(s ∗ tk ∗ x)))
(∗)
= εt˜n(λx . q(Φ(t˜n ∗ x)))
where for (∗) we have
s ∗ tk = s ∗ [sIPS(qs)(s)](k) = [Φ(s)](|s|+ k) = t˜n.
To show ips ≥ sips requires a little more effort, as seems to always be the case going
between bar recursion where computed values remain as parameters (as in ips) and bar
recursion where computes values are encoded in the outcome function (as in sips). We
define Φε(q)(m) := tailm(ips
ε,qm
ρ,τ (0m)) where q
m(α) := q(tailm(α)) and 0m := [0ρN ](m).
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Then sipsρ,τ [Φ]:
Φ(q)(m)(n) = tailm(ips
qm(0m))(n)
= ipsq
m
(0m)(m+ n)
= εm+n(λx . q
m(ipsq
m
(tm+n ∗ x)))
= εm+n(λx . q
m(tm+n ∗ x ∗ tailm+n+1(ipsqm(tm+n ∗ x))))
(∗)
= εm+n(λx . q
m(0m ∗ t˜n ∗ x ∗ tailm+n+1(ipsqm(0m ∗ t˜n ∗ x))))
= εm+n(λx . qt˜n∗x(tailm+n+1(ips
qm(0m ∗ t˜n ∗ x))))
(+)
= εm+n(λx . qt˜n∗x(tailm+n+1(ips
(qt˜n∗x)
m+n+1
(0m+n+1))))
= εm+n(λx . qt˜n∗x(Φ(qt˜n∗x)(m+ n+ 1)))
where for (∗) we have
tm+n = [ips
qm(0m)](m+ n) = 0m ∗ [tailm(ipsqm(0m))](n) = 0m ∗ [Φ(q)(m)](n) = 0m ∗ t˜m
and (+) follows from P (〈〉) which is proved using Cont + QF-BI, where
P (r) :≡ qt(tailm+n+1(ipsqm(0m ∗ t ∗ r))) = qt(tailm+n+1(ips(qt)m+n+1(0m+n+1 ∗ r)))
for t := t˜n ∗ x. Let N be the point of continuity of qt on α. Then
qt(tailm+n+1(ips
qm(0m ∗ t ∗ [α](N)))) = qt([α](N) @ . . .)
= qt(tailm+n+1(ips
(qt)m+n+1(0m+n+1 ∗ [α](N))))
which establishes the bar, and assuming ∀yP (r ∗ y) we have (using the alternative formu-
lation of ips)
qt(tailm+n+1(ips
qm(0m ∗ t ∗ r))) = qt(tailm+n+1(ipsqm(0m ∗ t ∗ r ∗ a)))
B.I.H.
= qt(tailm+n+1(ips
(qt)m+n+1(0m+n+1 ∗ r ∗ a)))
(∗)
= qt(tailm+n+1(ips
(qt)m+n+1(0m+n+1 ∗ r ∗ a˜)))
= qt(tailm+n+1(ips
(qt)m+n+1(0m+n+1 ∗ r)))
where for (∗) we have
a = εm+n+1+|r|(λy . qm(ipsq
m
(0m ∗ t ∗ r ∗ y))
= εm+n+1+|r|(λy . qt(tailm+n+1(ipsq
m
(0m ∗ t ∗ r ∗ y)))
B.I.H.
= εm+n+1+|r|(λy . qt(tailm+n+1(ips(qt)
m+n+1
(0m+n+1 ∗ r ∗ y))))
= εm+n+1+|r|(λy . (qt)m+n+1(ips(qt)
m+n+1
(0m+n+1 ∗ r ∗ y)))
= a˜.
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